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Abstract 
 
This study is an in-depth analysis of the Galápagos Marine Reserve management system, and 
the socio-political relations between the stakeholders who shape it and determine the 
mechanisms of access and control over its resources. The management problem of the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve was manifested through the conservationist narrative of over-fishing 
and a social conflict over access to resources between users. Failure of the conventional eco-
centric approach to management, that did not consider human element, has produced the 
realization of the importance of linking ecological sustainability with social and economic 
sustainability. This realization has resulted in a participatory approach to the management of 
the Galápagos Marine Reserve and the policy of diversification of economic opportunities for 
fishers, which became a step towards sustainable resource management and social conflict 
resolution. This thesis focuses on this shift in management and gives two examples of economic 
alternatives for fishers. The theme was approached by means of an empirical study, based on a 
series of interviews with key personnel within the organizations involved in the management of 
the Galápagos Marine Reserve and the local artisanal fishermen. We challenged the narrative of 
over-fishing and sought to characterize conservation politics of the Galápagos by accounting 
the positions of all stakeholders. By applying the theoretical framework of New Institutional 
Economics, Actor Oriented Approach and Critical Discourse Analysis, we produced our 
scientific discourse of the management system, the mechanisms of resource distribution and 
their implications for sustainability of the GMR management. Despite the Participatory 
Management System being a good example of co-management practices for marine protected 
areas, it has failed to fulfil its main purpose: to decrease conflicts among the GMR users. 
Although based on the ideal of participation, it has excluded certain users, and re-produced 
asymmetric power relations and conflicts among the included ones. It has maintained the crisis 
of fisheries and with it, the threatened image of the Galápagos.  
 
According to our discourse of the conservation politics of the Galápagos, i) the purpose of the 
over-fishing narrative was to maintain the crisis of fisheries and to overshadow over-
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exploitation of GMR by the tourism sector; ii) the conflict was not about the fisheries, but about 
the added value of the Galápagos as a threatened protected area that translated into inflow of 
donations; iii) the conflict seemed to serve all conflicting parties, thus they did not have an 
incentive to resolve it and, iv) sustainable management of the Galápagos Marine Reserve 
required addressing power relations between the users, as well as issues of equity in 
participation and decision-making. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
****** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: the Galápagos, marine reserve, artisanal fishing, over-exploitation, economic 
alternatives, fisheries management, social conflict, conservation politics, development 
intervention. 
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Preface 
 
“… Several citizens ran into a hot argument about God and different religions, and each one could not agree to a common 
answer. So they came to Buddha to find out what exactly God looks like. The Buddha asked his disciples to get a large 
magnificent elephant and four blind men. He then brought the four blind to the elephant and told them to find out what the 
elephant would "look" like.  
The first blind men touched the elephant leg and reported that it "looked" like a pillar. The second blind man touched the 
elephant tummy and said that an elephant was a wall. The third blind man touched the elephant ear and said that it was a piece 
of cloth. The fourth blind man hold on to the tail and described the elephant as a piece of rope. And all of them ran into a hot 
argument about the "appearance" of an elephant.  
The Buddha asked the citizens: "Each blind man had touched the elephant but each of them gives a different description of the 
animal. Which answer is right?"   "All of them are right," was the reply. "Why? Because everyone can only see part of the 
elephant. They are not able to see the whole animal...” 
The blind men and the elephant - a Story from the Buddhist Sutra1  
 
Likewise the Buddhist parable tells, where isolated parts of a reality may seem the “truth” 
depending on the viewer’s position in relation to the subject of observation, the story we want 
to tell here is about the diverse actors of the Galapagos islands, their perceptions and interests. 
Little has been done to put it together, although the story is definitely worth it. It is in the mouth 
of every Galapagenian, yet it is hard to put it down as tellers of the same story do not always 
agree about the same facts. Being outsiders, we thought to become recorders of the story and 
the fifth man who listened to the other four and created his own version. By including and 
comparing the versions told by Galapagenians and outsiders who have studied the subject we 
hope to pass it on in all its diversity and richness.
                                                 
1 http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/Courtyard/1652/Elephant.html, 19-07-06, 23.00 hrs 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce our problem field and study area. We begin by 
looking at the fishery crisis and management of fisheries in protected areas in general and in 
our study area. Following this we identify management problems and approaches, which lead to 
an introduction of alternatives to artisanal fishing in the Galápagos. We then move on to 
detailing our problem formulation and leading questions, methodology, as well as methods we 
employed to answer these questions. We conclude the chapter by briefly discussing the outline 
and importance of the following chapters. 
 
1.1 Crisis of Fisheries  
 
“Within 40 years life in the seas can be something that we will tell our grandchildren 
about. Because if fisheries and pollution continue as it is now, all sea species will have 
totally disappeared”, - concluded a team of researchers from Dalhouse University in 
Canada (Politiken 2 November 2006) 
 
Once again the world’s fisheries and the state of the ocean have been in the headlines, which 
gives little comfort. Every time we hear about declining yields, stock collapse, and “almost 
every way you look at fisheries, the trends are in the wrong direction: decreasing catch per unit 
despite improved technology, reduced fish abundance, average size decrease and reproductive 
output, loss of genetic variation, replacement of high value species by “trash” fish, increased 
by-catch mortality, recruitment failures, habitat degradation…the litany continues”(Roberts 
1997:35). 
 
Fisheries are considered to be in crisis (Roberts 1997) and therefore they are part of a new form 
of risk generated by the unexpected consequences of the systematic application of scientific 
knowledge to dominate nature (Beck 1992). The crisis is also subject to power relations, which 
underpin institutions and environmental, social and economic solutions to the crisis. Though 
dangers do not exist independently of our perceptions, they become a political issue only, when 
people are generally aware of them. They are social constructs which are strategically defined, 
covered or dramatized in the public sphere with the help of scientific material supplied for the 
purpose (Beck 1996). 
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To understand the reasons for the failure of fisheries, it is essential to account for the 
fundamental forces influencing fisheries management in Galápagos and world wide: i) 
industrialization and globalization; ii) conventional approach to natural resource management; 
iii) dominant conservation narratives, and iv) power relations within the local governance 
system. 
 
Industrialization uses the oceans for transportation, for food and chemical industries, and for 
waste dumping. Population increase and life-style changes have stimulated technological 
enhancement of fishing efforts, resulting in over-exploitation of stocks, habitat degradation and 
loss of biodiversity.  
 
The meanings and values given to natural resources have also changed with industrialization 
and globalization. “The meaning of resources was transformed into raw materials for industry. 
Globalization completes the process of reducing social, cultural, esthetical and ecological 
values of food, water and natural beauty to commercial value. Giving market value to all 
resources is central to the ecological crisis, and linking economic sustainability with social and 
ecological sustainability is central for the sustainable development of society” (Shiva 2001:128-
129).  
 
The concern about revising the current approach to management is growing among the 
fisheries’ experts, and was agreed already in 1995 by the American Fisheries Society (Roberts 
1997). The conventional approach to fisheries management is rooted in the models and methods 
of population biology. Management reduces fisheries into their component parts with stocks 
assessed species by species. Population data are run through models from which the status of 
the fishery and future yields are estimated (Ibid:35).  
According to Roberts (1997), this approach has many drawbacks. First of all, it requires costly 
data on biological stocks to make predictions. Moreover, the data has precision problem, which 
is further compromised by the complexity of species interaction and environmental and climatic 
factors. As Roberts adds: “prediction in population biology becomes increasingly difficult as 
more species are added to an assemblage, and the capacity of models to simulate reality 
crumbles beyond a handful of species. Almost every fishery is multi-species, but the models 
most managers use still treat species in isolation” (Roberts 1997:36).  
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Mainstream conservation narratives are also important factors determining management of 
fisheries. Narratives such as over-exploitation and restoration of natural resources counteract 
the standard solutions in the narratives of democratic participation of capacity building and of 
pro-conservation economic development. We analyze the role of the conservationist’s 
narratives within the actor discourses and the Galápagos fisheries management.  
Critical discourse analysis helps us to understand the role of social actor discourse in 
management as a form of seeking power and dominance. We identify conflicting managerial 
issues of the Galápagos Marine Reserve as well as embedded solutions, such as diversification 
policy.  
 
Last, but not least, fishery management involves politicians, users, administrators, scientists and 
managers. Actors have their own power interest, which determine their actions. Inclusion of 
this range of actors, both public and private, into decision- making arrangements takes us to the 
issue of governance. The crisis of fisheries or of any other resource management implies crisis 
of local governance. Kooiman defines governance as “the totality of interactions, in which 
public as well as private actors participate, aims at solving societal problems or creating societal 
opportunities; attending to the institutions as contexts for these governing interactions; and 
establishing a normative foundation for all those activities” (Kooiman 2003:4).  
 
The process of solving common problems in the archipelago as well as the creation of 
opportunities is the key in the analysis of this thesis. We relate local management of the 
Galápagos marine resources to the principles and characteristics of good governance. 
 
1.2 Protected areas: marine reserve as a tool for management and conservation 
Some researchers have established the value of marine reserves as a tool for both fisheries 
management and conservation. Reserves can simultaneously allow the building up and 
maintenance of spawning stock biomass of many commercial species, protection of habitat and 
restoration of biodiversity. Thus, reserves should be seen as a vital component of any safe 
management scheme (Roberts 1997). 
Looking at how a protected area is established frequently sets the tone for the whole context, in 
which future parks or marine reserve management occurs. Therefore we will briefly account for 
which changes occurred for establishing the Galápagos Marine Reserve. However, 
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understanding the status of a marine area and the factors determining the rationale of its 
management lead us to identification and assessment of perceived problems and solutions. 
Poverty, environmental degradation, migration and overpopulation are just some of the factors 
that hinder conservation goals in protected areas. Biophysical, environmental and socio-cultural 
systems are changing rapidly and therefore conflicts within protected areas are inevitable. 
 
Conservation has “conventionally dealt with people only as a threat to natural resources. It has 
not considered the role of people in resource management, the impact of conservation activities 
on people’s well-being, or the need of different groups of people to participate in decisions 
about the conservation initiative” (Wollenberg & Colfer 1997:115). Failures of the 
conventional eco-centric approach have produced the realization of the importance of linking 
ecological sustainability with social and economic sustainability. This realization has resulted 
in a shift to a participatory approach in the management of the Galápagos Marine Reserve.  
 
Galápagos fisheries have gone through several stages of exploitation by humans since the 
discovery of the islands and later their colonization. Though, it is not until the 1990s when a 
series of factors created the crisis of fisheries and social conflict. In 1998 the Charles Darwin 
Foundation, the Galápagos National Park and the marine resource user groups established the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve. A new co-management and participatory system was developed 
which allows the main stakeholders to participate in decision making about the uses of the 
marine reserve. Although at that time it was an important step to solve social and political 
conflicts, today there are still conflicts about participation, power, access to and allocation of 
resources. The new system has also laid foundation for a new policy in fisheries management, 
which aims to decrease the fishing effort by offering the Galápagos’ fishers new economic 
opportunities in fishing as well as in tourism. 
 
In the next chapters we assess social and political aspects of the fisheries crisis in the 
Galápagos, as well as “technical” solutions such as the alternatives to fisheries that are under 
development and experimentation. Thus, these technical solutions, which are called “the 
alternatives”, will be analyzed not as technical solutions as such, but rather as social meanings 
within a conflictive field, where different interests and actors encounter each other.  
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1.3 Sustainable development 
The discussion here must be centered on the questions: what is to be sustained, for whom, and 
for how long?  The value of the concept, as Lelé argues, “lies in its ability to generate an 
operational consensus between groups with fundamentally different answers to these questions” 
(Lélé 1991:615). It is a multidimensional and complex concept and proponents and actors using 
or applying this concept in practice, interventions and policies face the “dilemmas that affect 
any program of political action and social change: the dilemma between the urge to take strong 
stands on fundamental concerns and the need to gain wide political acceptance and 
support”(Ibid:618).  
 
This paper does not discuss the concept of sustainability and sustainable development, but it is 
considered while analyzing the socio-political changes in the Galápagos archipelago. 
Sustainable development is the mainstream discourse in development and conservation science 
is challenged by a radical environmentalism stream for being vague and inconsistent (Jones & 
Carswell 2004: xxi). It allows people with hitherto irreconcilable positions in the environment-
development debate to search for common ground without appearing to compromise their 
positions (Lelé 1991).  
 
We consider conception of sustainable development to be a battlefield of discourses competing 
to legitimize the “truth”, interpretations and consequent policies and interventions. In the 
analysis of the Galápagos Marine Reserve management we discuss the importance of 
conservationist narratives, such as overexploitation, restoration, participation, equity, 
conservation and sustainability. We will go through the analysis of a local process in the 
Galápagos to show that ‘participation’ and other ‘fixes’ are not per se a guarantee of sustainable 
development. Alleviation of poverty (the traditional development objective), sustainability and 
participation are three fundamental objectives of the sustainable development paradigm, where 
many social, economic, cultural and environmental factors cross, affect and condition the 
objectives of development, sustainability and conservation.    
We have to recognize that the “conditions and utilization of the ‘physical environment’ (energy, 
materials, minerals, land, water, genetic stock, the atmosphere, the ocean and forests) 
fundamentally is dependent upon the political and social structure of our global society and in 
turn is predicated upon evaluative and ideological frameworks” (Whiston, T.2001:1860).  
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In this sense, we intend to critically assess social, economic, environmental and technical 
factors underpinning development and sustainability of the natural resource management 
initiatives in the Galápagos. 
 
1.4 Rationale of the study 
Our initial interest was to explore the potential of ecotourism within sustainable natural 
resource management. The Galápagos Islands appeared to be a promising choice because they 
are viewed as a particular test case for large-scale ecotourism destinations, and includes factors 
replicated in many protected areas and ecotourism destinations worldwide: “The Galápagos has 
been a protected area for 40 years; it is well known internationally for its conservation 
significance; and they are islands, where controlling visitors, tour operators and residents is 
logistically possible” (Buckley 2003:162).  
 
From publications and media, the problematique of natural resource management in the 
Galápagos appeared to consist of the threat posed by introduced species and the social conflict 
over access to marine resources. While these problems present huge challenges to the 
Galápagos National Park and need quick and effective solutions, the fishing issue has an 
intriguing recent history of political tension and thereby has secured our choice. 
 
Claims that fisheries conflicts have always been placed on local fishermen and solutions have 
always been sought by taking fishermen away from fishing.  
The available studies and descriptions of the general context of the conflicts reflect the reality 
in a fragmented manner. According to Ospina (2005), there is a shortage of detailed studies on 
overexploitation of species and fisheries trends. Thus, our curiosity was to find out whether it 
really was close to how it was presented or whether it was a particular discourse and product of 
power relations. 
 
Basing our judgment on the common knowledge that politicized claims represent only certain 
interest groups and distort the reality, we expected to correct the distortion as much as it is 
possible by attempting to grasp all pieces of the mosaic - both visible and invisible.  
Knowing about the new policy of change of activity to tourism for the Galápagos fishermen, 
our initial curiosity was to explore the potential challenges and constraints that the fishers face 
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in the process of change to a new activity. Although, in the field we began to realize that the 
reality of the fisheries and the tourism industry was much different and much more complex 
than represented in the media and publications. Furthermore, solutions to the fisheries crisis 
seemed to be not just in the change to tourism, but somewhere beyond this simple exchange - at 
a managerial level.   
 
Led by these indications, we changed our research focus from the role of ecotourism in 
resource management towards the conflicts about fisheries and the entire range of possible 
managerial solutions. Social conflicts, according to Åkerstrøm (2003) often “touch upon and 
challenge fundamental values, raising questions about the constituent character of what we see” 
(Åkerstrøm 2003:IX).  
 
The “crisis of fisheries” in the Galápagos appeared to be an institutional narrative of the 
managerial crisis, although in reality it was subject to various other factors beyond exploitation 
by fishers. Mass and exclusive tourism activities in the islands had little to do with ecotourism 
as such.  
 
According to researchers2, major threats to the unique marine ecosystems of the Galápagos are 
over fishing and illegal fishing. In this sense, local and international institutions develop new 
management strategies and projects3 to generate alternative income opportunities for fishers 
within the tourism and fishing sectors. During our visit, the alternative economic activities for 
fishers within tourism and fishing were the main issues on the agenda of the management 
institutions. 
 
However, we found that important issues were not accounted for in the actors and institutions 
local agenda’s, such as power that underpinned the management issues of the Galápagos 
Marine Reserve. In this way, we re-formulated the problem with new emphasis on fisheries 
management. 
 
                                                 
2 Fundación Natura/WWF ”Galápagos Report” 1997/1998   
3 The Inter American Bank approved in 2006 a project for the Galápagos of US$1.863.000 for strengthening local 
productive sectors to improve links with tourism development and conservation 
http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/Display/PRPrint.cfm?PR_Num=207_05&Language=English, retrieved 11-10-05 
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We hope to gain insight into how the interaction of social actors and institutions transform 
power relations in institutional arrangements. We will analyze the potential problems and 
advantages that the fishermen encounter in their transition to alternative activities. This implies 
study of their organized practices, their perception of other actors’ role in the management, and 
their perception of their natural environment in terms of a resource base for alternative 
livelihood strategies, such as local tourism or alternative fishing.  
 
We hope to contribute to the management agenda with new insights and issues which are  
common knowledge among the local actors but which have not yet been documented in a 
comprehensive manner. Our purpose is to reflect critically upon new issues within the 
management of marine resources so that the Participative Management System of the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve can take them into consideration. Then decisions on fisheries 
management can be based on a comprehensive approach, enhancing sustainable management of 
the fisheries. 
 
Therefore, the aim of this project is to assess the constraints and opportunities that the changing 
management strategies, power relations and conflictive narratives provide for the management 
of the Galápagos Marine Reserve. 
 
1.5 Problem formulation and research questions 
Our main problem formulation is the following: 
What characterizes conservation politics of the Galápagos and what are the implications for 
sustainability of the Galápagos Marine Reserve management? 
 
In order to answer the problem formulation we set the following research questions: 
1) What are the institutions involved in management? 
Answering this question will give us an overview of the institutional arrangements that 
determine access to resources for each actor, as well as what the role of each actor is in the 
fisheries decision making processes.  
2) What is the state of the main socio- economic sectors? 
By answering this question we will examine the context of socio-economic development of the 
sectors, their forms of resource uses and power relations within a conflictive field. 
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3) Who are the social actors with a stake in the Marine Reserve and what are the relations 
between them? 
By answering this question we will look at social structures of the user groups, their interests, 
perceptions and organized practices with regard to the marine resources and how they interact, 
form alliances or oppose each other. 
4) What are the meanings attributed to the Participatory Management System (PMS), by the 
users of the Galápagos Marine Resource? 
By answering this question we attempt to identify the discourse that actors use in the PMS 
including others involved and how these discourses reflect the strategies that are employed to 
negotiate their access to resources.  
6) How does the participatory management approach constrain and enhance development of 
new economic alternatives for artisanal fishers in tourism and fishing? 
Answering this question will help us to illustrate why and how these alternatives are put 
forward, reflecting on the rationale of the policy, power relations and discourses of the 
management system. 
7) What is the meaning behind the conservation politics of the Galápagos? 
By answering this question we will give our own meaning to the conservation politics of the 
Galápagos and thereby produce our own discourse of the PMS. 
 
1.6 Methodology 
This section describes how we organized our research. We identify our position as researchers 
and describe methods we use for answering our problem formulation.  
 
1.6.1 Method of narrative and metaphor: revelation of the elephant 
Narrative is used as a method to organize data about the institutional rules on the state of 
resources, forms of its use and how they are enforced through discourse and action. The 
narrative frame is a story told by the researchers. It contains narratives of the key actors, which 
are interpreted by the researchers and incorporated into the main narrative.   
 
The Buddhist story about the four blind men and an elephant, where each blind man describes 
an elephant as the part that he came in contact with, can serve to be a metaphoric reflection of 
the relationship between users of the Galápagos Marine Reserve and the subject of their dispute 
– that of resource management.  
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The actors in the Galápagos act as the blind men: they argue each for their own perception of 
the subject, instead of trying to draw a common view based on their combined perception. Each 
blind man sees the elephant from his limited point of view.  
 
1.6.2 Our path to the analytical problem formulation: who is the fifth blind man? 
Researchers suggest a new mythological character - the fifth blind man (non-existent in the 
original myth), who learns about the elephant from the other four men (figure 1). Having the 
views of the other four he gains the best understanding among the five men of what the 
phenomenon of an elephant is like.  
 
The question that arises is: why do they not talk to each other about the nature of the elephant? 
Why is the fifth man needed to put together their perceptions into one mosaic? As 
aforementioned, we intend to put together the different positions and views of the various 
actors. Therefore we create a new version of the mosaic, and in this sense, our own social and 
scientific construction and meaning of it.  
 
As no science is value free, we could not limit ourselves to a pure description and 
deconstruction of narratives and discourses, but rather construct a normative scientific identity. 
Furthermore, as individuals with our own personal identities and background, we inevitably 
create a subjective position in a discursive field.  We analyze perceptions, meanings, narratives 
and discourses of the actors by means of theoretical tools, thereby producing new meanings 
about the Galápagos Marine Reserve from our point of view.  
   
Instead of only “grasping the changes” one might “become a prisoner of the discourse 
producers of the day and their strategically constructed future images. It is easy to confuse the 
actual changes with the images and, in so doing, one may become an instrument in confirming 
the discourse producers’ political predictions of trends: globalization, the knowledge society, 
the network society and the dream society. Studying change, it is essentially difficult to 
maintain the necessary distance to the object; to the society that should be studied”(Åkerstrøm 
2003:V). 
As the “fifth blind man” we study the “battlefields” of power relations in the use, allocation, 
control and management of resources in the Galápagos society. It has been a challenge to reveal 
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and connect what we “saw” with the “actual changes” and with what was being said. We 
inquire about categories, their construction as well as positions and statements of the actors 
towards policy, development intervention and institutional arrangements of the Galápagos. We 
construct in this way our story of the rationale behind the actual situation of the Galápagos’ 
marine resource management. 
 
Most fishers identified us as any other researcher or even a “conservationist spy” putting the 
same questions as many others did before us. At times it has been a challenge to approach some 
fishers and to get “sincere” answers. In this sense, some answers were probably constrained as 
fishers are generally tired and suspicious of researchers and think that they want to take new 
information to make new rules and bans, etc. We received local institutional support from 
Conservation International and gained access to the offices of WWF in Santa Cruz and at the 
National Park in Isabela and therefore, some fishers related us with the conservationist sector. 
Our field research was of limited time including interviewing members of certain organizations 
and institutions, therefore our understanding of the other four “blind men” and “the elephant” is 
limited.  
 
Finally, as the research team consists of two individuals with different backgrounds, positions 
and personalities, therefore there are differences in our perceptions of the research subject. 
Thus, this paper is a product of continuous cooperation and compromise of opinions. 
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Figure 1: The red thread (a). 
 
 
  
This flow chart is a visual illustration of the logic of the thesis. It is built by two kinds of steps: analysis and 
output. Elliptic fields in gray color indicate analytical steps and rectangular fields in various colors indicate output 
of analysis. It begins with building the fifth man’s - the researchers’ - identity as social scientists. The researchers 
view the other “blind men” through a prism of theoretical tools, which help them to understand the stories of the 
other “men”, the local actors.  
The researchers identify conflicting issues or force fields that are analyzed critically, such as use, control and 
allocation over the resources, institutional arrangements, interventions and actors’ capacity for change and 
sustainability. The researchers’ final step is to assess the meanings of the conservation politics of the Galápagos 
and give their own values to constraints and opportunities for sustainable management of the Galápagos Marine 
Reserve. 
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1.6.3 Methods 
 
Literature review  
The research begins with a literature review on the latest developments in the fishing and 
tourism sectors in the Galápagos. Information on state policies, networks, projects, actors, and 
achievements is gathered through academic publications, reports, periodicals and websites4. 
 
Field research 
We did field research during two months in Ecuador, February and March 2006, mainly in the 
islands of Isabela and Santa Cruz of the archipelago of Galápagos and in the country’s capital, 
Quito. During this time we interviewed stakeholders and actors from the Galápagos Marine 
Reserve, researchers, inhabitants of the islands, staff from Ministries, Municipalities and private 
institutions. As well, we did participant observation in daily activities of the fishermen, of the 
towns and communities we visited, participated in meetings of the fishers cooperatives, the 
management bodies, etc. 
In this way our main methods were interview, daily observation, informal conversation and 
processing of the information obtained with these methods. 
 
Interview 
• Theoretical justification of semi-structured interviews 
The exploratory nature of this study has determined the main method of investigation: in-depth 
interviews. In order to explore the “real life” of our interviewees in terms of their livelihood 
activities, practices of resource use, and relations with other actors, the semi-structured 
interview, according to Kvale (1996) has the highest potential for creating new knowledge. 
Semi-structured interviews provide balance between structure and openness, while anticipating 
analysis (Gillham 2005:75). Personal live interaction, framed in a professional context, gives 
space for variations during the course of a conversation, for example to probe and follow up a 
certain statement of an interviewee by asking direct and specific questions.  
 
 
                                                 
4 A large number of our bibliographical sources were in Spanish, and we translated quotes from those sources to 
English ourselves. However, we have not noted within every quote whether the original was in English or in 
Spanish. The same has been done with our interview data, which for the most part was in Spanish 
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• Interview guide 
Interview guides were drawn for each social group and actor and sometimes for individual 
interviewees.  
For the majority of the interviews, questions in the guides were grouped into three themes: i) 
management of GMR and policies ii) relations between sectors and iii) environmental and 
social impacts of fishing and tourism. However, guides for certain key interviews had variations 
according to the purpose of the interview as well as the position and expertise of the interview 
subject. The guides were not strictly followed but served for general orientation. Very often 
interview conversation took a course different from that set in the guide and allowed for 
unpredictable findings.  
Only the researchers used interview guides and they had neither been presented to the 
interviewees in advance nor at the time of the interview. Interview guides are included in 
appendix. 
 
• Validation of the interview data 
The majority of interviews have been tape-recorded (48) and a number of them were recorded 
in the form of keynotes manually (25).  
Although there is no such rule in qualitative interview research methods, asking interviewees 
for verification of interview transcripts is considered to be a question of ethics and courtesy.  
Nevertheless, with regard to the interviewees that have regular access to computers and the 
internet, our policy is not to ask for verification in order to maintain the important political 
statements made during interviews unchanged. Nevertheless, transcripts had been sent to a few 
key interviewees, but not one was returned.  
 
Verification of the fishers’ interview data presented a logistical challenge due to the distance 
between the Galápagos and Denmark as well as poor computer and internet access among the 
Galápagos’ fishers. Already at the beginning of the research it became clear that it would be 
problematic to obtain verification from all interviewees after leaving the field. Besides, we 
assumed that the fishermen would otherwise not be interested in spending time on verification. 
However, we intend to send their cooperatives the thesis with the conclusions and abstract 
translated to Spanish.   
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We have respected the wish of a number of fishers, as well as of a few other informants that 
they remain anonymous. A list of interviewees and interview guides is included in the 
appendices. 
 
• The groups  interviewed 
Conservation organizations: Galápagos National Park Service, Participatory Management 
Board of the Marine Reserve, World Wildlife Fund, Conservation International, Wild-Aid, 
Charles Darwin Station, Fundacion Natura. 
Governmental organizations: Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Tourism, Governmental 
Institution for Galápagos Regional Planning (INGALA), Municipalities. 
Research institutions and universities: Universidad San Francisco de Quito, Universidad 
Catolica, PUCE, Universidad Andina. 
Fishermen and their leaders: from Santa Cruz, Isabela and San Cristobal Islands.  
Tour operators and guides: from Santa Cruz and Isabela. 
Owners & administrators of hotels and restaurants: from Isabela Island. 
 
• The types of qualitative interviews applied 
- Key-informant interview: 
To build on the knowledge gathered through literature reviews, interviews were conducted with 
key actors that had influenced or were part of major changes in the Galápagos, such as the 
Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Environment, NGOs and individual researchers. Thereby 
knowledge of the latest developments in GNP has been gathered. These interviews gave us 
important insights into inter-sector and inter-actor power relations, institutional changes and 
gave leads for further investigation.  
 
- In-depth interview: 
This type of interview (described above) targeted the majority of subjects from the fishing 
sector as well as some subjects from conservation, tourism and public sectors. 
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- Informal conversation: 
It is rather convenient and easily applied in an informal setting. It does not require preliminary 
arrangement with an interview subject, it does not hold a specific agenda, but it serves mostly 
to gather general information, also allowing for unexpected data and insights. 
 
- Group interview: 
It allows for issues not revealed by the more controlled context of an individual interview since 
group interview participants often “have an overlapping spread of knowledge which covers a 
wider field than that of any single person” (Chamber 1997:148). Furthermore, it allows to 
observe social interaction, “group processes, the dynamics of attitude, opinion change and 
opinion leadership” (Gillham 2005: 63). In other words, a group interview provides the 
background to the perceptions of individual interviewees.  
One group interview has been carried out on Isabela with three fishermen and a development 
worker from GNPS.  
Daily access to a community of fishermen, participation in their workshops and informal 
meetings has helped us to gain an understanding of their perceptions to nature, policies, laws, 
institutions and other actors. 
Interviews have been conducted in two months field research in Quito and on two of the 
Galápagos Islands: Isabela and Santa Cruz. The island of Santa Cruz is the center for tour 
operators on the Galápagos, and a base for all conservation and governmental organizations 
including GNPS. Isabela is the island with a predominantly fisher population. 
 
Participant observation 
We agree with Gillham (2005) that even an in-depth interview cannot give “the whole story”. 
The wider social phenomenon “may only partly be comprehensible without the background 
detail being painted in” (Gillham 2005:42). The interview material has to be located in a 
context, both descriptively and theoretically and has to be triangulated (ibid). By conducting 
interviews, interacting with the local people and being in the field we have also been observers 
of a wider empirical context, which has complemented and informed our interview research as 
well as data analysis. 
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Conferences and workshops 
We have participated as observers in several workshops and meetings held on the islands of 
Santa Cruz and Isabela during our stay: 
1) An inter-institutional meeting on regional tourism planning and development, held by 
the Municipality of Santa Cruz (February 2006) 
2) A meeting of the Participatory Management Board of GMR, held by GNP on Santa 
Cruz (March 2006) 
3) An USAID meeting with the tourism sector of Isabela on tourism planning and 
development, held by USAID and GNP (March 2006) 
4) A meeting of the fishing cooperative COPAHISA of Isabela with USAID, WWF, and 
GNP on FAD development, held by COPAHISA (March 2006) 
5) A workshop on open-sea fishing techniques with hand-lines held by the fishers’ 
cooperative of Isabela - COPAHISA (March 2006) 
 
Local institutional attachment and support 
Conservation International (CI) - Ecuador, was our local partner, and supported our research 
officially by providing institutional support to the research team in terms of academic and 
technical support. CI in alliance with other conservationist NGOs work on a development and 
multi-sectoral conservation project within the Galápagos Marine Reserve. CI works within the 
fisheries and tourism sector in the Marine Reserve, and they were therefore interested in our 
research. Moreover, another important conservationist organization in Galápagos, WWF, had 
kindly provided us with an office on Santa Cruz Island. The Galápagos National Park office on 
Isabela provided us with an office during our field research on that island. 
 
1.7 Limitations 
• The biophysical state of fisheries as well as economics of tourism and fisheries were not 
studied in depth, although considered based on available data. 
• Primary data has been collected from only two (out of the three) main inhabited islands 
of the archipelago. 
• Limitation of time for the field research is always a constraint. We would have liked to 
spend more time on the islands to participate in more activities, workshops and 
conferences. 
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• Vlada Fuks did not speak fluent Spanish when she began the field work. Although she 
has developed her Spanish considerably during the field work, it has remained a 
limitation for her throughout the field-work as well as in reviewing of documents and 
articles in Spanish and in transcribing interviews taken in Spanish. 
 
1.8 Outline and importance of each following chapter  
Chapter 2 discusses the New Institutional Economics and, especially, its Common Pool 
Resource School as instruments for understanding the institutional structures governing the 
Galápagos’ marine resources. NIE is complemented by the Actor Oriented approach, with its 
emphasis on the human agency and power relations. Force Field approach and Critical 
Discourse Analysis help us to reveal power relations within conflictive fields and discursive 
formations of management practices.  
 
Chapter 3 offers a retrospective view of the Galápagos: beginning with the history of its 
colonization to its current environmental state. We describe the main social, political and 
economic changes both for the country and the islands, as they are important for understanding 
the origin and context of the actual conflicts in the Galápagos and its use of resources. 
 
Chapter 4 describes organizations and working practices of social actors and the main users of 
the Galápagos Marine Reserve: the fishing sector, the tourism sector and the conservationist 
sector. Perceptions and discourses of actors in relation to the resources and the management 
system are identified and analyzed.  
 
Chapter 5 analyzes resource management models and approaches in the Galápagos that are a 
key for understanding the socio-political situation of the fisheries. We assess the management 
approach taking into consideration property rights and regimes. Thereafter we assess new 
approaches to fisheries, such as the ecosystem context and the diversification model, where 
emergence of new alternatives is an important part of the agenda in the management bodies of 
the Galápagos.  
 
Chapter 6 illustrates the above analysis of the management system through an example of the 
experiential artisanal fishing alternative. We introduce the history of this initiative and roles and 
discourses of various actors about its feasibility and meaning for diversification of economic 
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opportunities for the fishers. We attempt to link technicalities of the project to the discursive 
practices of the actors and explain force fields. 
 
Chapter 7 analyzes challenges and opportunities of the new diversification management model 
on the example of the open sea fishing alternative.  
We introduce the history of open sea fishing in the Galápagos, its technology and certain details 
of the implementation of this alternative. Then, by examining conflicting technical issues we 
link them to the actors’ discourse and attempt to identify how their power relations effect 
implementation of the open sea fishing alternative.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses and relates the theoretical approaches and concepts with the main issues 
analyzed from chapters three to seven, regarding management approaches to resources, the 
subject of study, its rationale, dilemmas and sustainability of management within the Galápagos 
Marine Reserve. 
 
Chapter 9 concludes the characteristics and challenges of resource management in the 
Galápagos, specifically on institutional arrangements and the diversification policy in fisheries 
management. In terms of answering the main problem formulation and taking into account 
conclusions of the thesis’ chapters, we put forward our discourse on the meanings and 
determination of the conservation politics of GMR: what are the social and institutional 
constraints and opportunities and finally what are the implications of these politics for 
sustainable management of fisheries in the Galápagos?  
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter we consider the different theoretical “streams” and concepts that we use in our 
thesis. Three main approaches are taken into consideration: New Institutional Economics(NIE), 
especially its Common Pool Resources school, can give us an understanding about institutional 
base governing structures of resource management. Though, we critique some of NIE’s pitfalls 
and complement our analysis with the Actor Oriented approach based on the human agency and 
actors encountering in a conflictive arena and fields. Power relations are the cornerstones of this 
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approach. Finally, a critical analysis of narratives and discourses are included in this 
framework.  
 
2.1 The New Institutional Economics 
The New Institutional Economics (NIE) is a branch of economics that goes beyond the usual 
economic focus on markets, to look more closely at manmade institutions with a vast analysis 
on resource management. As Lloyd et al. (2005) describes it, NIE has a: 
Worldview that incentives and rules can be used to regulate (i.e. govern) the behavior of social 
actors; 
Problems of environmental degradation or control are caused by the lack of or insufficient rules 
and incentives (e.g. Hardin 1968); 
Solutions come via the market and institutions. The market is regarded as the best form of 
regulation, but has it faults. Consequently the market needs to be complemented by regulative 
institutions (e.g. Ostrom 1999). 
 
For the New Institutional Economics and the Common Pool Resource school private rights 
system, market control and decentralization of governance are the main solutions to the 
problems of inefficiency and economic and environmental problems. This is in opposition of 
government involvement and bureaucratic control that often creates passive users and rigid 
administration systems incapable of rapid change (Saleth and Dinar 1999).  
 
This theoretical approach was part of the 1980s neo-liberal trend with a resurgence of theories 
about society that stressed the central role of the free-market, with origin in the new political 
Right5. Theorists claim that free markets maximize human welfare. This new wave of 
interventions were commanded by the World Bank, IMF and the USA, advising (many times 
pressing) Third World countries  on the need of unregulated markets, the removal of control on 
the private sector, subsidy avoidance, and so forth (Preston 1996). 
 
Decentralization leads to greater participation by users and stakeholders. Users have also 
become “customers and clients” in the new era of resource pricing as the preferred method of 
cost recovery and tradable rights. NIE followers consider that the old system of management 
                                                 
5 After some 30 years of opposition it was with the elections of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher that the 
New Right finally took power. 
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techniques involving engineering approaches, centralized management, bureaucratic allocation 
and subsidized provision are the enemies of sustainable resource management. What is required 
is a more efficient and durable solution involving economic approaches, decentralized 
management, market-based allocation, and full-cost pricing (Saleth and Dinar 2004:9). 
Therefore, the central problem to  overcome is the role of the state, which is part of the problem 
and not the solution, as it was considered corrupt and inefficient.  As Khan (2002) would 
suggest, current economic reforms are primarily used to make markets more competitive. 
 
We agree with the critiques of some of the NIE’s authors for not accounting for power relations 
(Welch 2001), although we do not agree on NIE’s solutions for global problems, as they are 
market-oriented and based on economic approaches. Latin American countries, specifically 
Ecuador has been in a process of economic reform and structural adjustment. Drawbacks both 
socially and economically such as the increase of poverty, inequality and an increasing margin 
of competitiveness in the national and local markets have been a result of the opening to 
international markets (see Acosta, A. 1993,1995,2000,2003 for economic analysis of Ecuador). 
 
Nevertheless, within the NIE approach, theorists and researchers have also contributed to new 
insights and trends dealing with resource management and institutions, finding a way out of the 
intervention and management problems within collective action and property regimes. We will 
follow the Common Pool Resource school, which analysis we find useful for our case such as 
the concepts and uses of institutions, collective action and common pool resources. 
 
2.2 Institutions, collective action and common pool resources 
Institutions, together with policy reforms, constitute the base for new governance structures 
needed for resource management.  Therefore we require for Galápagos an analysis of the local 
institutions, which devise “constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of 
formal constraints (such as rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (such as norms of 
behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct) and their enforcement characteristics” 
(North, 1993:1). 
 
Institutions are thought of as “the rules of the game in society”. Then organizations may be 
thought of as the players of the game, or a group of individuals bound together by some 
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common purpose to achieve objectives” (North, 1990:5). Organizations such as NGOs, 
cooperatives, etc. exist because there is a set of “working rules which determine who is eligible 
to make decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or considered, what aggregation 
rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what information must or must not be 
provided and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions” (Ostrom, 
1990:51). The concept of working rules describes rules actually used, monitored and enforced 
when individuals in a given situation make choices about actions they will take. Working rules 
may or may not closely follow formal rules (Guillingham, 1997:22). 
 
In our case, the institutional framework within the Galápagos will be analyzed, which is 
underpinned by formal rules such as the Special Law of Galápagos that guides all practices, 
interventions and narratives. On the other hand, we will assess the “players” of this game: not 
just organizations but also social actors, following or not the rules of the game. 
 
Furthermore, we consider central concepts, the collective action and the common pool 
resources in the framework of governance to deal with the Galápagos’ institutional setting. 
Collective action occurs when “more than one individual is required to contribute to an effort in 
order to achieve an outcome” (Ostrom 2004, brief 2). Common pool resources are resources 
jointly used by a group of persons and/or community (Husain & Bhattacharya 2004).  
 
Efforts to influence and put into action policies together with factors that increase the likelihood 
of individuals to manage their resources will have to deal with incentives for collective action. 
In this sense, we will assess incentives that are put into action for a collective shift from one 
sector to another (e.g. from fishing to tourism) and/or we will assess the abilities and constraints 
for collective action within a social actor as the fishermen in the Galápagos. 
 
Problems related to resource management are usually associated with resources that are used in 
common. Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Common” (1968) which predicts the overexploitation, 
degradation and eventual ruin of collectively used resources as a result of the user’s rational 
incentive to maximize his own utility, has become a strong symbol of the problems of common 
pool resources. The nature of such resources has been misunderstood as a result of Hardin’s use 
of the term “common” to describe an “open access” regime. Resources used in common are 
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variously referred to as “open access”, “common pool”, “common property” and “the 
commons”. However, although such resources are all characterized by the potential occurrence 
of a “commons dilemma”, they differ essentially in terms of decision-making arrangements that 
are present to govern their use (Steins and Edwards 1999). 
 
We will follow Steins and Edwards definition of common pool resources to identify resources 
that 1) are used by multiple-users and/or multiple user groups, 2) for which joint use involves 
subtractability, that is, one user will subtract benefits from another user’s enjoyment of the 
resource system, and 3) from which it is difficult to exclude users (Steins and Edwards 
1999:242). 
 
Common pool resources or CPRs may or may not have formal or informal property rights 
attached to them concerning control of their use. By terming a resource as a “property” we 
identify a flow of benefits to which rights can be attached. Property rights are social institutions 
that have evolved as a means of enforcing claims to that benefit stream. A “property regime” 
refers to the decision-making arrangements that define the conditions of access to, allocation of, 
and control over a range of benefits arising from a CPR, in other words the institutions 
(Edwards and Steins 1998, Steins and Edwards 1999). 
 
There are four basic classifications of property rights: 
1. Open access: use rights are not attached to any specific group, resulting in a “free for 
all” situation; 
2. Public property: access for the public is held in trust by the Crown or State; 
3. Common property or commons: use rights are attached to a specific user group; 
4. Private property: tradable rights are owned by an individual, household or company 
(Steins N. and Edwards V. 1999:242). 
 
By contrary to the typical papers which have focused mostly on CPR with one single extractive 
resource use by one distinct user group, this study will focus on multiple-use resources and 
multiple user groups that are impacted by collective action.  
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“Complex, multiple-use CPRs are resources that are used for different types of extractive and 
non-extractive purposes by different stakeholder groups and are managed under a mixture of 
property right regimes” (Steins N. and Edwards V. 1999:242; our italics). 
 
In the case of Galápagos, we have analyzed a regime with  complex multiple-use CPRs and not 
a single property right, but with public and private property rights co-existing with open access 
and common property rights. The Galápagos Marine Reserve and National Park has different 
users and sectors with extractive and non-extractive zones and activities such as artisan 
fisheries, conservation and tourism.  
The Marine Reserve for example is managed under a common-property regime (the 
Participatory Management System) and public property, whose waters and coasts (under a 
zoning plan) are accessible for non-extractive leisure activities such as tourism, diving, beaches, 
and conservation and scientific activities, while some zones are for extractive use such as 
artisan fisheries. The Galápagos National Park Services and Directory represent the state, the 
conservation sector is represented mainly by the private sector and also by the state. Both 
private and public sectors represent the fisheries and the tourism sectors. This regime will be 
described and analyzed in detail in chapters four and five of this thesis. 
 
This diversification of users and property rights underpins a diversity of institutions and 
interests. The Common Pool Resource school analyses the “collective action among user 
groups requiring to agree to rights about access to, allocation of, and control over the 
resource… and where the institutional framework has to be re-negotiated to avoid externalities 
associated with increased access of new users to the resource system, such as overexploitation, 
alienation of traditional users and inter-user conflicts (Steins, N. and Edwards, V. 1999:242). 
 
The impacts of these problems are for the common pool resource researchers “augmented by 
institutional framework at the legislative and organizational level. Moreover two problems are 
identified. First, policy makers fail to recognize the complexities associated with managing 
multiple-use CPRs due to 1) poor communication structures between policy-makers and the 
users, and 2) the top-down approach, which imposes policies upon users at the operational 
level. Second, the institutional framework that was originally designed for single-use common 
property regimes may not have been changed to keep up with new uses of the CPR”(Ibid). We 
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will use this approach for the CPRs of the Galápagos Marine Reserve analysis; nevertheless we 
will also identify its inherent discourse and its institutional rational solutions to problems that 
go beyond the ones described in the latter lines.  
 
The CPR school is linked to the notion of rational choice. Individuals find themselves in the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons and therefore are strategic actors. The 
core of the strategic decision is the effort to depend on one’s own decision on how to act on the 
anticipation of decisions on the part of at least one additional goal-directed actor (Habermas 
1987 in Steins 1999:13). 
Rational choice has been subject to criticism. “First it is criticised for being a normative theory, 
since it assumes implicitly that rational choices are the correct choices. The shortcomings of 
using the concept of purposive action based on the narrow principle of economic rationality has 
been acknowledged by rational choice theorists; they argue however, that its main benefit is its 
power to measure the outcomes of human action (maximisation vs. minimisation of utility) 
specifically. Second, many rational choice theories tend to place human behavior within a 
framework of calculated rationality rather than one of bounded rationality; this does not do 
justice to the dynamic of people’s actions in a changing environment. Third, in more traditional 
rational choice approaches, the rational individual is studied in isolation from his social and 
cultural status and society” (Steins 1999:13). We will analyse these issues in more detail and 
relate it to the Galápagos in chapter eight. Mainly, what we want to emphasise here is that 
although all social theories employ a concept of rationality, we want to address the need to see 
not just a rational individual or a social actor strategizing his actions, but also a citizen in a 
“society of man-kind”. As Arendt states, where “the social begins to acquire the general 
meaning of a fundamental human condition” (Arendt, H. 1969:24).  
 
There has been a trend in the last decade or so for a consensus suggesting that the 
implementation of what has come to be known as “sustainable development” should be based 
on local-level solutions derived from community initiatives. Statements of intent on global 
environmental problems were issued following the 1992 Earth Summit, including Agenda 21 
and the Desertification Convention. They strongly advocate a combination of government 
decentralization, devolution to local communities of responsibility for natural resources held as 
commons, and community participation as a solution.(Leach et al. 1999). Such approaches - 
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evident in the policies and programs of national governments, donor agencies and NGOs - 
argue for “co-management” or an appropriate sharing of responsibilities for natural resource 
management between national and local governments, civic organizations and local 
communities (Ibid:225). In terms of the Common Pool Resource school, it is a platform for 
negotiating resource uses. (Röling 1994). In terms of the Galápagos Marine Reserve it is the co-
management platform of the Participative Management Board (PMB) and the Inter-institutional 
Management Authority (IMA), who provide a forum where all users and stakeholders of the 
Reserve participate and decide on the management of the protected area. 
 
Despite the numerous good intentions and expectations to implement community-based natural 
resource management and co-management initiatives, many failures and problems have arisen. 
Reasons for this vary from different schools and theoretical approaches. The main problems 
have been that the “intended beneficiaries” are treated as passive recipients of project activities; 
projects are too short-term in nature and overly reliant on expatriate expertise and lack criteria 
by which to judge sustainability or success in meeting conservation or development goals. 
Others suggest that the interests of certain social groups have been consistently marginalized 
(Pimbert and Pretty1995; Arnstein 1969; Western, Wright and Strum 1994 Hobley 1992; Sarin 
1995 quoted in Leach et al. 1999). Further, we assess in the case of the Galápagos that the way 
of finding solutions to problems through efficiency, technical solutions and exclusion, amongst 
others, jeopardize sustainability of management and governance systems. Without certain 
requirements for good and robust governance of environmental resources such as access to 
information, conflict resolution tools, motivation for compliance with rules, rules congruent 
with ecological and social conditions, accountability mechanisms for monitoring, clear 
sanctions and application, encouraging adaptation and change in the system, capacity building, 
etc. management of resources cannot be sustained in the long term. Therefore good governance, 
one could suggest, be related with management of resources. 
 
With inputs of authors from the new ecology school, institutions are seen broadly, as 
“regularized patterns of behavior between individuals and groups in society” rather than just as 
mediators of people-environment relations. (Leach et al. 1999:226). There is a common 
assumption, that local organizations regulate the use of relatively homogeneous environments 
in the community’s interests. Environmental degradation is assumed to reflect a growing lack 
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of synchrony between the community and its natural environment, and the implied solution is to 
reconstitute community-based management organization so as to restore harmony to 
environment-society relations (Ibid:226). But advances in ecological theory suggest, however, 
that many environments are characterized by a high variability in time and space and also 
communities are dynamic and internally differentiated (Ibid).  
 
Therefore, environmental changes, risks and crisis as well as resource management should be 
seen not just as a problem of depletion and degradation (as we will assess in the Galápagos case 
study), but also as a part of a dynamic changing environment and a dynamic scenario with 
social actors contesting power relations at different levels. This framework seeks to elucidate 
“how ecological and social dynamics influence the natural-resource management activities of 
diverse groups of people and how these activities in turn help to produce and to shape particular 
kinds of environment. Rather than framing environmental problems simply in terms of 
aggregate population pressure on a limited natural-resource base, a more disaggregated 
approach is needed that considers the role of diverse institutions in mediating the relationships 
between different actors, and different components of local ecologies” (Ibid:227). 
 
To end this part, we consider that the Common Pool Resource school has a valid approach to 
deal with institutional dilemmas and the dynamics of the relation between environment and 
society. Mainly, for our case of the Galápagos we approach complex multiple users and CPRs 
in a diversity of property regimes. We will relate main theoretical problems and merits of this 
approach with our case in the discussions’ chapter eight. This theory does not give us a 
complete framework for dealing with the changing interests and power conflicts between these 
multiple users and actors. An approach to power as “relational and as the result of the working 
of multiple, intertwined institutions” is needed (Nuijten, M. 2005). Then the power 
configuration will be considered under the Actor Oriented and Force Field approaches, as 
outlined below. 
  
2.3 The shift of approaches and models: from passive to active actors, from external to 
internal forces of change 
The dependency theory, post-development and anti-development theorists (inspired by Marxist 
and new-Marxist theories) suggests that developed countries obtained their wealth through the 
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extraction of resources in developing countries (Stavenhagen 1966; Cardoso and Faletto 1969; 
Escobar 1988; Fanon 1972). The “underdevelopment” problem is not considered an internal 
problem, but is due to external factors6. Halls and Said’s formulation of the “West and the 
Rest” captures a distinctive way of conceiving the power imbalance between the affluent 
industrialized societies of Western Europe and North America and the developing countries. 
They describe this relationship in terms of the ways in which a pervasive system of representing 
the non-West as inferior to the West underpins the political economy of “the Rest” (Hall 2002; 
Said 2002, 1978). Social actors, as the “underdeveloped” countries, are considered to be passive 
and victims. 
 
An interesting aspect of these author’s ideas that can be useful for our case is that they draw on 
the work of Foucault where truth is identified with discourse, or a language and knowledge 
providing boundaries, in which shared meanings are constructed in ways that are regular, 
systematic, and are taken as truth at a particular time and place (Haggins and Schech 2002:xiv). 
Underwriting the ability of a discourse to attain the status of a general truth is a matrix of 
power/knowledge. 
 
On the other hand, modernization theory and later the neo-liberal theory took shape under 
parameters of the East-West and North-South divide, with concepts such as development-as-
modernization, which assigns the central role to the market.  
 
These two macro perspectives and structural models, the “modernists” and the Marxist and neo-
Marxist represent opposite positions ideologically, but the two models are similar in that both 
see development and social change emanating primarily from external centers of power via 
interventions by the state or international bodies. They follow some broad development path, 
signposted by “stages of development” or the succession of different regimes of capitalism.  
These so called “external” forces encapsulate the lives of people, reducing their autonomy and 
in the end undermining local or endigenous forms of cooperation and solidarity, resulting in 
increased socio-economic differentiation and greater centralized control of powerful economic 
and political groups, institutions and enterprises (Long 2001:11). 
                                                 
6 External factors such as the unequal exchange and commerce of services and goods, while the surplus and gains 
are taken from the underdeveloped countries. The old colonialist regime gave form to the neo-colonialism 
dominated by IFM, World Bank, etc. 
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Although it is true that important structural changes result from the impact of outside forces, it 
is theoretically unsatisfactory to base development analysis just on external determination. All 
forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds of the individuals and 
social groups affected, which are in this way mediated and transformed by these actors and 
structures (Long 2001; Arce and Long 2000). 
 
Subaltern studies, such as Postcolonial feminism, avoid the trap stated by Said and Hall, by 
suggesting that Third World citizens are not powerless victims, but also have their own 
mechanisms and strategies to counteract colonialism, modernity and identity re-creation, based 
on the contest ability of knowledge and power relations. As Leach et al. state, “a large body of 
work concerned with social difference has highlighted the ways that gender, caste, wealth, age, 
origins, and other aspects of social identity divide and crosscut so-called “community” 
boundaries. This work emphasizes how diverse and often conflicting values and resource 
priorities - rather than shared beliefs and interest - pervade social life and may be struggled and 
“bargained” over” (1999:230). Feminist work especially has shown how institutions can shape 
and reproduce relations of unequal power and authority (e.g Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1996, 
Goetz 1996 in Leach et al. 1999).  
Others suggest the need to assume the ability of the agency (knowledgeability/capability) to 
social actors, which are differently constituted culturally and affect the management of 
interpersonal relations and the kind of control that actors can pursue vis-à-vis. In the fields of 
development and management of resources, this means analyzing how differential conceptions 
of power, influence, knowledge and efficacy may shape the responses and strategies of the 
different actors as, for example peasants, development workers, local government officers, etc. 
(Long 2001:19). 
 
Notions of power bring new insights of hegemony, where recent approaches have “taken a 
focus on the partiality, the eternally incomplete nature of hegemony with its implication of the 
cultural as a contested, contingent political field, the battlefield in an ongoing “war of position” 
(Gupta and Ferguson 1997 quoted in Nuijten 2005:3) or as Roseberry (1994) also proposes to 
“explore hegemony not as finished and monolithic ideological formation but as problematic, 
contested political process of domination and struggle” (quoted in Nuijten 2005:3). 
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2.4 The actor oriented approach and power fields 
It is necessary to adopt a dynamic approach for understanding the social change which 
emphasizes the interplay and mutual determination of ”internal” and ”external” factors and 
relationships, and which recognizes the central role of human action and consciousness in 
social change.  
 
The actor-oriented approach will help us to manage categories such as the social actors that 
must not be depicted as passive recipients of interventions or simply disembodied categories, 
but as active participants who process information and strategize in their dealings with various 
local actors as well as with external institutions and personnel. Social actors, as individuals, 
groups, sectors and institutions have the ability of the human agency to act, take decisions and 
change situations that concern and affect them (Ploeg 1989; Villarreal 1992, Long 2001).  
 
Unequal relations of power and resource access, under increasing scarcity, leads to struggles 
between groups. Outcomes reflect power relations but are not determined by them. Giddens 
(1984) argues that those who are subordinate have the opportunity to influence the activities of 
their ‘superiors’. He recognises the centrality of the human agency to human behaviour, that is 
the capability of people to intervene in the world and the course of events in a wider social 
environment that is both constraining and enabling (quoted in Jones & Carswell 2004:98). 
 
Communities cannot be treated as static, rule-bound wholes, since they are composed of people 
who actively monitor, interpret and shape the world around them (Long & van der Ploeg 1989; 
Long & Long 1992). Structures, rules and norms emerge as products of people’s practices and 
actions, both intended and un-intended. The structure does not strictly determine people’s 
action, but it provides flexible orientation, which may either constrain or enable what is 
possible. While some actions serve to reproduce structures, rules and institutions, other actions 
have served to change the system and perhaps in time, remake new rules (Giddens 1984; Bryant 
& Jary 1991 quoted in Leach et al. 1999:230). In this sense, we intend to show how actors in 
the Galápagos through their actions and strategic abilities have gained power to change rules, 
institutions and the system of management. Furthermore, those who are thought to be under 
control of the more powerful groups (e.g fishers), also influence rules and institutions by the 
use of tools and tactics that will be explained in the following chapters. 
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We assess how different actors gain access to and control over the resources. Moreover, 
conflicts over access to resources often intensify when the resources in question become scarce, 
limited or controlled by rules and institutions. 
Actors encounter conflicting situations in their daily life and may choose or may be forced to 
act in unruly ways e.g. illegal fishing or there being social unrest among the fishermen in the 
Galápagos. Gore (1993) refers to such “unruly” social practices as the way different forms of 
protest and resistance challenge legal rules governing people’s ability to gain command over 
commodities. But such practices may well be bound by a different set of moral/informal rules 
(Gore 1993 quoted by Leach et al 1999). Once more, we can see competing notions of 
legitimacy, interplaying with rule sets in a context of prevailing power relations (Ibid:238). 
 
There is a need to ground institutional analysis in a theory of power.  As Leach et al. (1999) 
state, “many institutions patently do not serve a collective purpose, even if they may once have 
done, different actors perceptions of the “collective good” depend very much on their social 
position. Equally, involvement in some groups may be a response to inequities in others” 
(Ibid:238).  
 
The Actor Oriented approach helps us to define these institutional assets, inequalities of access 
and control over resources and institutions, regarding power relations as a basic assumption. 
Nuijten (2005) following and adapting Lemke (2003), identifies three types of power relations: 
 
1) Power as strategic games; it is a feature of human interaction, insofar as it signifies 
structuring possible action fields of others. This can take many forms, e.g. ideological 
manipulation or rational argumentation, moral advice or economic exploitation. This 
can be perceived in many daily interactions between individual people and groups. 
2) Government or institutional power; it refers to more or less systematized, regulated and 
reflected modes of power (a “technology”) that goes beyond the spontaneous exercise of 
power over others, following a specific form of reasoning (a “rationality”). This is 
similar to approaches to governmentality that argues that power works through the 
constitution of defined subjectivities (such as citizens, civil servants), through discursive 
rituals and administrative practices. 
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3) Domination or structural power; it is a particular type of power relationship that is 
stable, hierarchical, fixed and difficult to reverse. Domination refers to those 
asymmetrical relationships of power in which the subordinated persons have little room 
for manoeuvre because their “margin of liberty is extremely limited” (Foucault 1988:12; 
Lemke 2003:5 quoted in Nuijten 2005:2). 
 
The three forms are connected and presented in our analysis of the Galápagos actors, their 
asymmetric relations, strategic power games and alliances, institutional practices and 
rationalities that are outlined in the following chapters. Individual power is always part of a 
wider institutional and structural process. Nuijten (2005) adds to this formulation the notion of 
“force fields” to refer to more structural forms of power relations, which are shaped around the 
access to and use of specific resources. There are multiple force fields and this explains that 
power relations are diversified according to the resource at stake. “The concept of force field 
helps us to analyze the weighting of different kinds of socio-political networks, the influence of 
law and procedures, the role of formal organizational structures, the role of various discourses 
and different positions of power” (Nuijten 2005:2-3). An important view of the force field is 
that patterning of organizing practices is not the result of a common understanding or normative 
agreement, but of the forces at play within the field (Ibid). 
 
Nuijten’s notion of force field resembles Bordieu’s (1992) notion of a field that is the locus of 
relations of force and not only of meaning. “Every field has its own logic, rules and regularities 
which are not explicit and which make it resemble the playing of games. However, it always 
remains a field of struggles aimed at preserving or transforming the configuration of forces. 
These struggles and activities in the field always produce differences. Agents and institutions 
constantly struggle…those who dominate in a given field are in a position to make it function to 
their advantage but they must always contend with the resistance, the claims, and the contention 
of the dominated. The coherence, ruling and regularities of a given field emanate from conflict 
and competition...” (Nuijten 2005:3).    
 
2.5 Narratives and discourses 
Discourses, perceptions and narratives of the social actors are key in these conflictive 
encounters. “Discourses are the product of processes of domination in society. They reflect the 
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symbolic order and influence the formation of identities. However, because of the existence of 
multiple force fields, discourses are never totally consistent” (Nuijten 2005:10). Discourses do 
not necessarily shape human minds and cognitive processes in a fixed way (Said 1978, Bhaba 
1991 and Spivak 1987 for analysis of effects of colonialism in colonial subjects).  
 
Discourse is a form of social action; it constitutes society and culture, and social power of 
groups and institutions. Thus, the better access groups have to the social resources such as 
force, money, status, fame, knowledge, information, culture, and other forms of public 
discourse and communication, the more power they have to control the acts and minds of the 
other groups (known as persuasion and manipulation). Members of powerful social groups, and 
especially their elites, have more or less exclusive access to, and control over public discourses, 
which are an important “symbolic” resource of knowledge and information (van Dijk 
2001:355). All the levels and structures of discursive power, defined by Dijk (2001) as context, 
text and talk can be used by resourceful speakers to abuse power at the expense of other 
participants.  
 
For Laclau & Mouffe (1985) discourse is a structural totality of differences. It is a result of a 
practice and it is “constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the 
flow of differences, to construct a centre” (Ibid: 112). In this stream, we analyze how the 
Galápagos actors construct the discourses of e.g. conservation, over-exploitation, and 
sustainability, which become the discursive nodal points, the centre of a discursive battle, 
capable of changing the rules of the game in the battlefield of power and domination.  
 
Narratives are stories, told about certain events in personal lives, in institutional history, which 
construct certain social reality for those persons or institutions. Experience and stories are a 
primary source of knowledge in society “as reality is socially constructed through narrative” 
(Johnstone 2001:642). Thus, narrative is social representation of knowledge and can serve as a 
power base in a discourse.  
 
Johnstone (2001) emphasizes “the political effects of narrative, seeing storytelling not only as a 
way of creating community but as a resource for dominating others, for expressing solidarity, 
for resistance and conflict; a resource, that is, in the continuing negotiation through which 
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humans create language and society and self as they talk and act”. She sees narrative “as a way 
of constructing “events” and giving them meaning, as we pick out bits of the stream of 
experience and give them boundaries and significance by labeling them. Like all talk and all 
action, narrative is socially and epistemologically constructive: through telling, we make 
ourselves and our experiential worlds” (Johnstone 2001:644-645). 
 
The boundary between discourse and narrative is subtle. Narrative is a fragment of constructed 
reality, a story told about a specific event or a sequence of events. Discourse is a complex 
combination of various media and information, including narratives, about various events but 
united by the same point of view. Discourse may employ exemplary narratives as a persuasion 
and manipulation medium. Narrative approach to research is based on the assumption “that 
there is neither a single, absolute truth in human reality nor one correct reading or interpretation 
of a text”. It “advocates pluralism, relativism, and subjectivity” (Lieblich et al, 1998:2).  
 
Narratives can deal with particular conceptions of agency, self- interest, activity, opportunism 
and performance. All narratives are true and incomplete at the same time. In this approach the 
discourse available to and used by social actors in assessing their organizational situation are a 
central object of study (Nuijten 20005:11). 
 
Following Hajer (1996) in his explanation of narratives and discourses, the point is no longer 
simply how realities are constructed but also how reality-in-itself is re-produced by discourse 
politics within institutional contexts of decision, action and work. The centre is the “discourse 
coalitions” (Hajer 1996) that are not necessarily based on shared interests and goals, but much 
more on shared concepts and terms, and are stretched across the boundaries of classes, nation-
states and systems. They are, as it were, discursive landscape architects: they create and design 
“cognitive maps”, “story lines” or “taboos” (Hajer 1996; Beck 1996). Therefore, discourses for 
example in development had also underpinned intervention, strategies, planning, monitoring, 
evaluations, indicators and so forth. 
 
In summary, using the actor oriented approach and force fields we can assess perceptions of the 
actors in the conflictive setting of the Galápagos, the interests and power relations between 
them and how “external” and “internal” changes and trends are affecting and transforming the 
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livelihoods of the people at stake. Furthermore, discourses and narratives of each of the sectors 
and actors will be a method to help us reveal the underlying dynamics, interests, conflicts and 
perceptions. It will also enable an overview as to how these actors order their world, command 
and negotiate their standpoints. As the “fifth blind man” we have here constructed our scientific 
framework, our cognitive map for the journey along the stories, the social and political 
landscape of the Galápagos. 
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Figure 2: The Galápagos archipelago7 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: THE HARSHNESS AND THE BEWITCHING OF THE 
GALÁPAGOS ISLANDS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
 
3.1 Discovering the Enchanted Islands 
 
“In March 1535, a ship carrying the Spanish bishop, Fray Bartolomé de Berlanga, on a voyage from Panama 
to Peru was becalmed off the coast of South America. Although by no means an unusual event in itself, this 
heralded what was to become one of the strangest and perhaps most unexpected voyages of discovery. Swept 
to the west by strong offshore currents, the vessel was carried deep into the still largely unexplored eastern 
Pacific. Drifting for over a week, the bishop and his companions came at length to a group of barren volcanic 
islands. After further delays, landing parties scrambled ashore, their most desperate need now being for water 
to replenish supplies that were running dangerously low on board…An official account of the expedition, 
including the hardships of their journey to the mainland, was sent by the bishop in a letter to the Spanish King 
Charles V where he described the islands ‘as though sometime God had showered stones…the soil is like 
dross, worthless, because it has not the power of raising a little grass, but only thistles like prickly  pears’. 
Fray Bartolomé had the time to observe and comment on the tameness of the birds as ‘so silly they do not 
                                                 
7 http://www.galapaguide.com/Galápagos_map.htm, retrieved 04-02-07 at 13.15 GMT 
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know how to flee, the great numbers of iguanas, seals, and tortoises so large that they could carry a man on 
top”. 
(Perry 1984:1) 
 
The Galápagos did not escape Fray Bartolome’s attention in the 16th century - the sense of 
harshness, desolation, but unique and strange flora and fauna. Later voyages encouraged this 
perception, adding all forms of descriptions. 
Due to the islands’ inhospitable nature and lack of water, the Spanish paid little attention to 
them, giving them the name “Las Encantadas” or bewitched islands (and later the Enchanted 
islands). This was due apparently to the strong currents and light winds which made them hard 
to find, appearing as though it was the islands, rather than the ships, that were moving. On the 
other hand the European sailors, pirates and buccaneers found them to be useful hideaway 
spots, especially as they had by this time located water sources on Santiago, Floreana and San 
Cristobal islands8. 
 
The lure of the Spanish treasure fleets constantly drew adventurers to the Pacific and it was in 
the Galápagos that English buccaneers found a base for their activities. From the islands they 
launched raids on the long open coasts between Panama and Callao in Peru, returning to repair 
their ships and divide the jackpot. Their association with the islands extended from the late 17th 
century to the middle of the 18th century. The attraction of the islands lay in their safe and 
secluded anchorages, where there was little fear of reprisal from the Spaniards, in the fresh food 
available (in Dampier’s view ‘no pullet eats more pleasantly than a Galápagos tortoise’) and, 
once they had been located, reliable sources of fresh water (Perry 1989:8). 
 
“As demand for European goods grew, normal trade progressively replaced piracy and those 
few islands which had supplies of water came to be heavily used by new breeds of seamen: the 
whalers and seal-hunters. Whaling was a highly profitable business in the first half of the 19th 
century but it caused decimation not only of the whales but also of giant tortoises, which were 
used as food by the whalers owing their ability to survive for long periods without food or 
water. The killing of tortoises for their oil continued into the early years of the 20th century, by 
which population of giant tortoises were severely reduced and even disappeared in some of the 
islands” 9.   
                                                 
8 http://www.gct.org/history.html retrieved 23/09/2005.   
9 http://www.gct.org/history.html retrieved 23/09/2005. 
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Visits to the islands were much more frequent by 19th century and increasingly their purpose 
was scientific and strategic as well as commercial. A new period began in 1832 when Ecuador 
proclaimed its sovereignty over the islands. There were only a handful of permanent settlers at 
that time, but their number had increased to around 300 by 1835 when the HMS Beagle arrived 
with Charles Darwin on board (Ibid).  
 
3.2 Variation and natural selection: Darwin’s discoveries of the uniqueness of the islands 
The diversity and variation of each island, with distinctive species of terrestrial organisms, 
plants and animals has elevated the Galápagos to its unique place in science. With Darwin’s 
The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection (first edition 1859), his theory of natural 
selection posed a profound challenge to orthodox thought and belief: no beings or species have 
been specifically created, all are locked into pitiless struggle for existence, with extinction 
looming for those not fit for the task (Darwin (1859) 1998). 
 
The impressions gained in the Galápagos, in his 5 weeks of visit, matured in his mind over 
many years. His observations of mainland South America, such as the character of different 
species of plants and animals, had the same characteristics of the Galápagos yet it differentiated 
in many ways. He established the understanding of both evolution processes and the 
mechanism of natural selection as the forces by which nature creates new species. Darwin’s 
thesis together with Alfred Russel Wallace’s similar ideas was presented to the scientific world 
at a meeting held by the Linnean Society of London in July 1858. This combined with the 
publication of the Origin of Species (Perry 1989:13) the following year, brought light a new 
perception of the world and the recognition of the Galápagos as a unique natural laboratory of 
evolution. 
 
His discoveries revealing the complex mutual interdependencies between animal and plant life, 
climate and physical environment, and - by implication - within the human world, remain not 
just one of the founding documents of the modern age, but a clear description and 
understanding of the origin and uniqueness of the Galápagos. 
 
In the following years Galápagos received multiple scientific visits, and expeditions whose 
efforts were mainly to collect and enrich inventories of flora and fauna species. The Ecuadorian 
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Government did not remain passive towards the permanent scientific visits to the islands and in 
1934 promulgated the first laws protecting its wildlife. 25 years later – the same year as the 
‘100 years’ commemoration of the Origin of the Species’ publication – Galápagos was declared 
a National Park (Perry 1989:13, Ospina 2004) 
 
The islands are situated 800 to 1.000 km from the west coast of mainland Ecuador (see 
appendix 1, fig. 2), and span a distance of nearly 300 km between the North and the South. 
They form a scattered archipelago (fig.2) spread over 45.600 sq km of ocean, comprising 19 
islands, with 104 islets, rocks and reefs (PNG 2003; Perry 1989). The archipelago is delimited 
by an inner base line that surrounds the islands and a 40 nautical miles line delimiting the 
marine reserve (see appendix 1, fig. 3). 
 
The islands are situated in the Equatorial Line, in a meeting point of oceanic superficial and 
profound currents with diverse characteristics. The northern currents are warm and less salty; 
the ones arriving from the South are cold and saltier; the ones arriving from the West are 
profound and cold (fig.3). The high variability of the island’s marine biodiversity is probably a 
product of this highly complex oceanographic setting (Houvenaghel 1984). This environmental 
dynamic over an evolutionary time period has produced several discrete bio-geographic zones 
that are separated by very short geographical distances (Reck & Bustamante 2002).  
 
Moreover, these currents in the past were responsible for transporting nutrients and carrying 
organisms from different localities to the Galápagos, such as the penguins from the south, sea 
lions from the north, tropical fishes from the East, amongst others. 
The isolation of the Galápagos favoured the unique development of evolutionary processes in 
animals and plants, such as marine iguana, non-flying cormorants and sea lions that do not exist 
in other places in the world. This phenomenon is called endemism and the islands boast 18,2% 
endemic species, which gives an important picture of the unique character of the archipelago 
(PNG 2003).  
 
These ecosystems are fragile, as they have depended on the physical isolation to develop their 
unique variation of evolution. Nevertheless, existing human society develops constant new 
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Figure 3: Ocean currents in the Galápagos.10  
 
 
ways of communication, exchanges and relations. And here lies the clue for resolving the 
territorial and resource management issues that the Galápagos are faced with. They need to find 
an acceptable (and negotiated) balance to solve the contradiction between the high degree of 
isolation needed to preserve the uniqueness of the islands and the need for  Galápagos’ society 
to establish contacts and exchanges for its socio-economic development (Ospina 2004; Ospina, 
interview 2006). 
 
3.3 The social and demographic history: from the Norwegian whalers to the Ecuadorian 
farmers and fishers 
The islands had no indigenous people and the first inhabitants using the resources were 
buccaneers and later whalers and fur traders. It was not until the 1830’s when Ecuador assumed 
                                                 
10 Map adapted from Michael H. Jackson (1985), Galápagos: A Natural History Guide, University of Calgary 
Press, Calgary, USA, retrieved from http://www.junglephotos.com/Galápagos/gmaps/scimaps/currents.shtml, 04-
02-07, 14.00 GMT 
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sovereignty of the islands that the first settlers arrived and started subsistence agriculture and 
cattle ranching. Maize, sugar cane, coffee, sweet potatoes, bananas, melons, and citrus fruits 
were grown. Floreana was the first island inhabited by a colony that intended to settle 
permanently. 
The harshness of the climate and soil, isolation, deprivation of basic needs and lack of 
communication and permanent transport caused outbreaks of violence, lawlessness and 
desertion that have been the common path for all of the settlements established. San Cristobal, 
Isabela and Santa Cruz became inhabited during the late 19th century, by audacious men 
obsessed by producing wealth, but were also inhabited to create new frontiers on previously 
isolated and hostile lands.  
 
The general aspect of colonisation ended during the Second World War, when a North 
American military base was built on the island of Baltra, opening up the local market of goods 
and food with the first airplane runway base for future communication and transportation in the 
archipelago. In 1946 the base was transferred to Ecuador. Between the 1920s and 1950s these 
local enterprises and haciendas began to decline while properties were divided and shared up. 
Since the establishment of those small groups of isolated agrarian settlements, the Ecuadorian 
State consolidated the “occupation” and control over the islands (Ospina 2004:19).  
 
Colonisation of new lands in Ecuador since the late 1930s became the path to resettle the high 
number of landless people that the hacienda11 system produced. With the Ley de Tierras 
Baldias y Colonizacion (The Un-inhabited Lands and Colonisation Law) in 1936 and later the 
Agrarian Reform of 1964, the colonisation was institutionalised and thousands of landless and 
poor people from the highlands migrated and settled in “idle” and “empty” lands in the 
lowlands (Amazonia) and in our case the first permanent settlers established in the Galápagos. 
The colonisation was a form of “exhaust valve” to the pressure created by the demand and the 
unequal distribution of land. It was also a way to expand the agrarian frontier to help supply the 
increasing demand from the internal market of goods.  
 
                                                 
11 The hacienda was a social, organizational and economic system introduced in Latin America by the Spaniards 
in the 16th century. Huge amounts of land were owned and controlled by a landlord. This structure of land-tenure is 
characterized by the concentration of land in few hands, symbolizing an inefficient and unequal distribution of 
land and resources. A social and political movement started in the 1950s to end the hacienda system, but it was not 
until 1964 when an Agrarian Reform was approved and the process of changes in the land –tenure system started. 
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In 1972 Ecuador started exporting oil, which meant an important change and impact on its 
economy, with a re-organisation and modernisation of the State and the country. This final 
expansion and modernisation of the State, lead to the consolidation of its lands and control over 
the most isolated regions, such as the Galápagos. Furthermore, with the expansion of tourism in 
the 1970s the Galápagos became integrated with the rest of the country. Meanwhile the human 
population of the islands had increased from a few hundred to several tens of thousands, with 
diverse interests, resources and power.  
 
Although 97% of the islands’ land area has a National Park status, the population has more than 
doubled in the last 15 years, mainly due to migration from Ecuadorian mainland. According to 
a socio-economic survey by Castro (2005) in 2005 Galápagos had 23.508 inhabitants, with a 
6.4% annual population growth: the highest in comparison with Ecuador mainland which is 
2,4% (GNP 2003). Despite regulatory measures by the regional government to stop 
immigration, there is a permanent flow of legal and illegal new comers in search of a better life 
and job opportunities. Life-quality is regarded as higher in the Galápagos than in the rest of the 
Ecuadorian mainland regions (see appendix 4, fig. 9). Just a third of the permanent residents of 
the islands were born in the Galápagos in 1998. The major part of the “native” population is 
mainly living on Isabela and San Cristobal, while inhabitants of Santa Cruz are mainly migrants 
(Ospina: 2004:21). 
 
3.4 Land and marine resource uses in the Galápagos 
The Galapagueños base their living on three main livelihoods: farming with livestock, fishing 
and tourism. These have varied during the decades depending on the political and economic 
changes that were happening at the time. Conservation is an important sector (politically and 
economically for the islands), which is present in all forms and therefore we will outline these 
four sectors and actors. 
 
3.4.1 Land- use: farming, livestock-keeping and hunting 
The oldest land-use of the Galápagos has been agriculture. The fist settlers were farmers, who 
were dependent on the variability of the climate, lack of water shortages, limited market 
possibilities and transport etc. Today, farmers grow vegetables, grains and fruits for their own 
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consumption together with the management of a few domestic livestock. They have succeeded 
in building a local and inter-island market for their vegetables and animal products.  
 
The local population, together with around 1,000 tourists that stay overnight on the islands, 
depend daily on these local agro-pastoralist products (Ospina 2004:27). However, tour cruises 
bring almost everything from mainland.  
Only the livestock production in Santa Cruz is relatively permanent, due to the cattle “export” 
to the mainland. There are coffee plantations for export in San Cristobal, but their future is still 
uncertain because prices are low and there is a surplus of the product on the international 
market (Ibid). 
Life as a farmer in the Galápagos was always a tough, isolated and unstable one. Remembering 
the old days when Juan Mendoza was a farmer in the hills of Isabela (and today a fisherman) 
who told us the following “We used to take our rifles and take a one-day tour inside the island 
where nobody lived, but there were hundreds of goats ranging. We used to come back home 
with one animal or more, so we had meat for the whole week and we could even give to our 
friends, neighbors and family members. Hunting wild animals was a part of our lifestyle and a 
way to get meat…” (Mendoza, J., interview 2006). Thus, wild (introduced) animals were part 
of the diet for the farmers, yet conservation institutions started programs to control and 
eradicate them12.  
  
In the 1980s and 1990s when fishing became a lucrative economic activity, many 
agriculturalists re-settled on the coastal shores. Furthermore, the migration to the principal 
cities of the islands of Santa Cruz, San Cristobal and Isabela also increased in the 1970s when 
tourism began to grow offering new possibilities for the islanders.  Many Galapagueños that 
lived in the hills or depended on agriculture and livestock started to work within the tourism 
sector in these cities. Thus, many of the farmers who re-settled on the coastal shores kept some 
of the land in the hills to complement their production (Ospina, interview 2006; interviews with 
fishermen from Isabela and Santa Cruz, 2006).  
 
                                                 
12 The damage caused by introduced animals is well known in the islands. “Cats mainly affect young marine and 
terrestrial iguanas, the pigs eat native vegetation, destroying trees and shrubs and they attack the nests of the 
terrestrial and marine turtles, eating both the eggs and the newborn. Goats prey on the plant communities and erode 
the soils” (Washington Tapia in Fundacion Natura & WWF1998:54). 
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3.4.2 Fishing and fisheries 
Artisanal fishing was always a complementary activity for the first farmers and settlers of the 
islands. In the beginning of the 19th century large scale fishing was mainly done by foreign 
ships harvesting whales, sea lions and tuna. 
 
Taylor et al. (2000) estimate that fishing activities contribute to 8% of the Galápagos’ GDP and 
Isabela alone contributes around 61% of the local GDP (cited in Kerr et al. 2004). 
There are 450 artisanal vessels in operation in the Galápagos (Diaz et al 2005; see appendix 4, 
figure 5 for the diagram of evolution of the Galápagos fishing fleet). The GNPS holds the 
register of fishing boats. A moratorium on the number of fishing vessels was imposed in 1998. 
However, existing boat owners can replace their boats with larger vessels up to a limit defined 
in the Management Plan (Kerr et al.2004:101). 
  
There are four kinds of fisheries13:  
1) Finfish, which has been the main harvest for the local inhabitants since their settlement on 
the islands. Some species are sold to the mainland, dried and salted as part of a traditional meal 
during Easter14;  
2) Lobster was present since the period of the whale, tortoise and sea-fur traffic, but became an 
important part of the local economy since the 1960s due to export. Today its catch is regulated;  
3) Pelagic fish has since the 1930s attracted industrial vessels from all over the world to catch 
big pelagic fish, such as tuna. It has an industrial character, which has done severe damage to 
marine resources due to high levels of extraction and type of methods used. Although, the 
Special Law of the Galápagos prohibits industrial fishing in the Marine Reserve, industrial tuna 
vessels still enter the waters of the reserve, according to our interview data;  
4) Sea cucumber has evolved since the 1990s as an export-oriented activity and has become a 
“boom”, as high volumes when captured have a high profitability for fishers and traders. Easy 
to collect, abundant and highly priced in Asian markets, the sea cucumber boom attracted 
migrants to the Galápagos from the mainland. The huge volumes of capture during the first 
                                                 
13 “Fishery can refer to the sum of all fishing activities on a given resource […] it may also refer to the activities of 
a single type or style of fishing on a particular resource” (FAO 1997). This study also refers to a fishery as fishing 
resources themselves in termsof fish stock and its ecosystem.  
14 There are still some fishermen that are dedicated just to this kind of fishing. Moreover, they relate this fishery to 
a religious aspect and as some fishermen told Ramirez “this is a religious fishing” or “we have to maintain the 
tradition and custom of the religious fishing even though it does not give us an important economic 
income”(Ramirez 2004). 
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seasons were evaluated in 2000, the result being over-exploitation. Today it is a regulated 
fishery (see appendix 2 for detailed description of the Galápagos fisheries). 
 
Finally, shark-finning is a broad, illegal and profitable activity that has expanded since the 
1990s due to demands of the Asian markets. There is no information on the scale of this 
practice in the Galápagos. 
 
To summarize, fisheries have passed through different phases: whale and seal fur hunting in the 
early 19th century led to overexploitation and their decline in population with loss of economic 
viability. The second phase involved finfish and later lobster fisheries, with capture rates at a 
relatively low artisanal level through most of the 20th century. The last phase saw the boom of 
the sea cucumber fishery starting in 1992 and illegal shark fin harvest that drastically changed 
the economics and politics of fisheries on the islands.  
 
In 1997 the Charles Darwin Research Station (CDRS), the Galápagos National Park Service 
(Marine Resources Unit) and the four cooperatives on the Galápagos launched a Participative 
Fisheries Monitoring programme (PFM) in order to establish scientific basis for sustainable 
management of fishing resources15. The findings of the PFM are used by the bodies responsible 
for managing the Galápagos Marine Reserve such as PMB and IMA. This program usually 
monitors commercial species such as sea cucumber, lobster and finfish, shark, prawn, chitons, 
whelk and octopus (PNG & CDF 2003; Fundacion Natura & WWF 2001).  
 
Fishing is primarily controlled at ports and airports. Export of dried sea cucumber by boat is 
harder to control than lobster or finfish (which need to be frozen or at least chilled) because 
there are many ports and many illegal opportunities for smuggling the products (Kerr et al. 
2004). There are fishing quotas for lobster and sea cucumber for each season. The fishing 
quotas are defined for each fishing season at a time. Quotas are allocated equally to all 
members of the cooperatives, not based on historical catch. This means that full-time fishers 
                                                 
15 The programme is based on ”monitoring fishing activity and catches. When boats arrive at the three Galápagos 
ports – Puerto Ayora, Puerto Baquerizo Moreno, Puerto Villamil- fish catches are recorded and captains are 
interviewed for information such as sites, fishes, depth, number of crew and type of boat. Fishery observers travel 
on board of some boats to collect site-specific information. Monitoring data obtained in ports is compared with the 
information on the total number of fishing boats and crew leaving each port. There are certificates for all fish 
product leaving the islands and certificates for trade by fish dealers”(Fundacion Natura & WWF 2001:55).    
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receive no more quota than occasional fishers. Some quotas are traded but the market does not 
work well and some are not used. It is difficult for the fishers to assess their value in advance 
(Kerr et al. 2004:102). Some of the quota trade contracts make the price depend on the fish 
price during the year and some fisher’s individual quotas are not regarded as fair.  
 
The problem the fisheries on the islands face is an unstable economy, depending on different 
factors such as environmental and climatic changes, fuel prices, market prices, regulations, bans 
and quotas. Hence, the characteristics of the fisheries are seasonal, unstable, complex and 
subject to many managerial conflicts, as is explained in the following chapters. 
 
3.4.3 Tourism 
Tourism in the Galápagos is an important source of economic resource both for the country and 
the islands themselves. The tourism activity started at the end of the 1960s, but it was not until 
mid 1980s when tourism surpassed traditional farming and fishing as a source of employment 
(Falconi (2002) in Ospina 2004).  
In 2001, tourism was the third source of income in the Ecuadorian economy, after oil and 
banana exports (Table 1). Galápagos tourism generates a third of the income from the national 
tourism (Fundacion Natura & WWF 2002). 
 
Table 1: Income from export in Ecuador, 2001 (in thousands of USD) 
Oil 1.722 
Banana 827 
Receptive tourism 430 
Shrimps 278 
Elaborated sea food 269 
Natural flowers 212 
Source: Balanza de pagos del Ecuador, Banco Central, 2001. In Fundacion Natura & WWF, 2002 
 
At the time of our research more than 120.000 tourists had visited the islands in 2005 (Watkins, 
G., interview 2006; see appendix 4, figure 6 for the numbers of visitors to the Galápagos). Each 
tourist pays a fee for entering the Galápagos National Park, which is then distributed within the 
different institutions operating in the Galápagos.  
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Official tourist sites were established in the 1974 Galápagos National Park Management Plan, 
footpaths were defined for the use of tourists, and later it was determined that they could only 
visit the officially defined sites accompanied by naturalist tour guides, with the exception of 
certain sites near populated areas. There are 56 sites for terrestrial visit open for the public and 
62 marine sites for diving, which are in the Management Plan (1999). The GNPS controls and 
monitors the tourism activities on the islands. Marine tourism, including diving tours is the 
most dynamic business activity within the sector (Ribadeneira, M., interview 2006; Ospina 
2004). The carrying capacity is determined by the characteristics of each site. Nevertheless, 
there are observations that many sites are over-visited and others are utilized below their 
capacity (Edwin Naula, Director of the tourism unit of GNP, interview 2006).  
 
Tourism in the Galápagos has always been water-borne and water-based. Today, tourism is 
mainly driven by agencies selling packets of “sailing tours and cruises” with various types of 
boats, services, prices, etc. But in general, a trip to the Galápagos is considered expensive and 
exclusive. Tourists spend very short time in the main towns of the islands. In a study of the 
fisheries labor force vs. tourist activities, Hardner and Gomez quote that from the 91.342 
arrivals of 2003, just 8. 355 visitors stayed in hotels on the islands, while 55.745 stayed on 
board a boat (2004:5-6). Nevertheless, there is a market for “economy tourism” based on the 
islands, with hotel accommodation and day-trip offers to nearby islands. Today, many local 
people have their own businesses taking tourists on daily boat trips, or owning hotels, 
restaurants, bars and discotheques.  
 
There are four types of tours on the islands, which are in the process of being regulated by the 
National Park authorities and the management system of the Marine Reserve. They are: 
navigable tours, navigable tours with diving, bay tours and bay tours with diving. Other 
activities and enterprises existing within the tourism sector are hotels, restaurants, tour 
agencies, transport and services. The number of tour visits in the Galápagos continue rising, 
though some enterprise categories are under utilized, especially those as hotels and restaurants. 
Many cruise companies are operating at their full capacity, covering their capacity better than 
those companies on land (Hardner & Gomez 2004). 
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Taylor et al. (2002) emphasize the correlation between tourism and economic and population 
growth on the Galápagos, which have created political pressure to restrict tourism and 
migration in an effort to preserve the islands’ unique ecology.  
 
In 1995 the geographer Claude de Miras estimated that only 7.6% of tourist expenditures enter 
the island economy. Zador argued that more than 90% of the income generated by Galápagos 
tourism is absorbed directly by the two airlines serving the islands and by cruise ships based 
physically on the islands but owned by local operators in mainland Ecuador (cruise ships based 
outside the Galápagos are no longer permitted) (in Taylor et al. 2002:6). Wurtz el al. conclude 
that the spillover of tourism income into the island economy depends upon where the tourists 
lodge. Those who stay on cruise ships contribute much less to the local economy (in Taylor et 
al. 2002).  
  
A combination of agents and factors related to tourism and the local economy lead to an 
expansion in real economic output of goods whose demand is stimulated, directly or indirectly, 
by tourism. Taylor et al. (2002) in their article on the economics of ecotourism on the 
Galápagos conclude that the expansionary influences of tourism also stimulate population 
growth through migration to fill jobs linked to tourism. With this spiral of growth that nature-
tourist destinations create, incentives to either conserve or exploit the natural resource base are 
possible. 
 
3.4.4 Science and conservation 
The first steps taken officially by the Government of Ecuador to safeguard native species of the 
Galápagos date back to 1934, where protection was given to certain animals of the islands and 
legal provision was made for the declaration of reserves and national parks of Ecuador. At the 
same time it was prohibited for anyone to acquire land in the archipelago without the prior 
permission of local administrative authorities - including scientific expeditions - (Black 1989: 
266). In 1936 a decree was issued setting aside 14 of the islands as reserves. 
 
Different reports and requests from international scientists led to the formation of a Galápagos 
Committee at the International Congress of Zoology in London in 1958, leading to the creation 
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in 1959 of a special body in Brussels, under Belgian law, named the Charles Darwin 
Foundation for the Galápagos Isles. 
Already at that time there were underlined three main points: 
- That the Galápagos has strictly limited potential for agricultural development, 
- That the islands possess a unique fauna and flora of outstanding importance for  science 
- That the region has an incalculable potential for tourism (Black 1989:267) 
 
The Charles Darwin Research Station (CDRS) was founded in 1964 on the island of Santa Cruz 
with the support of UNESCO, IUCN and the Government of Ecuador. A 30-year agreement 
was made between the government and the Charles Darwin Foundation setting the duties and 
functions of the research station (Ospina 2004; Smith 1989). 
The CDRS determined the reserve zones, the plants and animals that required priority in 
conservation, control or extermination (Black 1989:267). To carry out these tasks the CDRS 
appointed the islands’ first conservation officer in 1964. The next step was to proclaim reserve 
status of all unpopulated islands and the setting up of protected zones on those with farming 
communities. In 1959 the archipelago was declared a national park, and in the 1960s nearly 
nine-tenths of the land area of the archipelago was assigned as part of the national park limited 
to onshore areas only. 
 
Furthermore, there was established a Galápagos National Park Service (GNPS) to help develop 
and control the restrictions of human activities, including tourism, that were already adversely 
affecting the environment (Black 1989). The GNPS and the CDRS functioned from the 
beginning closely, a symbiosis that became a key feature in the development of the future 
scientific and conservation philosophy and policy development of the islands.  
 
Further, it was argued that if the government would support conservation, tourism would give 
important revenue for this purpose. Following this criteria, a former secretary-general of the 
Charles Darwin Foundation in the 1980s wrote “…it was anything but evident and legitimate at 
that time to ask: What was Ecuador to get out of this peculiar, generous and unprecedented deal 
with international science? The eventual answer was: the tourist industry” (Smith 1989:271). 
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In 1986 the Galápagos was declared a Marine Resources Reserve to coordinate policies for 
interdependent marine and terrestrial systems and to regulate human activities in the marine 
areas assuring their compatibility with national goals for environmental conservation (Broadus 
1985)16. Today, the protected areas of the province of the Galápagos are the Galápagos 
National Park (GNP) and the Galápagos Marine Reserve. The management staff of the GNP is 
in charge of both protected areas. The National Park Service, GNPS, “manages marine research 
and is responsible for coordinating conservation and sustainable use of the Marine Reserve. 
This role includes administering the instruments of policies and planning that the management 
plan requires. GNPS has the power to enforce the provisions relating to the Marine Reserve” 
(Kerr et al. 2004:101). The Marine Reserve is zoned and regulated for different uses. Three 
basic zones are distinguished: port zones, limited use zones and multiple use zones.  
 
Conservation is key for the use and management of the islands. Activities vary from 
conservation of endangered and threatened species to the breeding and reproduction in captivity 
and eradication of invasive and introduced species17 (Interviews with staff from GNPS, 2006). 
Regulation of tourism, fisheries and extraction of raw material, such as sand and wood, in areas 
of the park and the marine reserve is also a responsibility of the park authorities. They give 
operation licenses, maintain official registration of fishers and authorize filming and research. 
Furthermore, the GNPS patrols marine zones to detect illegal fishing. 
 
The Charles Darwin Foundation is the leading research body on the islands that manage and 
take decisions in the Participative Management System of the Galápagos Marine Reserve. They 
specialize in studies related to captures, marine species densities, counting of species, 
reproduction and management. Both the GNP and the CDRS deal with environmental education 
and communication towards the awareness of environmental issues on the islands. Their target 
groups are mainly schools, natural resource users and actors of the islands. 
 
                                                 
16 Amongst the different titles and acknowledgments Galápagos was one of the first four natural areas to be 
declared a World Heritage by UNESCO. In 2001 UNESCO assigned the status of Natural Patrimony of Humanity 
to the Marine Reserve, including it to the already existing terrestrial Biosphere Reserve site declared within the UN 
International Man and Biosphere Program (PNG 2003; Broadus 1985). 
17 Terrestrial iguana and different varieties of giant tortoises are some of the endangered species protected and 
under captivity to be later re-introduced in islands where they are fragile and few. Goats, pigs, rats are introduced 
species to be eradicated from the islands. Plants such as mora, guayaba and cedro are invasive species to be 
eradicated.  A system to combat the introduction of insects and new diseases is also under development, using 
quarantine and inspection, especially in ports and airports.  
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A major change in the management of the Galápagos happened in 1998, after a new Ecuadorian 
Constitution entered into force in August 1998. This new constitution made major structural 
changes in the architecture of the national regions, with the de-centralization as key point, and 
the opening of doors to the development of special regimes for territorial administration based 
on demographic and environmental considerations.  
With this new process of the constitution as a key national context, as well as a series of 
conflicts and local factors in the Galápagos, the Special Law for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Development of the Province of Galápagos was approved in March 1998. A new 
regime was formed, which we describe and analyze in detail in the following chapters. 
 
To summarize, science and conservation has always been a key sector ruling and organizing 
resource management on the islands, while fishing and tourism have been the main economic 
sectors, especially since the 1970s. All three sectors are today powerful social actors, with their 
own resources and interests to struggle for, as we explain in the following chapters. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:  THE SOCIAL ACTORS AND USERS OF THE 
GALÁPAGOS MARINE RESERVE 
 
In this chapter we focus on the main actors and users of the resources of the Marine Reserve: 
the fishermen, the tourism sector and the conservationists. These users become actors in the 
way that they are part of the decision-making processes of the management system and in the 
political and economic arena. 
 
4.1 The fishermen 
The population of fishermen is diverse, with various factors of internal differentiation between 
the fishers, which affect their social relations and political alliances and positions. 
 
There are different ways that one could classify the fishing sector. For Ospina (2005) the main 
aspects of differentiation are as follows: 
- The variations between the islands of residence (each island has its own characteristics 
in relation to the type of fishing, methods, relations with authorities, etc.). 
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- The  fisher’s place of origin, such as the ones living on the islands for decades, migrants 
from the 1990s, and a group of recent migrants  related to commerce, services and 
public employment. 
-  The degree of dedication to the activity: fishers who fish permanently, some who only 
have the fishing license and others who fish sporadically. Or as Keer et al.(2004) 
described, long-term local fishers, part time local fishers, and short –term migrants from 
the continent who are considered to have “ no interest in the long-term health of the 
fishery”.  
- The social diversity and division of labor within the fishing sector (Ospina 2005: 18-
19). 
 
For Klever Lopez, from the fishing cooperative of Santa Cruz, “there are very well defined 
groups of fishers according to the type of fishing product and labor: one group, which is the 
majority of fishers who are dedicated to the export products such as sea cucumber and lobster, 
and those who are dedicated to the finfish fisheries which are very few people now. But we 
have also divisions between those who own boats, which are the “capitalists”, and those fishers 
who do not have a boat and work for the “capitalists” or just fish in association with boat 
owners, and all of them are members of the cooperatives”(Klever Lopez interview 2006). 
 
For many authors and researchers (Ospina 2004, 2005; Ramirez 2004, Ribadeneira, M. 
interview 2006) social and labor division in the fishing sector are: Boat owners (armadores); 
divers (buzos); assistants such as conductors of small boats (pangueros) and cooks; and 
(comerciantes) local traders of lobster, sea cucumber and fish.  
  
As the fishers are a diverse sector in its social composition, there is also income 
differentiation18. Although, there is an economic and social stratification, all fishers suffer from 
instability of fishing, as they depend on seasonal quotas and bans, as well as environmental and 
climatic changes and factors. As export-oriented fishing in the Galápagos is seasonal - during 
some months and even years fisheries are closed - fishers have to complement their income 
with other activities, which vary from family to family. 
 
                                                 
18 Boat owners are the ones who earn more as well as divers. Divers do not need to invest in operative issues as the 
owners do. Assistants get the lowest share of income. 
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The key to understanding the fishing community is its relatively young history. The majority of 
the fishers arrived on the islands in the last decade and most of them neither had knowledge of 
the local Galápagos fisheries, nor any knowledge of fishing. Ramirez accounts for only 24% of 
the migrants arriving to the Galápagos as previously engaged in fishing, the remaining 76% had 
other previous occupations. (Ramirez 2004:107). Despite of the conception of the Galápagos as 
a marine protected area threatened by local artisanal fishing, in 2005 the fishers comprised only 
4,2 % (1001 fishers) of the total population and with the depending of fishing extended families 
– 15,2 % (3583 persons) (Castro 2005) (see appendix 4, figures 2 and 3). 
 
The “new generation” fishers have been learning by doing, but also from the “old generation” 
fishers who were engaged in coastal fin-fishery and lobster fishery (fishers, interviews 2006). 
But there has been an important input from contacts with industrial fishers, which introduced 
them to the long-line techniques for open sea fishing as well as the use of a hooka for lobsters 
and sea cucumber collection. 
Methods used and the types of captured species are mainly export-oriented, where market and 
income incentives have determined the change in their lifestyle. For Ramirez (2004) the 
objective of the fisherman is to have an efficient catch, without caring about the damage 
caused. Therefore, the conflicts between the conservationists and fishers about the bans on the 
use of long-line and harpoons and other measures are far from being accepted by fishers. The 
maximization (to exploit it to the maximum) of resources drives the fisher’s practical habitus 
and cognitive behavior, and commands their daily production and economic activity (Ramirez 
2004). 
 
The most important factor of change in the fisher’s life is that there is a fast and progressive 
dislocation of their traditional farming economy to their introduction to a “protected” area 
under the dominant image of an ideal place for making easy and fast money. Fishing in “El 
Dorado” (image of a place full of gold and richness) and the myth of the turtle with the golden 
eggs of the Galápagos, are central to the fishers’ perception of a nature that has to be exploited 
and extracted at its maximum.  
Moreover, as Ramirez (2004) states and is confirmed by our interviewees, the perception of the 
Galápagos is not only purely economic, but is also a place where people can live in peace and 
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harmony with the environment, “where stillness still exists, as it is a forgotten value in the cities 
and other regions of the country “ (Interview Maron Mieles, fisher). 
In this sense we believe that people from the Galápagos have different kinds of interests, 
different “realms” in the language of Arendt (1969), which are mixed in the symbolic, cultural, 
social, private and public worlds of life and therefore actors become also citizens and vice 
versa. 
 
4.2 The fisher’s cooperatives 
Fishing cooperatives were created in the beginning of the 1990s on each of the main islands. 
Their creation was related with fishing conflicts stirred by a seven-year ban on lobster 
collection and an unlimited ban of sea cucumber collection from 1992 (Ospina 2005:9). 
Therefore, the fisher’s cooperatives from their origins have been guild associations rather than 
enterprise associations (Ibid). 
 
Until 1997 the four cooperatives were relatively small. None of them had more than 35 
members. The fishing boom of the 1990s led to a fast increase of the fishing sector: from below 
200 fishers in the 1970s to 992 in 2004 with rapid escalation of growth between 1999 and 2002, 
when it peaked (see appendix 4, fig 2,3,4). The number of fishers stabilized in 2003 when 
GNPS introduced a moratorium on inclusion of new members into the cooperatives (Diaz et al. 
2005: 17) The new institutional conditions put forward by the Special Law to control the 
growth of the sector are: i) each fisherman has to be a cooperative member and ii) he has to 
have permanent residence in the Galápagos. 
 
The fisher’s sector has been through different processes and changes, with nothing less than 
high levels of conflict. Thus, the fisheries and fishers are the most researched themes in the 
Galápagos19 - the studies vary on methods used, emphasis, characterization, positions and 
perceptions of the researchers.  
  
Some authors claim the consistent increase of registered fishers and number of boats as one of 
the main characteristics of change and conflict (Ben Yami 2001)20. The increase in fishers and 
                                                 
19 See Ospina 2004b for a “Commented Bibliography” on studies of the Galápagos society(1988-2004). 
20 Even though figures with the precise number vary in the documents and articles, according to Ben- Yami in 
1982 there were around 120 fishers in the islands, which were mainly doing finfish fishery. In 1993 there were 370 
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fishing fleets appears to have been largely driven by the opening of the sea cucumber fisheries 
in 1999 and 2000, with many persons having no previous history of fishing entering this high 
profitable market (Fundacion Natura & WWF 2001:56). 
Many fishers commented that they could not deny the entrance of members of their family or 
close friends to the cooperatives. The mixture of social relations and sea cucumber boom 
explained the increase of members in the cooperatives. For example, on Santa Cruz, the 19 
original members suddenly received 105 and then 108 new members (Klever Lopez interview) 
or on Isabela in 2000 the cooperative accepted 150 new members (Ben Yami 2001). 
The increase in the number of fishers is also due to the new Special Law which states that only 
artisanal fishing is allowed, while fishers have to be subscribed to one of the four cooperatives 
of the islands to obtain the Parma license, as active fishers. Many of the island’s interviewees 
told us that people who are not fishers who work in public institutions, trading etc. got access to 
the cooperatives and the fishing Parma license. As Ospina states “their objective was not to 
miss this opportunity to gain a fishing license, having the possibility in the future to participate 
in a fishery season or use the fishing quota to obtain the tourism quota, that had already been 
closed since 1990” (Ospina 2004:31). 
 
Today, the registration of new fishers to the cooperatives is closed. This has resulted in signs of 
“ageing”, as only the fisher’s sons are allowed be registered as new members, yet few of them 
have the interest in following their father’s footsteps. As expressed by the administrator of the 
Santa Cruz cooperative, today cooperatives are “mainly an obligation and a standstill 
institution” (Lopez, K., interview 2006).  
 
Kerr et al. (2004) believe that the growth of the cooperatives is a political strategy to win power 
in the decision-making bodies at a regional level and in the PMB. Klever Lopez, the 
administrator of the fisher’s cooperative in Santa Cruz said, “in the beginning the strategy was 
to win a political and social presence - the bigger the group, the bigger the pressure. Afterwards 
fishers organised a guild to defend the fisheries against industrial fishing and later against the 
conservationists. We were never structured and organised as a productive enterprise” (Lopez, 
K. interview 2006). 
                                                                                                                                                           
fishers and 101 fishing boats. In 1996 there were 596 fishers and 270 fishing boats. In 1998 there were already 613 
fishers, indicating an increase of 34% in two years (Bin Yami 2001). The total number of fishers on the GNPS 
registry in 2000 was 682, whereas the total number of fishers in the four island cooperatives was 1.014 (Fundacion 
Natura & WWF 2001:55). 
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The growth of the cooperatives meant also an increase of internal heterogeneity in terms of 
types of people, diversity of interests and political positions. There was also an important 
increase in tension, as the high number of fishers also meant more competition for resources 
(Ospina 2005). 
Many authors (Ospina 2005, Ramirez 2004, Ben Yami 2001, Kerr et al.2004) agree on the 
disunion of cooperatives. All the fishers expressed disappointment about the cooperative 
movement in contrast with the stronger labor unions and social organizations in mainland 
Ecuador21. 
 
During our field research on Santa Cruz and Isabela, most of the fishers and members of the 
cooperatives complained about the cooperatives. The main issues were the following: 
- There are always the same leaders 
- There is no help for fishing activities 
- There is no access to credit 
- Most of the members do not participate at the general Assemblies and meetings 
- Fishers do not know the agenda of meetings 
- There is no flow of information from the Direction Board to the members 
- Decisions are made without asking the members 
- Personal interests are set by the leaders 
- Monthly payments to the cooperative are done just to keep the fishing license  
- Many members have long delays of payments to the cooperatives 
- They do not know how the cooperative’s money is spent  
 
Nevertheless, on the one hand according to Ospina, no important decisions are made without 
the approval of the members, otherwise some leaders would have been removed from their 
posts. The Assembly controls the critical and important issues such as the sea cucumber and 
lobster fisheries (Ospina 2005:12).  
On the other hand, they have a strong leadership, which has influence on the institutional and 
political life of the fishers. The diversity of political positions of the leaders reflects the internal 
                                                 
21 The social movements in Ecuador have had an important role in the of the countries´ social and political 
changes. One example is the indigenous movement, which has gathered power and became a key political actor in 
the national society. 
 
Stacey and Fuks                                                                 Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 57
heterogeneity of the cooperatives members. Although leaders have their own ideas about the 
management of the resources, all fishers and leaders have a common opinion about the 
conservationist sector: that it is perceived as their “common enemy” (Ospina 2005). 
 
Some authors and organizations (Berkley 2003, Hern, A. Interview 2006) agree that the tactics 
and strategies used by the fisher cooperatives for demanding and negotiating is through social 
upheaval. Since the introduction of bans on sea cucumber and lobster fishery strikes, and 
violent actions have increased (see figure with days of strikes in appendix). For example, in 
2000 after the disagreement on the ban and later establishment of a quota for lobster capture, 
fishermen went on a violent strike destroying the home of the Director of the GNP on Isabela 
island, disrupting tourist activity, and preventing employees of the GNP, CDRS from working 
for several days. Armed guards were flown from the mainland to ease the situation. After failed 
negotiations, including the fishing sector’s rejection of an offer by the CDRS and GNPS to 
increase the original quota, the lobster season reopened for a short time (Buckley 2003; 
www.neweraGalápagos.org). 
 
In 2004 fishermen from the cooperatives of Santa Cruz and Isabela islands occupied the offices 
of the Galápagos National Park (GNP) and Charles Darwin Research Station (CDRS) during 11 
days. Occupation ended by reaching an agreement with the minister of the environment and the 
government of Ecuador. The fishermen’s protest sought changes in the rules governing fishing, 
tourism, and other activities in the Galápagos National Park and Marine Reserve. The new 
agreement with the government included a long list of demands from fishermen, which from 
the conservationist point of view were viewed as threatening the island’s marine environment 
and those who depend on it. Furthermore, “the agreement sets yet another precedent of 
fishermen getting their way via the threat of violence, and ignores the mechanism for conflict 
resolution established in the Special Law for the Galápagos”22. 
 
For Ospina (2005) many of these acts of violence are a product of particular situations:  
- The exhaustion of stock of the sea cucumber (Stichopus fuscus)  
- A decay of profitability in export activities (fisheries and tourism) 
                                                 
22 retrieved on 26-07-05 from http://www.neweraGalápagos.org/news.php?id=65_02-28-04_11-
day_Occupation_Ends 
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- A change of political position among the fisher’s leaders (there is an erosion of the old 
alliance between the fishing sector with the right wing PSC (Partido Social Cristiano) -
which was in alliance with the local conservationists and development agencies in the 
1990s- to the shift of the fisher’s support to the central party DP (Democracia Popular). 
 
Even though there is still potential for strikes and uprisings today, the fishers participate with 
one representative of the cooperatives in the management participatory body of the Marine 
Reserve.  
 
The turning point  
There is a dispute for the access of and control over resources. The fishermen are interested in 
using the resources as a source of living, income and work. 
As the fisher’s origin in the Galápagos is mainly due to the boom in export-oriented fishing, 
they have an extractive vision of the island’s resources. Fishers have a perception that the 
golden eggs are in the sea and they have to extract everything they can.   
 
Despite the strong individual leaders and their key political role in the Galápagos, fisher’s 
cooperatives are weak in terms of organizational structure, lacking a common identity and a 
sense of union and belonging. They can be fairly well organized and unified when they have to 
react against restrictions to their resource rights. But on a daily basis and overall structure there 
are no common objectives, positions and long-term strategies for resource management. 
Although there is internal differentiation of interests and positions, a common perception 
unifies them: conservationists are against them… 
 
4.3 The tourism sector 
According to Ospina (2004) there are four main actors in this sector of the Galápagos: the tour 
agencies, in charge of marketing; tour operators, who are generally owners or direct 
administrators of the boats and in charge of operations and services of the trips; the guides, that 
operate as middle-men between the client and the operator, who are also in charge of 
communicating both the rules and the attractions of the islands and the owners of services on 
land (hotels, restaurants, shops with handcrafts, discotheques, etc) (Ospina 2004:36-37). 
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Generally, most tourists buy a “tour package” in Quito or Guayaquil at a tour agency, with a 
fixed or pre-determined itinerary. On arrival in the Galápagos, at the airport of Baltra, a guide 
will be waiting for the tourists. The “naturalist guide” (that is educated and trained by the 
GNPS, under the Special Law that all tourists agencies have to use an official naturalist guide) 
will give all the instructions and rules of the GNP and the Marine Reserve. One guide can take 
up to 16 passengers. If the boat is bigger the tour must get extra guides according to the 
numbers of passengers23. 
 
There is an old alliance between conservation and tourism. Since the creation of the CDF at the 
end of the 1950s tourism was one of the main activities that was developed on the islands. 
Conservation programs became dependent on tourism, as they were funded from tourism 
revenues, such as entrance fees to the islands and to CDRS.  
Furthermore, tour operators market the Galápagos using romantic ideals of the “wild” and 
“pure nature”, which respond to the notion of a lost paradise (Christophe Grenier 2000, Ospina 
2004).  Both conservationists and tourism operators have always utilized this institutional 
narrative - a narrative that calls for a nature without humans and a time and space without 
human intervention.  
 
Tour agencies have a well-planned marketing strategy to sell: package deals that directly or 
indirectly show animals and birds in their isolated and unique environment. No local  
people are shown or appear in their catalogues. Tourists that pay for the trip are also  
expecting to get a tour to the Darwin islands, where animals and birds live in perfect relation 
with each other and their surroundings. 
As Ospina (2004) analyses, tourists as well as conservationists share a common origin and 
perception: they come from cities, urban worlds, and modern lifestyles with environmental 
problems/pollution. In the Galápagos they seek the “lost paradise”. 
 
The fast increase in tourist arrivals and the consolidation of the alliance between the 
conservationist and tourist sectors caused a radical change in the economics of the islands. 
                                                 
23 The tourists that are without a tour at their arrival in Galápagos can find tour agencies and local guides in Santa 
Cruz for some short walks and tours around the bay or find local offers for different sailing tours with variation of 
offers, prices, quality and services. 
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Traditional activities such as agriculture, livestock and later fishing became secondary, while 
tourism emerged as a main economic sector with a vast potential for continuous growth.   
 
In the scenario of the 1960s-1980s fishers and farmers entered the tourism sector as service 
assistants (as cookers, marines, etc) or as owners of boats that were accommodated for tourism. 
Fishers earned more in tourism than in fishing. However, when the tourism sector and actors 
became well established and products became well defined and consolidated together with new 
regulations, fishers and new-comers had no more possibilities to enter the tourism sector. 
 
GNPS is in charge of controlling tourism activities along with the administrative judgment and 
sanctioning of illegalities. Nevertheless, there is a local perception that tourism illegalities are 
neither “seen” by the Park authorities nor are they judged or sanctioned. Based on the GNP data 
on felonies, in 2004 there were 23 administrative processes for illegal activities by fishers, 
while 62 were committed by the tourism sector.24 Although the number of tourism illegalities is 
higher than fishing illegalities25, infringements by fishers are more visible for conservationists 
and general public and have a sound repercussion in the media. Although the negative 
environmental impact of tourism is known, a fisher is still considered the main lawbreaker, the 
one who does most harm to the environment. Oscar Cortez, a lawyer of the GNP confirmed that 
the tourism sector has more infringements (not felonies) than that of the fishing sector, but that 
its environmental impact is less. (Cortez, O., interview 2006). He argued that people often do 
not denounce illegal activities to the GNPS because everybody knows each other on the islands 
and are related in one way or another. Denouncing a potential employer would jeopardize 
future job opportunities. Furthermore, according to various interviews, GNPS has failed to back 
up a few denouncements and thereby has given a negative incentive to do so for all the other 
tourist guides and inhabitants of the Galápagos. 
                                                 
24 According to Oscar Cortez, the lawyer of the GNP, this was a product of a very unstable year for the Direction 
of the Park, with many changes of  directors and therefore there was a lack of control and monitoring of fishing 
and other activities (Int. Oscar Crotez, 2006). 
25 In the article ”The admistrative judgement and effeciency of sanctions imposed in Galápagos”, Monica 
Rivadeneira (2006) shows statistically that in the last two years the relation was two processes for fishing 
infringements for seven processes of infringements in tourism. 
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4.4 Conservationists and development organizations 
The conservation sector has since the creation of the Galápagos National Park and the Marine 
Reserve been a key actor in the Galápagos, dealing with policies and leading research 
programmes, with influence on fisheries, tourism, planning, and the general management of 
resources.  
 
The Charles Darwin Foundation (CDF)26 and the Galápagos National Park (GNP)27 are the 
main conservationist institutions. Each of them has their own research institutions and/or areas 
dealing with marine resources, tourism, administration and laws etc.  
In general, since the end of the 1990s both institutions grew economically and in terms of 
personnel - but also in terms of political power, as they became key actors in the decision-
making management process of the island’s resources. The Special Law of 1998 gave 
administrative and economic independence to the GNP and the possibility to rule and decide 
locally about the management of resources. 
  
The upward spiral of environmental and social conflicts since the 1990s opened an entrance for 
new conservationists and development organizations to move in28. Obviously, their budgets, 
objectives, methods and aims differ from each other. Even though these organizations have 
their personnel and offices on the islands, they are considered by many local inhabitants as 
“external” actors, guided by external institutions (such as the Ministry of Environment) and 
authorities both from mainland Ecuador and from international environmentalist sectors 
(Ospina 2004, pers. comm. fishers, researchers from local NGO). There is a common 
                                                 
26 In 1989 the CDF had 60 employees, while in 2002 there were 174. In 1993 operated with a budget of around 1 
million USD, while in 2002 had more than 5 million USD. (Ospina 2004:39). 
27 The GNP depended during many years of the monetary assignations of the central state and therefore could not 
search for and administer independently international funds. Since 1998, with the Special Law the GNP got 
independence for administering the protected areas in the islands. 45% of the entrance fees are assigned to the 
GNP (which represent annually around 2,5 millions) and additionally there is a fund from the central government 
for the payment of their employees. Today, the GNP can contract personnel, build infrastructure, and make 
financial agreements with international and national funds (Ospina 2004, Ramirez 2004). 
28 Among the main organizations are the following: Wild Aid, World Wild Fund (WWF), Conservation 
International (CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), Fundacion Natura, Universidad San Francisco de Quito, the 
Spanish NGO Araucaria, the Japanese JICA. Multilateral organizations and banks are also in the list of donors of 
development and environmental projects and programs, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Bank (BID in 
Spanish). Most of these organizations have their local offices and administration in Ecuador mainland (except 
Wild Aid that has it central office in Santa Cruz island).  
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perception between local inhabitants, especially the fishers that these NGOs are on the islands 
due to mainly economic interests and prestige. Economic, because there is a considerable 
amount of money involved in the projects that supply an important sum in relation to the local 
economy. It is also considered that having an environmental protection project in the 
Galápagos, the NGOs can easily get access to funds (anonymous communication by a local 
NGO). 
 
Grenier (1994, 2000) analyzed in the 1990s that the images sent to Western countries of a 
pristine, protected and consecrated space of natural science, common to both conservationists 
and tourism institutions, was intended to get international funding (images sent out to donor 
countries) and to attract more tourists (by an exotic image). 
 
For environmentalists and conservation organizations the biological base and analysis is the one 
that counts the most in decision-making. In 1999 scientists and mainly biologists with expertise 
on the Galápagos published a document: A Biodiversity Vision for the Galápagos Islands 
(Charles Darwin Foundation & WWF, 2002) - its aim to formulate the optimum objectives for 
the conservation of the island’s marine and terrestrial biodiversity over the next 50 years. “Back 
to Eden – one last chance” the term coined at the meeting the biologists attended to. The point 
was that “the archipelago still retains 95% of their original, pre-human diversity of species, and 
important areas of modified habitat could eventually be restored, if radical steps are taken to 
control alien species and human activities” (Ibid: 1).  
 
Certain development trends are considered to be in conflict with the conservation of the 
Galápagos, especially the growth in three sources of pressure: human population, transport to 
and within the archipelago, and fishing. Without radical and innovative measures to halt these 
trends and mitigate their impacts on the native flora and fauna, the processes of ecological 
change already under way will lead inevitably to loss of populations, extinction of species and 
disruption of ecosystems and evolutionary processes (Ibid).  
It is considered a possibility to go back to an original environment without humans. This 
biodiversity strategy for conservation did not include any social and economic vision to be 
articulated to the biodiversity aspirations of the conservationists. Although this panel of the 
Galápagos’ experts mentioned conservation objectives compatible with principles of human 
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welfare and social justice, sustainability was a concept related only with biodiversity restoration 
rather than the link with environmental, social and economic sustainability. 
 
Since the arrival of Darwin, conservationists had converted the Galápagos into a unique space 
that attracted naturalists, biologists and environmentalists from the North. As Ramirez states, 
CDF and GNP have been founded under the primary concern of preservation to the natural 
laboratory that the Galápagos is considered to be (Ramirez 2004). Since the beginning of the 
20th century numerous publications referred to the islands as a “ living lab”, “the last paradise” 
or “the enchanted islands” promoting their image as a treasure to be protected and thereby 
producing the myth of the turtle with golden eggs (Ramirez 2004). 
 
Finally, we want to point out that these actors are the ones participating in the management 
body that we will describe in the next chapter, where “stakeholders” and “users” are present 
politically and economically in the Marine Reserve. But, what can be done about the “rest” of 
the galapagueños? What are their interests, desires and dreams of the Marine Reserve and the 
Galápagos as a society? We are not analyzing them here as they are not participating in the 
management body, our main study subject, but we consider that there is a need to see the 
galapagueño as a “citizen” in Arendt’s (1969) sense, where all groups (women, fisher’s wives, 
youngsters, migrants, students etc), individuals, sectors (farmers, traders, professionals from 
different areas etc.), families, and so forth are part of the local society with a high variation of 
people, realms and activities (see appendix 4, fig. 8 for economic activities in the Galápagos). 
The list can be large, as the society is broad in its characteristics and in permanent change and 
dynamics and therefore stakeholders cannot be considered the only ones with rights to 
participate in decision-making.    
  
The turning point: the myth of the turtle with the golden egg 
Conservation and tourism actors have built an image and concept of the islands as a pristine and 
balanced nature, without human intervention. Biodiversity restoration is the main goal of 
conservationists. 
The richness and uniqueness of the flora and fauna made possible the attention of  both 
conservationists and tourists. Although this image serves the strategy for obtaining funding for 
conservation and for tourism marketing, it is also an image attracting migrants. The fast growth 
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of tourism activities created a national perception that the islands offered easy well-paid work 
and a peaceful life. As detailed in chapter 3, population growth increased rapidly since the 
1990s. People from the mainland began to migrate to the Galápagos in search of a better life, in 
hope of finding El Dorado - the turtle with the golden egg. 
 
So, it is the building of images and media messages interacting with economic and legal 
incentives that make the Galápagos an interesting source of profit for the tourism agencies, 
conservationists, development agencies and fishers.  
 
 
CHAPTER 5:  SEARCHING FOR NEW MANAGEMENT MODELS 
 
In this chapter we analyze different resource management models and approaches that have 
been present in the Galápagos and are so far a key to the understanding of the socio-political 
and fisheries situation. 
In this way, we start to assess the changes in the management approach taking into 
consideration property rights and regimes, with power relations between the actors as a 
crosscutting aspect and sometimes as a main issue in the analysis.  
Thereafter, we analyze the changes in fisheries management, assessing new approaches to 
fisheries, such as the ecosystem context and the diversification model where the emergence of 
new alternatives are an important part of the agenda in the management bodies of the 
Galápagos. 
 
5.1 Shifting property models: from an open access to a common property 
The potential of sustainable management of the Galápagos Marine Reserve was diminished in 
the 1980s and especially in the 1990s due to severe conflicts, both locally and nationally, over 
the exploitation and management of the Reserve. There was a lack of legal framework for 
administering the Reserve, and the existing management plan was never accepted neither by the 
fishery sector of mainland Ecuador nor by the fishermen of the Galápagos. Additionally, there 
was an overlap of functions among the various institutions related to the Reserve (WWF & 
Fundación Natura 1998:14). Furthermore, during the 1990s a rapid economic and demographic 
change came about with the presence of unregulated industrial fishing and the appearance of a 
high-value fish market for Asia, encouraged a complex multi-stakeholder conflict (Heylings, P. 
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& Cruz, F. 1998). These conflicts of interest between the actors of the Marine Reserve were 
mainly as follows: between fishermen and tour operators, between conservationists and 
fishermen and between all these actors with industrial fishing groups in the mainland that led to 
a lack of proper management of the Reserve and to an inability to control the expansion of 
illegal sea cucumber and shark-fin fisheries as a result in high immigration flow (Ibid: 2). 
 
Until 1995 the main constraints hindering efforts to balance and manage tourism, fishing 
development and biodiversity conservation were as follows:  
• Lack of consensus among users on management objectives, centralized and sectoral 
control of the marine resources 
• Weak legal policy and administrative base for conservation  
• Limited institutional capacity of the Galápagos National Park  
• Limited local support for environmental management  
• Basic lack of information on the state of the resources  
• Lack of sustainable small-scale fishing systems - there was no unified organization to 
serve as a forum for analyzing fisheries management problems  
• Τhe presence of influential groups, with external interests, such as mainland sea 
cucumber exporters, the national and international fishing fleets, small scale fishermen 
from mainland and tourism companies, have all exerted pressure to open up the Marine 
Reserve to fishing and tourism, often without any consideration for the environment or 
the local community (WWF & Fundación Natura 1997/1998). 
 
We believe that these aspects were present in the Galápagos; nevertheless, they are also 
narratives within a sustainability and management discourse already existing at that time. The 
need of a rational and efficient institutional arrangement was the attempt to dominate the field 
of discursivity, competing to legitimize the “truth”, interpretations and consequent policies and 
interventions. Sustainable conservation towards the recuperation of species as it was before 
human population, the threat of over-exploitation and the need of actors’ participation at the 
exclusion of others were the nodal points capable of changing the rules of the game. 
 
In 1997 in a conflict analysis from the Galápagos Marine Reserve, Macdonald concluded that 
there was a serious lack of participation by the local population in decision- making and 
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problem solving. According to Macdonald, “much of the current management dilemma rests on 
the resident’s sense of rights to the resources. By contrast to those involved in common 
property management, residents of the Galápagos have a feeling of marginality and, with it, 
resentment as a result of government policies. These rules are perceived as alien, imposed and 
inappropriate. There is, therefore, little local support for compliance and few incentives for 
community self-monitoring” (Macdonald 1997: 7). 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that it is the manner in which rules have been introduced 
(exclusion, lack of participation) that frustrates and angers local people, not simply the rules 
themselves. The resulting feeling, in turn, leads the residents to act as if the land and marine 
resources were located in areas of “open access” despite clear state claims and related rules 
(Macdonald 1997: 8).  At the same time, national government agencies have been generally 
unable or unwilling to enforce their unpopular rules, and inadequate facilities and lack of 
appropriate funding constraints regular monitoring. 
 
Therefore, it was suggested at the time that there was a need to change the pattern of the 
property regime (state owned property) using an alternative model: the Reserve should be 
considered and managed as a “common property”. In this way, the users could participate in the 
local institutions to help define, review and monitor access to resources and conservation 
(Macdonald 1997; WWF & Fundación Natura 1997/1998). 
The Ecuadorian government will never, and has never given up property of a protected area or 
any other category of area. Therefore, the state would remain the property owner of the 
Galápagos Islands. Nevertheless, the idea was to start building the path to a new regime as if it 
was a common property management in a protected area, to increase local participation in 
decision-making under certain collaborative and co-management principles. 
The requirements for a common property management are: 
- A well-defined and limited community 
- Locally defined management rules 
- Locally developed institutions that are accepted and stable 
- Higher levels of authority that support local institutions and help to monitor and enforce 
compliance  
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- In fishery co-management specifically, the right to exclude others from participating in 
fishing (Macdonald, T. 1997; Ostrom, E. 1990, Reiser; 1997 quoted in Heylings, P. & 
Cruz 1998:3). 
 
All of these conditions were absent in the Galápagos until 1998. Furthermore, there were no 
favorable national policies and political support for radical change. There was a long way to go 
to build up the right conditions to change the management situation.  
 
5.2 The participatory arena: building co-management and dialogue in a conflictive 
scenario 
In 1997 the Galápagos National Park Service and the Charles Darwin Research Station took the 
initiative and began a process of participatory planning while overhauling the Marine Reserve 
management plan.  The so- called “Grupo Nucleo” was formed, made up of the fishing, 
tourism, conservation, science and education sectors. There was a change from the situation of 
conflict to a proposal for consensus within a participatory management regime. This Group 
“had the unique opportunity to draft an appropriate legal framework and to revise the 
management plan and thus lay the foundations for institutionalization of the conflict and 
participative management of the Reserve” (Heylings, P. & Cruz.F 1998). 
 
In March 1998 the National Congress approved the “Law on the Special Regime for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Development of Galápagos”, which we refer to in this thesis as 
the Special Law. The Special Law creates a new category of Marine Reserve29 and defines the 
stakeholders of the Reserve, excluding the industrial fishing sector. The Law officially 
recognizes the 40 nautical miles surrounding the archipelago as a protected area, with multiple 
use and integrated administration; restricting fisheries in the Reserve to artisan fishing by 
registered members of the islands cooperatives, and establishing a structure and strict rules to 
control immigration, and other tourism regulations.  
  
It is the Directory of the National Park who is in charge of the administration and management 
of the Reserve. A Management Plan defines the alliances and levels of participation and 
                                                 
29 The Galápagos Marine Resources Reserve was created in 1986 by special decree. This category of reserve did 
not exist outside this decree in the national legislation, making enforcement difficult. In 1996 the National 
Protected Areas Authorities (INEFAN) unilaterally declared it a Biological Reserve, bringing it under national 
protected area legislation. There was legal and administrative confusion (Heyling, P. & Cruz, F. 1998:5).  
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responsibilities of the users. The policies and planning instruments are run by the following 
main principles: participative, responsible, adaptive, precautionary, sustainable and integral 
management (Ley Especial 1998, Plan de Manejo de la Reserva Marina 1999).  
 
The Special Law also created the Participatory Management Board (PMB), a mechanism for 
representatives of the fishing, tourism and conservation sectors to collaborate on the planning 
and management of activities in the Reserve, as well as the Inter-institutional Management 
Authority (IMA). This is headed by the Minister of the Environment and encompasses both 
government departments and primary stakeholder groups as the Reserve’s highest decision-
making body30(see appendix 3 for the flow chart of PMS). “At the local level, it created an 
incentive for previously ignored parties to participate in the process, helped build consensus, 
increased transparency, and reduced conflict, at least temporarily” (Garlick 2002: 2). 
 
There are different levels of participatory management in protected areas ranging from 
consultation to co-management to transfer of authority over management (Borrini-Feyerabend 
1996). The Galápagos Marine Reserve is a system of contractual co-management where the 
national government and the National Park Service remain owners and managers of the Reserve 
(public property rights). Under a form of contractual agreement whose operating conditions are 
determined by the overall goal of the management plan - i.e. biodiversity protection and 
sustainable resource use - certain functions, responsibilities and levels of decision-making are 
delegated to an Inter-Institutional Management Authority at a national level and a Participatory 
Management Board at a local level (Heylings, P. & Cruz, F. 1998). It is a shared ownership 
between the government and the community, and as Ostrom (1990) argues, a system of 
complex and nested institutions. 
 
Although this new system was a benign solution to the previous situation, we argue that there is 
a problem with the underlying interpretations of participation: the system is built to take 
decisions efficiently, with the “direct users”, leading to a problem of democracy. As we 
analyzed in the previous chapter, only the most “active actors” with economical and political 
presence were able to participate in the new system. The ”rest” of the citizens were left outside. 
The stakeholder participation is behind the management rationality, where actors, users and 
                                                 
30 www.darwinfoundation.org 
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stakeholders take the decisions. The next sub-chapters analyze the relations between the actors 
involved in the management system and the fisheries’ approach within the system. 
 
5.3 The new system of participatory co-management 
The Participative Management System, PMS, integrates local users, the national government 
and conservationist NGOs in the decision-making process and administration of the area (see 
appendix 3 for the flow chart of PMS). 
The results of internal and external evaluations (WWF & Fundacion Natura 2001/2002) have 
given a view of the different perceptions of the sectors and users of the Marine Reserve and the 
Participatory Management System. The following are the main perceptions by the users and 
external evaluators of the Participatory Management System: 
Positive aspects: 
• The system allows participation from and dialogue between all the sectors 
• The system was designed through a participatory process 
• There is a Secretary of co-management for technical support 
• The National Park is part of the system and gives institutional support 
• There is a clear legal base for the system 
• The system is flexible 
• Decisions are taken by consensus 
• There is an agreement for area zoning and fishing calendar dates 
 
Challenges and constraints: 
• The knowledge about the system is not homogeneous between the different social 
groups 
• There are still only a few people who understand the whole system and its procedures 
for decision-making 
• There are external influences, affecting the nature of the system 
• Centralized power is confined to Santa Cruz (where the tour operators and researchers 
are situated) 
• Fishermen perceived it as a conflicting platform, where all sectors want to solve their 
problems. For the Charles Darwin Foundation and the National Park the system 
constructs a mutual understanding. 
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• Weakness of the local organizations, with important political influences over their 
authority 
• Lack of “scientific information” and poor communication between sectors 
• A lack of respect for agreements and lack of knowledge about agreements 
• The communities of the Galápagos are “young” because they are socially and culturally 
heterogeneous newcomers 
• There are still violent clashes between sectors 
• There is no internal statute for the proper functioning of the system 
• The system should also review and debate issues as tourism and conservation (fishery is 
the main issue and is always on the agenda) 
• The system should include the supervision of the Marine Reserve’s administration 
• The National Park should be more involved in exercising their conservation principles.  
(WWF & Fundacion Natura 2001/2002: 74-75). 
 
It is clear that a big effort from many institutions and actors, together with the political 
willingness and appropriate factors for paving the path, made it possible to establish such a 
system, which has been seen internationally as an example of co-management of a protected 
area. We argue that the building of this system has also been part of a narrative and discourse 
that have been socially constructed. As Bech (1996) would put it, it is strategically defined and 
covered or dramatized in the public sphere with the help of scientific material supplied for the 
purpose.  
 
Although the above evaluations of the management system were done back in 2001-2002, 
conflicts and constraints hindering the process of participation and consensus were still alive in 
2006 during our visit to the islands. In almost all interviews we made to the fishers, farmers and 
people from outside the management system, their comments, tones and adjectives towards 
these bodies were very critical. The principles and narratives of the terms: sustainable, 
participative, flexible, adaptive and precautionary management in this case were conflicting. 
We believe that the understanding and practice of participation leads to a question of 
democracy and equity that are not covered in these principles. The people in the Galápagos (not 
participating in the management system or the fishers who participate) feel that they do not 
have a “say” and that rules are made with unequal participation. On the one hand, only a “few” 
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actors and users make decisions. Here we encountered another problem of legitimacy: why is it 
that just a few actors are participating and deciding - what about the “others”? Who has the 
right to participate in the management as citizens living in the society of the Galápagos? On the 
other hand we also encountered problems of equity: how are they distributing the benefits, how 
are they compensating the losses during periods of bans and how are they enforcing solutions? 
There are still many questions unanswered or with political pressure for avoidance. 
Conservationists commonly argue that locals have to understand that they are living in a 
protected area and therefore there are specific rules and constraints. If they do not like it then 
they have to leave the islands.   
Sergio Larrea, the facilitator of the PMB, stated that between 2003 and 2005 only 25% of the 
agremments reached by consensus in the PMB were complied (Larrea, S. interview 2006) We 
believe that this is a clear sign of the problems discussed above.  
 
On this basis, users decide the main aspects of the fisheries such as fishing techniques, size of 
permitted catch, fishing calendars, bans, quotas, proposals for new norms and fishing 
alternatives etc. All these aspects are of course a matter of intrigue and internal confrontation, 
which would make any institutional body of this type tremble. There are also many critical 
themes not discussed such as tourism, as analyzed in chapter four, that has an important impact 
on the environment, but has never been recognized neither as an aggressor nor as an extractor 
of resources. This gives an idea of the interests and perceptions of what is “the main threat”, 
who the aggressors are and what has to be limited, controlled and punished. 
  
Manuel Bravo, an ex-facilitator of the PMB recalled: “When things are not done well by a 
conflict management team and not taking the users seriously, then you will get the whole 
system into trouble. Here in the Galápagos things begin to get hot all the time, accumulating 
frustrations, misunderstandings with many issues and one day they explode like a bomb, pum! 
Then you have to start again by trying to solve them step by step, until you reach some results” 
(Bravo, M., interview 2006). 
 
5.4 Asymmetric relationships 
This new participative management system where users of the Marine Reserve have the 
possibility to sit around a negotiation table to discuss policies concerning management of a 
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protected area was the first and most valuable, serious and interesting process of 
decentralization in Ecuador.  
 
Thus, analysis of this participative platform has given an insight into the management of the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve with its constant social and environmental conflicts. We believe that 
different understandings, discourses and values given to the resources and activities can be 
conflictive. For Ramirez (2004), fishers use natural resources as a tool for an aim: commercial 
products. Fishing and the oceans are a source of employment, generating income and economic 
improvements. It is in this way an extractive vision. 
On the other hand, for conservationists, nature is a space to protect, conserve and restore.  
As a fisherman told Ramirez: “for the National Park a shark alive is more profitable, but for us 
is more profitable dead” (Ramirez 2004:153). These two visions and perceptions are 
encountered in the participative management bodies. Problems and people are treated 
differently. 
 
In the PMB decisions are taken by a consensus (and at IMA by votes) where each actor has to 
participate and represent their sector.  By this way the fishers have the right to have one leader 
representing the four cooperatives. Here we find a main conflict in participation: one leader 
cannot represent their heterogeneous community, with various interests. As we described in the 
previous chapter, fishers are neither unified nor have a common management strategy. 
Furthermore, the cooperatives continue existing because according to the Galápagos Special 
Law fishers have to maintain their fishing license through their membership.  
 
Generally for fishers, the AIM and MPB are not a negotiation-arena where their demands and 
interests are heard and agreed. When key aspects of the fisheries have to be decided such as 
quotas and bans, fishers are keener to use tactics such as: actions, blockades, kidnappings of 
animals and uprisings to get what they want. Moreover, the PMB has also been an important 
step for many fishery leaders to access other political positions, higher in the hierarchy of the 
local political world. The PMB serves a politician like a”show window” (Ramirez 2004:165), 
where he has the opportunity to show his abilities to maneuver, negotiate and present his 
position. 
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On the other side of the table, are the conservationists and the representatives of the tourism 
sector, which for many years have developed common alliances and have common perspectives 
towards the resources. They have, as we analyzed before, a common view of the Galápagos: a 
unique place of protection for science, for the stability of ecosystems and as an attraction for 
tourists and economic benefits. But they also see the fishermen as a weak sector, un-organized 
and without the skills to come up with common proposals based on scientific “data”. In this 
way, conservationism and tourism become more powerful actors in the decision-making 
processes of the participatory platform and a majority weight in the consensus process.   
 
Another important aspect which was well described by Ramirez (2004) is the way these 
asymmetric relations are represented, also in the control of information and the kind of data and 
language used in the PMB and IMA. When the actors have to present data to sustain a position 
or a negotiation, the information varies within the actors. As Ramirez stated: “it is not a matter 
of sitting all together around the negotiation table, but how they sit and what they can say and 
sustain” (Ramirez 2004:167). Furthermore, the conservationist sector has “the knowledge, the 
legitimacy of science and the power of technical data with a vast specialist vocabulary, 
resources and PhDs. On the other side, there are fishermen with the lost hope of being able to 
express what they feel and want in the same scientifically convincing way. Therefore they use 
threats and violent actions instead” (Ramirez 2004:167). 
 
In these negotiation platforms, where discussions are based on tons, quotas, weights, measures, 
fishing calendars, sites and zones etc. the “scientific” data and the scientists are the ones who 
possess the truth. Concepts and words such as sustainability, management, ecosystems etc., 
using indicators with nice Power Point presentations, are in the hands of the conservationists 
from the CDF, the GNPS, and the tourism sectors (Ibid.). These “rational arguments have a 
political and ideological common, dominant and hierarchical base, which is neither questioned 
nor explicit: there is a superiority of science over empirical knowledge. Science is on one side 
of the table” (Ibid:168).  
 
Conservationists ask the fishers to provide data to defend themselves when they present their 
positions, demands and alternatives. While doing our field research we had the opportunity to 
attend one of the PMB meetings as observers of a new way of fishers presenting their “data”. 
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The fishers’ strategy was to have an adviser (a French marine biologist) to help them provide 
the “scientific data”. His job was also to encourage the fishers of the four cooperatives to 
discuss common proposals, attend and finance their participation at the PMB meetings.  
 
There is also an internal hierarchy within the conservationist organizations. It is not all the 
researchers who have the opportunity to participate in the meetings of the PMB and IMA. From 
the hundreds of researchers, administration people, students and volunteers who work in the 
CDF and GNPS, only few have access to the meetings. Moreover, the hierarchy is limited to the 
Directive Council. It is in these high-ranking spaces where conservation policies are decided, 
that very influential decisions and activities concerning the Galápagos are made (Ramirez 
2004). The GNP as the administrator of the Marine Reserve has the responsibility to control 
policies and is the State representative of the protected areas. The GNP is the authority that 
gives permission for new boats, monitoring certificates and who confiscate boats and illegal 
fishing tools etc., and is therefore also the fishers’ main “enemy”, the body who “only controls 
fishers” (Ramirez 2004). The Park representative in the PMB is an actor that has more power 
and tools to decide, control and maneuver in the negotiation platform than other actors.  
 
The purpose of PMS is to enhance sustainable management of the Galapagos marine resources. 
However, differences between the perceptions of users about their resources, sustainability of 
use and means of communication translate into a discursive field of sustainability, where its 
interpretation becomes an instrument in pursuite of power and access to resources.  
 
To summarize, we believe that although there is an asymmetric participation in the PMS with 
differentiated means, tools and resources, actors such as fishers can exercise power and 
strategize actions and meanings in their own terms. The dialogue and the negotiations are 
fulfilled with cultural, symbolic and linguistic barriers and differentiations. Following Foucault 
(1979, 1982), power is neither possible to locate as an active or passive part in the struggle nor 
to describe in the world in bipolar terms of dominated/dominator and victim/victimizer. Power 
is the name one attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society. Therefore, 
power relations can at different points in time be fairly stable or openly contested. In this way, 
there is no one common power and strategy, but different meanings, values and strategies 
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according to time and space that confront each other, encountering a “force field” with 
conflicting narratives.    
 
5.5 Changes in the fisheries management model  
 
5.5.1 Placing fisheries in their ecosystem context 
This was the name of a Conference supported by the EU Commission held in the Galápagos in 
December 2000 where scientists from all over the world attended to discuss fisheries 
management. The core of the conference was how to place management taking into account the 
effect of fisheries on the ecosystems in which they are embedded. The foundation of the 
meeting was centered on the use of modeling software31 in ecosystem analysis. But this 
“placement” of fisheries in the ecosystem context is more than a 25-year old demand for 
“overdue changes in management approaches and practices, leading to restoration of degraded 
ecosystems to earlier levels of productivity” (Nauen, C. 2002:2). 
Already in December 1995 the 95 States represented at the International Conference on the 
Sustainable Contribution of Fisheries to Food Security in Kyoto, Japan, agreed that ten 
immediate actions should be taken by the States, including “to conduct, within their 
competences, and where appropriate, in cooperation with regional and other intergovernmental 
organizations, integrated assessments and ecosystem management”32.  
 
As Christensen, V. and Pauly, D. stated in the Galápagos Conference “in order to manage 
exploited marine ecosystems, we must increase our knowledge of the resources they contain. 
For this reason fisheries management has for decades focused on obtaining information on 
catches, and on stock sizes of the exploited resources. This has been done, however, largely in a 
species by species manner. Over time it has become increasingly clear that fisheries resources 
interact strongly, and that their interaction have implications for how fisheries should be 
managed. A preliminary study as an example estimates that on a global scale, predation 
outweighs the fishery more than threefold. For this reason it is necessary to obtain far more 
information of how fish resources interact, most notably their feeding ecology” (Christensen, V. 
& Pauly, D.2002:5). 
                                                 
31 The use of Ecopath modelling software including the dynamic programme Ecosim and spatial module Ecospace. 
 
32 http://www.fao.org/fi/agreem/kyoto/kyoe.asp) quoted in Christensen, V. and Pauly, D. 2000:5 
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It seems that the only more socially oriented aspect included in this model is the “bio-
economic” factors, through inclusion of market prices, comparison of revenue flows, evaluating 
alternative management strategies, and comparing revenues of exploitative versus non-
exploitative resource uses (Ibid:7). 
For Günther Reck, the University of San Francisco de Quito, and Rodrigo Bustamante, the 
Ecuadorian CSIRO Marine Research, conclusion at the Conference in the Galápagos was that 
“these software models have opened new horizons for describing and evaluating in a structured 
manner the marine ecosystems of the Galápagos. This has led to the development of an initial 
working model that can be used to create plausible scenarios and outcomes…We are now faced 
with the challenge of improving the data quality and its coverage, testing the models over a 
broader range of management options, and to incorporate the oceanographic diversity and 
climatic instability that constitute one of the key features of the Galápagos marine ecosystems. 
Another challenge will be to make those powerful management tools transparent and credible to 
fishers and government, and transform them into instruments of highly participatory and 
adaptive management”(Reck, G. & Bustamante, R. 2002:20). 
 
So far, this management model has been the most recent base for researchers from the Charles 
Darwin Research Station who are the ones who “provide the data” to the management decision-
body that we previously analyzed. This includes providing knowledge in different ways and the 
subject of asymmetric access to power, information, language etc. As we discussed before, the 
Foucaultean relation of knowledge-power occurs again. “Scientific data” and software models 
should be developed in order to take decisions on management. But, have these models and the 
people behind them been able to transform them into a participative tool to all actors involved? 
We argue that this has not happened in the Galápagos and therefore it has remained an elite 
management approach. Furthermore, there is still the broad use of the classical species-by-
species approach when decisions of fishing quotas, bans and the fishing calendar are taken into 
account.  
 
We continue by describing and assessing another approach towards changes in the management 
model in the Galápagos Marine Reserve, the economic diversification and the alternatives to 
fishing. 
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5.5.2 In search of alternatives to fisheries: the diversification model 
The co-management system developed on the islands to cope with a participative and more 
community-based model of managing resources that has been triggered not only by internal 
conflicts and power issues as we analyzed above, but also dealing with conflicts around the 
development of economic alternatives to cope with what is believed to be an economic crisis of 
fisheries. 
Escalating conflicts and the economic crisis of fisheries need an urgent solution in terms of 
economic alternatives to fishing. This conflict expressed itself in the loss of confidence that the 
fishing sector once had in the participatory management of the Galápagos Marine Reserve. 
Economic urgency is related to the decline in productivity of local fisheries and exportation and 
decrease of the formerly abundant populations of the main export species – sea cucumber and 
lobster (Ospina 2005: 9). 
 
The fisheries crisis is due partly to the over-exploitation in the 1990s of sea cucumber and 
lobster that has also meant an increase in both bans and illegal fishing methods. As a fisherman 
told us “when there is no more possibility of fishing, as it was some years ago, then we have to 
find new ways to survive. So either we have the illegal way which is not sustainable for ever 
and is dangerous for us, or the way where we find and develop alternatives which are realistic 
and appropriate for us and for them” (meaning conservationists) (a fisher from Isabela, 
interview 2006). 
In this way, the participative management system has been discussing and negotiating another 
conflicting issue: economic alternatives to fishing. This is sought to be a step towards the idea 
of a more diversified economy, taking away pressure from the fisheries resources and giving 
new economic means and alternatives to the fishers. Moreover, it is sought to be a part of a new 
way of thinking in resource management within the institutions of the Galápagos where 
economic diversification is the core to solutions in the fisheries crisis. Behind this objective is 
the mega goal of combating over-fishing and illegal fishing which is an assumption perceived 
by almost all actors in the Galápagos as an established narrative. 
 
5.5.3 Contested narrative of over-fishing  
The assumption about over-fishing being a major threat to the unique Galápagos marine 
ecosystem takes its departure from the conservationist perspective. It is backed up by numerous 
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studies of population biology, which is criticized for not taking into account inter-species 
interactions and other environmental factors that influence ecological dynamics and species 
populations.  
Remarkably, evaluation of the state of the Galápagos’ fisheries by fishermen and 
conservationists differ with respect to certain commercial species. For example, both of the 
sectors agree that bacalao fishing has declined years ago. Even though, some authors (Ben 
Yami 2001) state that this decline is a product of the shift in fishing from bacalao or finfish to 
the export-oriented resources. However, their evaluations of the sea cucumber and lobster 
fisheries vary: fishermen claim that there are still resources in the sea to be caught, like other 
species of sea cucumber, while conservationists consider the sea cucumber fishery as collapsed 
and the lobster fishery at the edge of collapse. Thus, each stakeholder has its own criteria for 
evaluation depending on their interest in the resource. Fishers do not consider the resource 
over-fished until it is completely extracted beyond recovery, while conservationists consider 
values and principles of the Management Plan such as precaution and sustainability. But, the 
inconsistent population model does not account for all the determining factors, thus, cannot be 
linked only to exploitation by humans. The gap between these two views upon over-
exploitation or over-fishing is the fundamental issue of the fisheries management and the core 
of the discourse of conservation and management. 
 
Furthermore, the argument that the problem of fisheries is the increasing number of fishers is 
contested by some local researchers such as Carlos Zapata from the local NGO FUNDAR who 
argued, that ”the solution to this crisis is not the reduction of number fishers by buying their 
fishing license or other similar programs started by some NGOs and conservationists, but rather 
reduction of fishing effort33 through diversification of  local economy” (Zapata, C., interview 
2006).  
 
5.5.4 Emergence of the Alternatives  
The process of identifying alternatives to fishing and its negotiations between sectors began in 
2000 after the creation of the Galápagos Marine Reserve, as a policy for conversion of the 
fishing labor force to non- extractive activities.  
                                                 
33 “Fishing effort represents the amount of fishing gear of a specifi type used on the fishing grounds over a given 
unit of time e.g. hours trawled per day, number of hooks set per day number of hauls of a beach seine per day” 
(FAO 1997) 
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From 2000 distrust and frustration of fishermen about the participatory management system, 
has been growing. In 2003-2004 conflicts around the Fisheries Regulation (Reglamento de 
Pesca) and the attempts to close sea cucumber fisheries heated up the already critical situation 
(Ospina 2005: 27). 
 
In 2004 alone, four strikes took place, including the longest fishers strike in the history of the 
Galápagos, which lasted 18 days (Ospina 2005: 7-8). In the same year fishermen withdrew 
from the Participatory Management Board for almost nine months as they considered their 
position unfair in relation to conservationists and the tourism sector, and they decided to rely on 
their direct connection to the minister of environment.  
The government at the time34 was in favor of merchants and fishermen. The president had the 
support from the Galápagos fishermen and returned this support by openly approving 
opposition of the fishermen to GNP and the tourism industry35. The strategy of violent strikes 
plus the support of the president (that they never had before) made the fishing sector politically 
more powerful than ever. The government needed to take decisive measures to resolve the 
crisis. The first step was an invitation from the Ministry of Environment to representatives of 
the fishing sector to negotiate and formulate alternative economic activities, and the second step 
was facilitation of negotiations with the other sectors of Galápagos about the management of 
the Galápagos Marine Reserve (Larrea, S., interview 2006).  
 
In June 2004 the Ministry of Environment and fishing sector identified potential alternatives to 
fishing within the fishing and tourism sector which are described in the document called 
“Economic Alternatives for the Fishing Sector of Galápagos” (Ministerio del Ambiente, 2004). 
The alternatives identified as tourist activities are: 1) conversion to the traditional bay tour with 
diving and navigable diving tour, 2) development of new tourist activities, such as sport fishing 
and experiential artisanal fishing36, 3) development of tourist activities designed exclusively 
                                                 
34 The goverment of Lucio Gutierrez (November 2002- April 2005) an ex-military who won the elections with the 
support of different social movements, such as the Indigenous organizations and who argued for a populist 
discourse of social change. But shortly afterwards, his position changed drastically and he began to make alliances 
with the Right wing parties. 
35 Great News for the Galápagos – Sea Shepherd Cheers the Removal of President Lucio Gutierrez, Sea Shepherd 
News 04/21/2005, http://www.seashepherd.org/news/media_050421_2.html, retrieved 21/10/2006, 22.00 
36 This is in a process of regulation, as a result of lobbying by the fishing sector and has been classified as both a 
tourist and fishing activity. 
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for the island of Isabela such as the day tour and navigable tour (Ministerio del Ambiente 
2004). 
The alternatives identified as fishing activities are: 1) optimization of the existing fisheries 
(lobster, sea cucumber and finfish-fishery) with the aim to improve return for fishermen, 2) 
implementation of the open sea fishing (of large pelagic fish), which is already a part of the 
fishing calendar, 3) development of pearl cultivation, 4) development of new fisheries of the 
meon sea cucumber (Holothuria arta)37 and white sea urchin fisheries (Tripneustes depresus) 
(Ibid).  
 
5.5.5 Rationale of the alternatives 
The appearance of the diversification model or activities for the fishing sector labelled them the 
“alternatives”. V. Gravez, the facilitator of the fishing sector of the Galápagos, suggests that 
this term is not entirely accurate. He states that they should be analyzed not simply as  
“alternatives” but as a possibility to develop a new management system where sound 
optimization, implementation and regulation contribute to it. The root of the crisis lies in the 
fundamental mistake of the management: the fisheries were open for a too short period of time 
for everybody. In these conditions there is no way to manage fisheries. Everybody harvests all 
they can” (Interview V. Gravez, 2006).   
 
The economic alternatives are not limited to the actual fishing and tourism activities. There are 
a variety of services indirectly related to tourism or fishing that also present opportunity for 
changes in livelihood. For example: plumbing, welding, carpentry, mechanics, retail – 
especially on Santa Cruz, where there are a variety of economic sectors. These options are not 
considered in this study as the main focus, as they are not within the tourism and fishing 
alternatives. 
 
There are alternatives that are priorities for the fishing sector such as open sea fishing, 
development of the meon sea cucumber and experiential artisanal fishing (5a. Cumbre Pesquera 
de Galápagos 2004). The motivation of fishermen to change is a product of the difficulties in 
sustaining their life as fishers. The fishing sector shows ambivalent attitude towards illegal 
                                                 
37 Meon sea cucumber is one of the many sea cucumber species in Galápagos, but not the same as the one already 
fished. It is smaller in size.  
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fishing. According to various sources and interviews, illegal fishing predominates Isabela, 
where there are very few other options. Fishermen’s leaders complain that those fishermen who 
do not commit illegalities have problems because the resources are already exhausted by the 
time the sea cucumber and lobster seasons open. They complain about the lack of control by the 
GNPS during the bans. On the other hand, the fishers’ leaders admit that economic urgency 
leaves them with no other choice. This is an expression of the ambivalence and despair from a 
situation they do not know how to resolve. “The call of the fishing sector to solve the dilemma 
is one: to diversify the fishing effort” (Ospina 2005:22).  
Not only illegal fishing, but also the excessive number of fishermen creates expectation for an 
opportunity to change to another activity. Some fishermen want to change and others hope that 
once some of them change there will be a bigger resource quota for each one that remains in 
fishing. Finally, the fundamental reason for change is excess in strict regulation by GNP, which 
makes the fishing activity problematic to operate and unreliable as a livelihood base (Ospina 
2005:23).       
Motivation for change, the resources available for it and challenges that all parties involved 
face in the process of economic diversification of the fishing sector translate into capacity for 
change which became the central discursive field in power relations and access to resources.  
 
The turning point 
The establishment of the Participatory Co-Management System, which allowed the “direct” 
actors and users of the marine reserve to participate in decision-making excluded some other 
groups of the Galápagos as a society. Even though it was a benign step toward improving the 
previous situation in management, social conflicts continued occurring. Asymmetric access, 
allocation and control over the resources were some of the characteristics leading to upheaval 
and a violent strategy of fishers to negotiate their interests. 
An escalating social and economic conflict pressing for changes in management, a discourse of 
overexploitation, the fisheries crisis pressing for finding alternatives to take away pressure from 
marine resources and an appealing discourse of sustainable development entering the 
conservation rationale, allowed further modifications of management - a diversification policy. 
This policy and management model intended to give economic alternatives, incentives and 
inspired fishers to start new activities away from fishing.  
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In further analysis of constraints, potentials and challenges of this conflicting scenario in 
management we use two examples of the economic alternatives that actors are dealing with in 
the Galápagos today: the experiential artisanal fishing alternative (chapter 6) and the open sea 
fishing alternative (chapter 7).  
 
 
CHAPTER 6: THE EXPERIENTIAL ARTISANAL FISHING 
ALTERNATIVE 
 
This chapter illustrates the previous analysis of the management system through an example of 
the experiential artisanal fishing alternative. We introduce the history of this initiative and roles 
and discourses of various actors about its feasibility and meaning within the management 
system. We attempt to link technicalities of the initiative to the analysis of the actors’ 
discourses and how power relations affect its implementation. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Since early 1970s local fishermen offered cheap and simple fishing tours and transport services 
to tourists. Back then it was easy as no special requirements had been imposed on this activity 
(G. Reck, interview 2006). Thirty years later, with the policy of alternatives to fishing, a former 
fisherman from San Cristobal, Carlos Ricaute, began offering traditional fishing tours (Reck, 
G., interview 2006; El Colono 2006:838). With the help of NGOs it was possible to draw up a 
proposal and promote it as an alternative for the fishers at the level of the Participatory 
Management Board and Inter-institutional Management Authority (Gravez, V., interview 
2006).  
 
As formulated in the GNP resolution 0003 (2006), experiential artisanal fishing is a fishing and 
tourism activity, in which the “artisanal fisherman of Galápagos, using his fishing license and 
his permit for the fishing boat, his work infrastructure and his own boats, offers visitors to the 
islands the technique and the culture of fishing and his experience and knowledge of living in 
harmony with nature. It is a demonstrational artisanal fishing activity for tourists, with limited 
extraction without commercial purpose, within the limits of security, quality of service and 
                                                 
38 El Colono is a private monthly newspaper of Galápagos. 
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interpretation”. Only Galápagos fishermen, who comply with this regulation, can execute this 
activity (PNG res.0003, 2006). 
 
The Director of the Charles Darwin Research Station commented: “This approach allows 
tourists to travel with fishermen during their work outings and is the first step towards 
integrating fishers into a business that is conservation-oriented, in that it minimizes the 
extraction of fish and provides direct local benefits. Over time, local fishers will gain 
experience in managing visitors to the islands so that, while they will initially work with small, 
converted fishing boats, they could gradually move towards tourism or towards sport fishing 
while ensuring local ownership and employment” (Watkins 2006). To add to this 
comprehensive definition given by Watkins, regulation of experiential artisanal fishing 
abbreviated to “experiential fishing” or “EF”, limits extraction to a few species (finfish, lobster, 
sea cucumber) and to a number of one or two fish per tourist.  
 
The alternative of EF aims at creating new economic opportunities for the fishing sector and 
integrating it into the tourism sector by decreasing their dependence on marine resources. At the 
initial stage it was seen as a marginal complementary activity, which could be a start to a 
complete transition in tourism39.  
 
The fact that the initiative stemmed originally from the local fishing sector has given this idea 
credibility in the eyes of the conservationists and the fishing sector itself. The simplicity and 
small scale of EF was considered an important advantage because of relatively low investment 
required for security, fishing equipment and training, and therefore it was more affordable for 
local fishermen than conventional sport fishing40.  
 
6.2 Implementing Experiential Artisanal Fishing  
This case is interesting for our investigation because it is an output of diversification policy and 
its implementation has been in process during our field research. All the main GMR users had 
an interest in the activity and influenced its development. By analyzing actor discourses in this 
                                                 
39 To achieve complete transition the activity must substitute the income generated from fishing: ca. $ 800 per 
month, according to Marzo (2006).  
40 Sport fishing was a competing concept of ‘fishing for tourists’ in the Galápagos 
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process we hope to reveal relations between actors and institutions and how these interactions 
determined their claims and rights for resources. 
 
A summary of the main events in the process of implementation of EF is offered in the figure 
below to introduce the empirical context of the illustrative case. 
 
Table 2: Experiential Artisanal Fishing alternative – the main events of the implementation process.  
 
As a result of the dialogue between all the sectors, in 2005 the Inter-institutional Management Authority, 
IMA, decided to incorporate the concept of EF into the Management Plan for Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of the Galápagos Marine Reserve (PNG 1999) as an artisanal fishing activity. 
Regulation of EF was made in coordination between the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of 
Tourism and GNP (PNG, res.0003).   
The key aspects of implementation are the appropriation of legal framework and knowledge of possible 
profitability and market demands (Min. del Ambiente 2004:5). Since the establishment of the actual 
legal base, parameters such as profitability, market demand, experience and resource base knowledge 
still remained un-determined. Fishermen faced uncertain beginnings and had to learn-by-doing.   
Cooperatives have established their agencies of EF and can monitor consistency of service by 
coordinating commercialization, schedules, security, price, qualification of fishers and their boats and 
the number and size of fish etc.  They can operate EF only in the special zones assigned for it. 
Although EF is regulated and approved, it still could not be implemented (at least until April 2006) 
mainly due to: a) opposition of the navy or DIGMER41, (b) lack of internal regulation of EF by 
cooperatives, c) contradicting rules for implementation. 
To complete the process of EF’s regulation, security and technical characteristics it needed to be 
approved by the navy’s institution DIGMER. Based on its security concerns DIGMER has protested 
against EF in a letter to the Ministry of Defense, contending that fishermen were not able to provide the 
minimum level of security to international tourists. 
Beside the regulatory problems, EF initiative faced challenges in the lack of investment funding and the 
lack in marketing strategy.   
In September 2006 24 boats were ready to begin operating, with 42% of market segment potential and 
74% of local tour agencies ready to sell EF (Marzo 2006). 
 
Given the above context and aspects we move on to identifying them in the analysis of 
conflictive discourses. 
 
6.3 Force fields 
The main sectors with a stake in the Galápagos Marine Reserve have expressed certain views 
on the feasibility of the alternative and the issues around its implementation, such as regulation, 
access to credits, capacity for tourism service, marketing strategy, investment policy, 
development intervention etc. Remarkably, their views rarely coincide and thereby form 
conflicting discursive fields around institutional arrangements, allocation and control over  
                                                 
41 The navy (DIGMER) executes control of life at sea and patrolling of the 200 miles of the Ecuadorian territorial 
waters around Galápagos. Therefore, according to the Special Law, the navy also patrols the waters of GMR 
together with GNP and participates in management and regulation of waterborne activities within GMR (GNP 
2003). It subordinates to the Ministry of Defense, through which it is represented in IMA. 
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resources and, most importantly, capacity for change (table 3). 
 
Table 3: Elements of experiential fishing discourse: perceptions and narratives by sector.  
 
Fishing sector Conservationists sector Tourism sector  
- Fishers can keep fishing license 
 
 
 
- Original idea from fishers and 
knowledge of the activity 
 
 
 
- Local market exists 
 
 
 
- Needs low investment, but 
access to credit is very limited 
 
- There is an established legal 
base, but contradictions in 
regulations delay implementation 
 
- It has support of the 
conservation sector, but limited 
to capacity building, with little 
funding  
 
- Competing interests from the 
Navy/DIGMER and tourism 
sector. 
 
- Pro-conservation activity 
and part of the diversification 
model 
 
- It is a fisher’s initiative. But 
fishers do not have the skills 
to work with tourists and they 
are unreliable 
 
- For access to market, fishers 
need alliance with tourism 
sector 
 
- For some, it is not an 
expensive activity for fishers. 
For others, it is an expensive 
activity. Access to credit is 
very limited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- For some, it is an 
interesting offer for a tour 
package. For others, it 
means competition 
 
- New activity within the 
same sector without the 
sectors’ control 
 
 
 
 
Actors’ narratives and perceptions of EF identified in the table form conflicting fields about 
implementation issues and reveal patterns of power relations among them. The conservation 
sector’s approval, the fact that it is the fishers’ own initiative and the possibility for fishers to 
keep their fishing rights make a strong common base for cooperation between the 
conservationists and the fishers. However, their views vary significantly on commercialization, 
which is subject to regulation, access to market, relations between sectors, access to credits and 
competition from external groups. Access to market and to credits is key to successful 
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commercialization, yet these issues show the biggest contradictions in views: the 
conservationists did not believe in the fishers capacity to market EF and insisted on their 
alliance with tour operators, although they knew that the alliance was unlikely; fishers needed 
new alternatives urgently, yet they were constrained by contradicting regulations and external 
interest groups; support of the conservationist sector was mainly about capacity building and 
little about marketing and access to funds, where it was most needed. 
 
There were some differences in the degree of hopes associated with EF in each sector.  
Considering the traditionally restrained relationship between the tourism and fishing sectors, 
the interviewed tour operators expressed various attitudes ranging from welcoming the new 
initiative to concerns about unjust privileges for fishermen in joining tourism.  
 
Opinions among fishermen varied as well. Some of them opted for a change of activity, some 
of them wanted to stay fishermen. A few from the latter group wanted to compliment traditional 
fishing with EF, because fishing was unstable and unreliable during some periods due to 
climatic and oceanographic factors as well as due to the strict regulation by GNPS. 
 
6.3.1 Institutional arrangements: regulation 
Discrepancies in the regulation of EF by public institutions have become conflicting discursive 
issues, as shown in the two following examples. 
 
Technical and security requirements for artisanal fishing were restrictive and apparently 
contradicted the same requirements for EF. In the fishermen’s interpretation of the law, fishing 
and taking tourists for EF was done in the same boat they normally used in their daily fishing, 
but for example, a fishing fiberglass boat was not allowed to have a tilt in the regulation for 
artisanal fishing. However, if the same fisherman wanted to conduct EF he had to set up a tilt 
(Santana, E., interview 2006). 
 
There was also a difference in the motor power (HP) allowed for artisanal fishing and for EF. 
The most commonly used motor is Java with 75 HP. An artisanal fishing boat was not allowed 
to exceed the motor power of 135 HP. Meanwhile DIGMER required a boat with tourists to 
have two motors in case one of them fails. Installing two motors with 75 HP would exceed the 
allowed motor power of 135 HP and thus would make the operation illegal.  
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Fishers interpreted these discrepancies as an intended obstruction for EF implementation. 
Nevertheless, the adviser of the fishing sector Vincent Gravez commented that in the case of a 
tilt, it is an inadequate interpretation of the law and that it is not prohibited to put up a tilt. 
Regarding the motor power he assumed that the restriction of an artisanal boat to 135 HP had 
been established with the purpose of keeping illegal fishing under control: the motor power of 
the artisanal boats should not exceed the power of the boats of the GNP guards in case they 
needed to inspect a fishing boat suspected for illegal fishing (Garvez, V., interview 2006).  
 
Every rule has its rationale, but in the complexity of different regulations it is not easy for 
fishers to find the “right” interpretation. Therefore contradicting regulation could easily be 
translated as an intended or unintended, but tolerated, constraint. Especially when fishers did 
not give much effort to resolve contradictions.   
 
Rationality of service security and capacity has translated it into a discursive field of its own, 
where the strict position of DIGMER in relation to regulating EF is explained by the underlying 
story of external stakeholders. According to a number of interviews and informal conversations, 
the high ranking staff of the Ecuadorian navy had links to the well established continental yacht 
club(s) and had been planning to introduce its own exclusive sport fishing in the Galápagos. 
Although the equipment of the local fishermen was incomparable to the luxurious yachts of the 
continental clubs, yacht fans of the navy saw EF as potential competition and obstructed 
implementation by refusing to negotiate security requirements for EF (in this specific statement 
interviewees wished to remain anonymous). 
 
Conservationists agreed that the security of tourists is of primary concern. Some of them 
believed that investment in security was a too high price for the fishermen to afford, others 
believed that fishermen could find means for investment if they joined their efforts and assets 
(Ortiz, F., interview 2006; Hearn, A., interview 2006)  
 
Fishermen considered the requirements unreasonable and could not understand why they were 
not given an opportunity to develop their capital and investment capacity and comply with the 
requirements step by step. They regarded the high demands of DIGMER as a masked effort to 
block the initiative as a competition of the same resource – the right for tourism fishing.  
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The study of the EF market conducted by Marzo (2006) in August-September 200642 has 
confirmed that this rationality has been justified, because 24 fishing boats were ready for EF 
operation at the time and complied with all technical and security requirements. This indicates 
the distance between the conservationists’ discourse of fishers’ capabilities and the real abilities 
and knowledge of the fishers. 
 
Varying interpretations of regulations indicate that they are not clearly defined and not adjusted 
to each other. Diversity of institutions regulating the use of the marine resources by various 
actors and the need to adjust to changing conditions of use and management create a situation 
where harmonization of regulation is hard to achieve simultaneously for all activities.  
 
The resulting contradictions maybe regarded as intended, as in the interpretation of the fishers, 
or unintended, as in the interpretation of their facilitator as well as of the conservationist sector. 
Even if they are unintended effects of the complex and changing regulatory framework, they 
favor certain user groups and obstruct the others in access to the new activity and eventually to 
the resources at stake. This unintended effect of regulatory inconsistence that constrains fishers 
from implementing EF may be in favor of the other user groups, who see EF as a competition to 
their interests. Thus, the governance institutions would be under conflicting pressure from 
certain actors to solve the regulatory inconsistence and from other actors to tolerate it.  
 
The turning point  
Discrepancies in regulation and presence of economic interests of continental groups in the 
agenda of the governing public institutions brought differentiation into the objectives and 
working practices and obstructed advancement towards the common goals of diversification. 
The effect was resistance to change and a tendency to maintain the “old” order of things, where 
external groups control the local Galápagos tourism market.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The study of EF by Marzo, R.O. began four months after we concluded our fieldwork. This difference in time 
can explain certain discrepancies in the state of implementation of the alternative. For example, recently the 
DIGMER conflict seems to have been resolved, and more fishing boats are ready for activity. 
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6.3.2 Capacity and motivation for change 
Investment funding 
According to the interviewees from all the three sectors, as well as research literature, the need 
for investment in the new activity is one of the main difficulties that fishermen face in 
implementing EF. Few fishermen have savings or a possibility to borrow money from their 
networks. Most of them work with a small rotating capital of approx. $ 500. There is a history 
of unpaid bank loans by artisanal fishermen in the Galápagos that made banks adopt a ‘no 
credit’ policy for fishermen (interviews with fishermen; Ospina 2005). There is no local 
financing system that would be able to give credit to fishermen. Thus, they are forced to look 
for co-investors outside the Galápagos (Piu, M., interview 2006; Watkins, interview 2006).  
 
With the investment regulation of the Galápagos, as it is today43 (with the exception of Isabela), 
external co-investment in the new fishing and tourism activities may lead to a replication of the 
history of the Galápagos tourism sector which is now for the most part owned by outsiders. 
This model is well known through the example of the “floating hotel” tourism, which leaves 
almost no benefit for the population of the Galápagos (Piu, M., interview 2006; Larrea, S. 
interview 2006; Lopez, K., interview 2006) 
 
As suggested in various interviews, in the absence of a local credit system, there were two 
solutions to avoid this kind of development: i) associations between Galapagenians, and ii) 
loans and donations from governmental and non-governmental organizations. 
 
The Director of the Marine Resources Unite of GNP saw associations between Galapagenians 
from different sectors as a solution to both the shortage of patents and shortage of financing 
(Piu, M., interview 2006). However, the tourism sector was against integrating fishermen into 
their operations as they considered them unqualified and unreliable. For example, although 
fishermen were excellent divers, tourist operators claimed they could not take a risk of an 
accident with a fisherman, which might lead to loss of business for the entire tourism sector 
(Ribadeneira, M., interview 2006).  
 
                                                 
43 Galápagos investment regulation did not protect local residents from losing their activity rights to an external 
co-investor (Piu, M., interview 2006, Larrea, S., interview 2006) 
Stacey and Fuks                                                                 Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 90
The fishers did not like the idea of involving tour operators either, and preferred to create 
associations with other fishermen, as they were afraid of losing their activity rights to tourist 
associates (Reyes, H., interview 2006). Tour operators, on the other hand, according to the 
administrator of the fishers’ cooperative of Santa Cruz, were interested in EF, but on a different 
scale and without participation of fishermen. (Lopez, K., interview 2006).   
 
As M. Ribadeineira, the adviser in the Ministry of Environment for the Galápagos issues, 
stated: “EF is the greatest opportunity I have seen for the last ten years to create an alliance 
between the tourism and the fishing sectors”. However, she continued: “the tourism sector of 
the Galápagos was made to be self-sufficient and does not need participation of the local 
community in order to successfully run its operations” (Rivadeneira, M., interview 2006). Thus, 
associations between tour operators and fishers were unlikely.     
 
To conclude, commercialization of EF required investment and the best available source of this 
was association with investors. Access to investment determines capacity for change to EF, 
which gives additional user rights and thereby better access to resources.  
 
Thus, discourse by the conservationist sector suggested a solution to lack of credits - the 
associations between sectors - that would not be likely to be accepted by the fishers.  
Conditioning access to credit to capacity for change makes the fishers, who had neither 
experience in tourism nor financial assets, not only dependent on the dominating alliance of the 
conservationist and tourism sectors in their effort to implement EF but actually denied them a 
capacity for change as such.  
 
Even though it may seem that capacity for change is all about fishers (like it may seem that 
over-exploitation of marine resources is all about fishers), without the other key users, tour 
operators and conservation organizations coming along with a diversification policy, fishers 
alone would not succeed. The delay by GNPS in legalizing alternatives and the strict policy for 
lengthy and costly carrying capacity studies make fishers doubt the true intentions of GNPS and 
its dedication to the policy.  Tour operators are not seen as in favor of the diversification policy 
either, as it threatens their monopoly.  
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The turning point 
Capacity for change was a major force field in the process of implementation of the 
diversification policy. It revealed the paradox of the Galápagos conservation politics: on one 
hand, a change is forced upon the fishing sector; on the other hand, there is little confidence in 
their ability to do so. Furthermore, by not coordinating or harmonizing regulation, governance 
institutions obstruct the fishers’ efforts and motivation to capacitate themselves for change. 
GNPS lacks capacity for timely studies, institutionalization and the issuing of patents. The 
tourism sector was reluctant to give up its monopoly of tourism activities and resisted 
diversification policy by seeking to occupy the opportunities designed for fishers44.  
 
6.3.2 Access to resources: the golden egg of the Galápagos 
Development intervention 
The economic crisis of fisheries has given an entry for NGOs to offer assistance in looking for 
alternatives. The conservationist organizations have come forward with short term and long-
term strategies in capacity building and funding for implementing the diversification policy.  
 
The inflow of donations and little output created prejudice among fishers towards the assistance 
by NGOs.  Fishermen blamed the conservationist sector for using their crisis for attracting 
donations, while they saw little transparency of how the donations were being distributed.  At 
the same time they claimed capacity building to be the way for NGOs to make their living by 
justifying donations and showing some project activity.  
As a short term strategy small credits would be given to twenty fishermen interested in EF for 
purchasing equipment, and diving courses were given to ten fishermen from San Cristobal 
Island. According to interviews with fishermen and development workers, $20,000 has been 
allocated by a local NGO for credit to support a few fishermen in the transition to EF. Fishers 
referred to this amount of financial assistance as “ridiculously little”, considering that there 
were about twenty fishermen interested at the time and each needed at least $5000 to equip his 
boat for EF. The amount sounded very low also in comparison with the millions of USD of 
donations pouring into the Galápagos each year in the name of governance, environmental 
                                                 
44 Analysis of relations between the tourist sector and the fishing sector is based on perceptions and speculation of 
actors about future prospects with regard to EF and cooperation with each other. Thus, no real alliances and 
associations were observed at the time of the field work. 
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management and fisheries management (see appendix 6 for budget figures of international 
development and conservation projects in the Galápagos)  
As a long term strategy (5 years), in June 2005, $1,5 million was offered in government support 
by the Minister of Environment and 3 million Euros by ETIMOS45 (the Ethical Bankers of 
Italy) to establish a credit system for alternative forms of income generation for fishermen 
(M.Ribadeneira, interview 2006; www.Galápagos.org 2005; Ortiz, F., interview 2006; Villón, 
C., interview 2006). Some of the money was destined for developing EF. The loan from Italy 
was on condition that the loan from the Ecuadorian government was realized. Unfortunately, 
the Ministry could not live up to its commitment due to budget shortage, and the credit loan 
from Italy has remained pending (Larrea, S., interview 2006; Villón, C., interviews 2006) 
 
In this case development initiatives depended on the government’s ability to manage its budget 
and commitments. Given the high economic and political instability in Ecuador, this 
dependency rendered a high risk of failure for the development and conservation initiatives. 
The fishers translate this failure to NGOs giving promises and then “eating” the development 
funds.  
 
The funding issue was a source of conflicting perceptions about how donations should be 
managed. Despite the well-acknowledged purpose of the donations to serve as economic 
opportunities for fishers, discourses indicated asymmetrical power positions through full 
“ownership” of funds by conservationists and very limited access to those by fishers. The 
pattern of limited participation in project planning by the “recipients”, gives the fishermen 
limited access to decision-making, control and monitoring of the projects, and thereby enforces 
paternalism in development intervention.   
 
Fishermen believe their crisis is being used by the conservationist sector as their “golden egg”.  
The interest of GNPS and environmental and development NGOs in the Galápagos, by the 
                                                 
45 Consortium ETIMOS is a saving and credit Cooperative offering its financial services to its member 
organisations involved in Development Cooperation and International Solidarity, Ethical Finance and Microcredit, 
as well as Fair Trade. Its mission is to support its member organizations involved in development cooperation, 
international solidarity, ethical finance, microfinance as well as fair trade.  
Its main objective is to promote the development of its members through the provision of loans and technical 
assistance. Other forms of investment such as equity participation and the issuance of guarantees are under 
consideration but currently are not provided. 
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fishermen’s opinion, is not to find lasting solutions, but to maintain the crisis. An ever-lasting 
crisis would attract ever-lasting donations, and thereby create work and employment for 
conservationist organizations. Another effect of this strategy is that as long as fishermen will 
remain in the central focus, problems associated with the tourism industry will continue to be 
unnoticed.  
 
The turning point 
The Galápagos is translated into a valuable commodity in captivity. The “threatened nature” of 
the conservationist discourse translates into the metaphor of the “golden egg” in the fishers’ 
discourse.  Thus, the two sectors compete for the same “commodity”.  However, the 
conservationist discourse dominates at the level of the institutional narrative, as their “rights” to 
“protect” nature are institutionalized. The fishers’ discourse expresses their unwillingness to 
comply with the governance institutions, whose narratives embed bias against fishers and 
manipulation of their needs. 
 
In this setting, power relations jeopardized capacity of actors to collaborate and transformed 
governance of resources from collaborative and linear into hierarchical, as defined by Kooiman 
(2003). Thus, efficiency of collaborative management of GMR, the diversification policy and 
thereby sustainability of the Galápagos marine resources is subject to actors’ capacity to not 
only comply with the policy, but to collaborate with each other in this change. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
The experiential fishing alternative became a supplementary economic opportunity for 
fishermen as well as a chance to integrate themselves into the tourism sector without losing 
their fishing rights.  However, in the process of the introduction to the initiative the following 
challenges and opportunities were identified.  
 
Institutional arrangements and regulation represented conflicting power fields. In the discursive 
interpretation, both the intended and unintended institutional constraints favored the dominating 
narratives and interests of the economically powerful groups. 
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The discursive field of capacity and motivation for change also revealed the “old” pattern of 
power relations: fishers’ “lack” of capacity was in the center of common attention, while the 
dominant alliance was neither seen with much capacity or motivation. 
 
Analysis of the EF initiative revealed that there was competition among the GMR users both for 
the marine resources and development intervention resources. In this setting capacity for 
change was subject to the existing access to resources. Thus, varied reaction to diversification 
policy (and the redistribution of resources it brought along) has indicated that for fishers it is a 
promise of better access to resources, while for actors in tourism and conservation it is rather a 
threat to their resource rights.  
 
The main challenge and opportunity for sustainability of GMR management appears to be the 
capacity of the actors to comply with diversification policy by means of effective collaboration. 
As formulated by the facilitator of PMB, experiential fishing had a potential to bring interests 
of the tourism sector, the fishing sector and the conservationist sector closer together and “to 
bring the two sectors into the same reality”, where they can speak the same language, agree 
about common goals and cooperate with each other (Larrea, S., interview 2006).  
 
 
CHAPTER 7: THE OPEN SEA FISHING ALTERNATIVE 
 
This chapter analyzes challenges and opportunities of the new diversification management 
model on the example of the open sea fishing alternative.  
We introduce the history of open sea fishing in the Galápagos, its technology and the main 
events of the implementation of this alternative. Then, by examining conflicting technical 
issues we link them to the actors’ discourse and attempt to identify how their power relations 
effect implementation of the open sea fishing alternative.  
 
7.1 Introduction 
Traditionally fishing in the Galápagos has been centered on the coast. Coastal fisheries have 
been abundant and there was no need to go further out into the open sea. While the fishing 
sector has been growing, open sea fishing has been introduced with the use of artisanal 
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longline46. However, the scale of open sea fishing has been low, because the coastal fisheries 
provided enough resources. With the recent perceived crisis of the traditional coastal fisheries, 
the fishing sector began to opt for open sea fishing with the familiar longline method as a way 
out of the crisis (see appendix 5, figure 1 for a drawing of longline gear). 
 
Although the Management Plan of 1999 includes longline as one of the open sea fishing 
methods, it needed to be regulated before it could be implemented. But regulation of longline in 
the Galápagos after the Special Law could not be a more difficult task. There was very strong 
opposition from international environmental organizations to use this fishing tackle that is 
blamed for high by-catch of protected and endangered species such as dolphins, sharks and 
turtles. This made it very difficult for GNP and especially for CDRS to allow its use in a 
protected area as unique and fragile as the Galápagos. The local tourism sector has launched a 
political campaign through media channels against longlining in the Galápagos, arguing that 
diving tourism would suffer if populations of sharks declined. In April 2005 the IMA prohibited 
longline use in the Galápagos after six years of negotiations between the fishing, tourism and 
conservationist sector and the Ministry of Environment, (Coello, S., Larrea, S., interviews 
2006).  
 
The search for an alternative to longline was a very important strategic decision in the context 
of the participatory management, because the fishing sector has been lobbying for open sea 
fishing with longline since the Special Law (1998) was introduced, which has put this method 
into an unregulated and therefore illegal state.  
 
This alternative aims at improving stability of fishers’ economy and at decreasing their 
dependency on the traditional coastal fisheries, thereby contributing to conservation goals of the 
Galápagos National Park and to conflict management. Pro-conservation features of this 
alternative were the low impact fishing method of oceanic handline and the fact that the target 
species were migratory and not endemic to the Galápagos. 
 
                                                 
46 A method of fishing that consists of a horizontal mother line with hooks with bait attached at certain intervals. It 
is used adrift in open sea supported by a number of buoys and lights. The lengths of a longline can vary between 
4.500 and 11.000 m (GNP 1999). Open sea fishing traditionally has been done in Ecuador with the use of longline 
characterized by efficient but unselective catch. 
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As formulated in the Special Regulation of Artisanal Fishing in the Galápagos Marine Reserve 
(PNG 2003), “open sea fishing is harvesting the resources in open and deep waters, especially 
of migratory species. Fishing in this category will be subject to special regulation within 
zoning, fishing tackle, bans and species, determined by the Management Plan for GMR and 
resolutions of IMA” (Ministerio de Ambiente, 2003). 
 
Analysis of open sea fishing focuses on the pilot project of oceanic handline, complemented 
with another initiative in open sea fishing called Fish Aggregating Device (FAD). Both 
initiatives were in progress during the time of our research.  
 
FAD is a technology used worldwide to improve the efficiency of harvesting large pelagic fish, 
especially tuna. Although it has been used by the Ecuadorian industrial fishing fleet, FAD was 
new to the Galápagos.   
 
Fish aggregating devices are floating rafts or buoys that are anchored or float freely in deep 
water. They create a microhabitat for small organisms like plankton, attracting small fish, 
which cause tuna and other oceanic fish to gather around them in search of food. There are 
different kinds of FADs, from small artisanal to industrial. With the FAD method very good 
specimen of large pelagic fish can be caught and with adequate cleaning and preservation 
methods can receive excellent export prices (Preston et al, 1998:1; WWF Galápagos 2006:1; 
Coello, S., interview 2006) (see appendix 5, figure 2 for drawings of FAD). 
 
Oceanic handlines, also called ‘vertical longlines’ are either tied to the FAD or the boat itself or 
allowed to drift free suspended from floats. This arrangement of gear simultaneously gets 
numerous baits into the water, focuses the fishing effort close to the FAD and allows fishing 
over a range of depths. FAD does not limit the choice of extraction technique, however it is 
usually combined with vertical longlines (Preston et al.1998:1, WWF Galápagos 2006:1) (see 
appendix 5, figure 3 for drawings of vertical longline and description of technology). 
 
Since commercialization was essential for the sustainability of alternative fishing activities, 
processing centers perceived as a key link to local and external markets, are also included in the 
discussion. Although they did not form a part of the open sea fishing alternative, they appeared 
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to be important to the discourse of the diversification of fishers’ economy and sustainable 
development of the fishing sector.  
 
A processing center is a facility for cold storage, processing and packaging of fish with the 
purpose of commercialization. It allows fishers to save their catch if it is not sold on the day of 
harvest, as well as to process it into a marketable product for selling to the local tourism sector 
and to the continental market. 
 
7.2 Implementation of the open sea fishing alternative 
Table 4: The open sea fishing alternative – the main events of the implementation process. 
 
The pilot project of oceanic handline. 
Oceanic handline is a permitted fishing gear, it is a part of the Management Plan (1999), and the open 
sea fishing is a part of the 5-year fishing calendar.  
In June 2005, GNPS with financial support from BID, launched a pilot project for implementing open 
sea fishing with the oceanic handline method, which is considered an alternative to longline. The project 
started off in Isabela with a small group of fishermen who volunteered to learn and test the new 
technique (García Banda, A. 2005).  
The pilot project financed by BID was initiated in June 2005 and terminated in February 2006. 90 
experimental trips with the fishers have proven the technique to be applicable to the Galápagos setting 
and its environmental impact of by-catch to be very low (1% of the total catch).  
 A “mother-ship” Mi Esperanza, was invited from the mainland for a fishing experiment with the 
following objectives: 1) commercialization of catch to the mainland market 2) transportation of ten 
artisanal fishing boats to open waters and back; 3) to serve as a base for fishermen during a trip that can 
last from ten to fourteen days; 4) processing and storage of catch while at sea. 
The experiment has shown that: i) oceanic handline gear works in the open sea of the Galápagos 
(specimen of good quality and large size have been caught), ii) the volume of catch was much lower 
than expected: four tons (two tons of tuna and two tons of sword fish) instead of the expected ten tons 
(García Banda, A., interview 2006) 
For the owner of the ship, this outcome meant loss of time, effort and investment. The fishers 
recognized the low amounts of catch, the loss of money they also invested in the trips, but considered 
the experiment as a capacity building effort and hoped for new opportunities that would be in favor of 
the oceanic handline method (García Banda, A. 2005).  
The FAD technological element 
IMA has approved the use of FAD in the Galápagos in December 2005 as an option of 
operationalization of open sea fishing (COPAHISA 2006:1, WWF Galápagos 2006:1) 
In April 2006, soon after the Mi Esperanza exercise, GNP and WWF, with cooperation from the 
National Institute of Fisheries and BID-FOMIN247 project, began the construction of static artisanal 
FADs to facilitate efficient use of the new fishing technique of oceanic handline. It was planned to 
construct five devices, one for each island and two spare. FADs would then be the property of fishing 
cooperatives.  
                                                 
47 ATN-ME/9410 EC - BID-FOMIN project for capacity building of the main productive sectors – tourist, fishing 
and agricultural – as well as cooperation between them. The project has been initiated in 2004 as a result of the 
diversification policy. It is funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (BID).  
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In order to discuss the management system and the diversification policy and dynamics of 
power relations between the actors, in table 4 above we offer a summary of the main events of 
the open sea fishing alternative that consists of the pilot project of the oceanic handline, open 
sea fishing with the “mother-ship” Mi Esperanza and FAD construction (table 4). 
 
Given the above context we continue by identifying discursive issues and the main conflictive 
fields in the implementation process. 
 
7.3 Force Fields 
 
Table 5: Elements of dicourses of the open sea fishing alternative: perceptions and narratives by sector. 
 
Fishing Sector Conservationist Sector Tourism Sector
- New alternative to sea cucumber 
and lobster fisheries 
 
- Substitution to longline  
 
 
 
 
- No restrictions on large pelagic 
fish 
 
-  FAD technology for efficient 
catch. 
 
 
 
- There is a local and external 
market  
- Processing centers are a link to the 
local and external market 
- “Mother-ships” are links to the 
external market 
 
- There is limited knowledge of the 
technique and processing of large 
pelagic fish 
 
- Pressure for high catch from 
“mother-ships” 
- Takes fishing away from coastal 
fisheries 
 
- Maintains the opportunity for open 
sea fishing for fishermen  
- Low environmental impact of 
oceanic handline gear 
 
- Not regulated 
- Conservationist sector concerned 
about uncontrolled growth of the 
activity and high environmental 
impact 
- Low environmental impact of FAD 
is questionable 
 
- No external market for the 
Galápagos eco-labeled fish products 
 
- “Mother-ship” concept of 
marketing contradicts the purpose of 
fish processing centers.  
 
-No knowledge of the technique and 
processing of large and pelagic fish 
 
 
- Risk of illegal fishing 
 
No data 
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The main sectors with a stake in the Galápagos Marine Reserve have expressed certain views 
on the feasibility of the alternative and the issues around its implementation, such as rationality, 
regulation, knowledge and availability of technology, access to market, development 
intervention etc. Remarkably, their views rarely coincided and thereby formed conflicting 
discursive fields around institutional arrangements, allocation and control over resources and, 
most importantly, capacity for change. Due to time constraints no data could be obtained on the 
discourse of the tourism sector on this alternative (table 5). 
 
Actors’ narratives and perceptions of the open sea fishing alternative identified in table 5, form 
conflictive fields about implementation issues and reveal patterns of power relations among 
them. The pro-conservation nature of the initiative was the fact that it gave fishers a possibility 
for open sea fishing, and technological assistance from the conservationist sector made a 
common base for cooperation between conservationists and fishers. Even though there was a 
common rationality that drove the initiative, it was a compromise for both parties. Their views 
still varied significantly on commercialization and capacity.  
 
With respect to commercialization, fishers expressed a fair deal of confidence in their capacity, 
while conservationists were rather skeptical about the fishers’ skills and knowledge of fishing, 
processing technology and marketing. Conservationists were concerned that if left unregulated 
open sea fishing activity could expand past the carrying capacity limits. This was an internal 
contradiction in the conservationist discourse, indicating that their skepticism could be an 
indirect expression of the fear of the uncontrolled growth of the activity. By underestimating 
fishers’ capacity they could discourage fishers from being involved in the activity, and thereby 
would decrease the potential growth of open sea fishing.  
 
Another contradiction in the conservationists discourse was that illegal fishing was seen as a 
very realistic possibility in any kind of open sea fishing. The last contradiction was about the 
environmental impact of FAD. Support of the conservationist sector was mainly about capacity 
building in technology and equipment, and little about access to market, which was key to the 
success of the initiative. 
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7.3.1 Institutional arrangements: regulation 
Substitution of longline:  pursuing conservation or political power? 
For fishermen, the opportunity to use a new open sea fishing technique was a positive factor, 
but not as good as fishing with long line. Fishers considered this alternative as a new economic 
opportunity in the situation of longline prohibition, yet also a constraint to their well-being. The 
alternative was perceived as grounded, not in conservation goals, but in power politics of 
environmental organizations and tour operators. 
 
In 2004 the Ministry of Environment together with the National Institute of Fisheries and the 
fishing sector put forward a proposal for an experimental artisanal longline fishery with 
technical modifications, which minimized its environmental impact. According to the facilitator 
of the Participatory Management Board, the modifications to the artisanal longline48 approach 
have made its characteristics close to the ones of an oceanic handline: “The gear does not 
matter, it is only a matter of perception” (Larrea, S., interview 2006).  
 
The artisanal longline that fishers lobbied so strongly for, could have given them a better 
income at a lower effort and could have maximized their well-being at an environmental cost 
that was acceptable in conservation terms (fisherman Santa Cruz; Larrea, S., interviews 2006).   
 
Consensus on this issue was not reached in the Participatory Management Board due to 
disagreements on the details of the proposal between the conservationist sector and the fishing 
sector, and the Inter-Institutional Management Authority prohibited the use of artisanal longline 
fishing, despite its technical solutions for minimizing by-catch of protected species. According 
to interviews with fishermen, with the facilitator of the Participatory Management Board and 
with the former sub-secretary of the Ministry of Environment, the artisanal longline 
experimental fishery proposal was declined due to political reasons – that being of keeping a 
strong image of CDRS in the eyes of the international conservation community (Larrea, S., 
Coello, S., fishermen, interviews 2006). 
 
                                                 
48 It was made shorter, with use of a low number of hooks – only thirty. The hooks were to be of the special 
“ecological” circular shape that allowed liberation of accidentally cought protected species, and it was to be set 
deeper (at 60-100 m below surface) for a more selectivity on target species. 
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As Rogelio Guaycha, the president of the Union of Cooperatives of the Galápagos, commented, 
the decision to prohibit longline kept fishermen limited to the sea cucumber fisheries (El 
Universo April 2005). Even if it supposedly enhanced ecological sustainability of fisheries, it 
has re-enforced the social conflict over the access to fisheries. Conclusions fishermen drew 
from this outcome were that i) their well-being was disregarded for the sake of maintaining the 
conservationist sector strong, and least for the sake of conservation itself, and that ii) 
conservationists feared prosperity of the fishing sector and its consequent political power 
(fishermen Santa Cruz, interviews 2006). 
 
The Special Law as the dominant structure, states through the Management Plan (1999) that 
longline is a permitted fishing technique. Nevertheless, the institutions organizing fishing 
practices – the Participatory Management Board and the Inter-Institutional Management 
Authority – re-enforced the narrative of over-fishing, illegal fishing and by-catch of protected 
species using the rationality of not setting a bad example to the world’s other protected marine 
areas. Thus, rules of the Special Law became “bended” according to the winning 
conservationist discourse and implicit power interests. International prestige and the credibility 
of GNPS and CDRS were at stake here.  The fishers’ narrative of the “low impact” longline 
could not break through the rationality of the dominant structure of the conservation sector 
indicating asymmetrical relationships of power, where fishermen had “little room for 
maneuver” (Nuijen 2005:2). 
 
In this case the fishing sector formed a tactical informal alliance with the governmental 
institutions (for the purpose of designing a proposal for the artisanal longline experimental 
fishery) and gained considerable power. However, being an actor characterized by 
marginalization in terms of negotiation tools and by unruly conduct towards dominant 
structures, at the end of the day they employed their usual tactics of resistance and insisted on 
an unlimited number of fishing boats in the experimental fishery of longline49. This lack of 
flexibility, usual in the fishers’ negotiation strategy, was not appropriate in the alliance with the 
                                                 
49 The crucial mistake of the sector was not to demonstrate flexibility in negotiating details such as a number of 
fishing boats to participate in the experimental fishery of the artisanal longline. Unlimited number of boats could 
not have been accepted by CDRS as an obvious risk for uncontrolled use of longline and impossibility for 
monitoring and data collection for evaluation of the proposed technical solutions. 
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governmental institutions; it undermined success of the tactical alliance and impeded 
achievement of the common goal. 
 
Prohibition of longline caused resentment in the fishing community, and some fishers intended 
to file a law suite against GNPS for denying them their right to use a fishing method, which was 
legal by the Management Plan (PNG 1999). Although prohibition of longline was a decision 
made by a body representative of the main stakeholders (PMB and IMA), fishers associated it 
with a decision enforced by GNPS, which once again reflected their perception of power 
relations and who ruled the game. In the mean time they felt they had a full moral right for 
illegal fishing, which was not only an informal working rule of certain groups of the sector, but 
also a negotiation strategy that responded to institutional constraints. The struggle against 
domination continued... 
 
Ospina (2005) also argued for the lack of logic in this position of the conservationists and 
suggested an explanation. Considering the recent history of industrial fishing in the Galápagos, 
the maximum annual capacity for the local fishermen to harvest six tons of fish were relatively 
low figures for the second biggest Marine Reserve in the world. On Ospina’s opinion, the 
restrictions on fishing seemed to be excessive. Available diagnoses showed that the state of the 
marine ecosystems was healthier than the terrestrial ecosystems. It appeared that for the 
environmentalists the problem was not in the present state of fisheries but in what they might 
come to be. Fishing policies of the environmental organizations seemed to have been 
dominated by the fear of an uncontrollable growth of local small-scale fishing into a 
commercial industry (Ospina 2005: 28). 
 
The turning point 
The analysis of the battle for longline fishing has demonstrated that technical problems and 
solutions were embedded in discourses and became translated into socio-political symbols, 
which served as persuasion and manipulation instruments for structuring opinions and actions 
of the other actors and stakeholders.  
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Prohibition of longline was an outcome of asymmetrical power relationships where the conflict 
of the fishers’ discourse of longline with the narrative of the dominating institution revealed the 
issues of prestige and control that underpinned conservation politics of the Galápagos.  
 
7.3.2 Access to resources: a struggle for the golden egg  
Territorialism in the conservationist sector  
The two organizations – WWF and GNPS have been working at the same time on developing 
two elements of the same activity: i) testing of gear and training of fishers in the use of oceanic 
handline, and ii) introducing a technological tool for efficient catch - FAD. However, according 
to our observations, there seemed to be little coordination between the two projects until the 
termination of the pilot project of oceanic handline technique. It expressed itself in the little 
knowledge that project coordinators showed about advances of the other projects.  
 
GNPS being the manager of the pilot project of oceanic handline naturally saw construction of 
FADs as continuation of the same project, thus putting the two elements into a bigger project 
frame of the “open sea fishing alternative “. Good communication and cooperation between the 
two organizations was crucial for timely completion of the construction of the first FAD of 
Isabela, but in a situation of contest, cooperation turned into leadership disputes and caused 
delays in supplies (anonymous personal communication). 
 
According to various anonymous accounts, this behavior was perceived as competition for a 
winner’s reward and eventually for more project activities and funding. Loss of time here also 
meant a waste of donated funds. But most importantly it meant loss of the fisherman’s 
confidence in development initiatives and increased distance between the sectors. 
 
FAD: sustainable fishing or a new face of longline? 
Apart from territorialism, there was certain controversy within the development initiatives. 
While efficiency of FAD for increasing catch per fishing effort was indisputable, opinions 
about its sustainability varied considerably among conservationists and fisheries experts.  
According to Segundo Coello, a marine biologist, the former sub-secretary of the Ministry of 
Environment and the leader of the artisanal longline proposal, there are at least three reasons to 
claim FAD to be unsustainable. First of all, there is vast scientific evidence that industrial FADs 
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produce high by-catch. This device attracts all kinds of organisms and, as expressed by S. 
Coello, “everything that has a mouth big enough to bite, will bite”. Secondly, it attracts mostly 
small juvenile fish that are not of high value due to their small size. Thirdly, it creates a false 
illusion of abundant population around it, while the areas away from the FAD might be totally 
depleted.  (Coello, S., interview 2006).  Thus, the FAD appeared to be a questionable 
alternative to the “unselective” and “unsustainable” longline, as it offers the same risks. 
 
Conservationist discourse represents one controversial fishing technology – FAD – at the cost 
of the other controversial fishing gear – longline – and translates their technical characteristics 
into normative political meanings. 
Controversial characteristics of FAD jeopardize the conservationist’s discourse of open sea 
fishing as a low impact alternative to longline and questions their intention to address highly 
unselective fishing gear (or environmental impacts of fishing). If FAD produces highly efficient 
yet highly unselective catch, then in principal, how is it different from longline? 
 
7.3.3 Capacity and motivation for change: commercialization 
Both the fishing sector and the conservationist sector agree that access to external markets is 
essential for the sustainability of open sea fishing in the Galápagos. Since there was a lack of 
experience and conditions necessary for commercialization of large pelagic fish, this fishery 
required strategic alliances with exporters to get access to a specialized and highly competitive 
market (Ministerio de Ambiente, 2004). Along with commercialization through a “mother-
ship”, processing centers have been considered an independent way to market the product.  
 
Marketing strategy and investment approach 
The first “green” Galápagos product has already made its way to the international market: 
Galápagos coffee. Finding its market was facilitated by the already existing niche market of 
island coffee. However, according to the director of CDRS and other conservationists, 
development of “green” Galápagos fish market was still a major challenge to successful 
implementation of open sea fishing with oceanic handline (Watkins, G., Villón, C. interviews 
2006).  
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To ensure local control over resources and price, the source of investment in the production 
system must be local too, which will allow independence from external pressure on volumes of 
extraction, independence in choice of means of production (fishing technique) and will 
maximize the price per unit of product (Watkins,G., Villón, C.,interviews 2006). 
The Galápagos fishers had neither local sources of investment, nor an organized marketing 
strategy, which would then put them out of competition with the continental industrial and 
artisanal fishing fleet that largely relied on longlining.  
 
The pattern of low catch in exercises with “mother- ships” also suggested that the targeted catch 
of ten tons, as was the expectation of the experiment with the ship “Mi Esperanza”, was too 
high for oceanic handline. This channel of commercialization implied a more efficient fishing 
technique and did not take into account constraints of resource use in a protected area. The 
main concern of conservationists was that temptation to use long line remained a major 
challenge against keeping the opportunity of fishing with a “mother-ship”. 
 
Continental prices did not leave any profit margin for Galápagos fish, if it was sold at the 
common price. Furthermore, there was a problem of extra costs and maintenance of quality 
incurred by transportation to the continent (Watkins,G., Villón, C.,interviews 2006). 
 
Lack of marketing strategy put Galápagos fish into direct competition with the industrial fish 
market of continental Ecuador. Selling Galápagos fish on equal terms with continental fish 
devaluated outcomes of the open sea fishing alternative and diversification policy by giving a 
negative economic incentive to use oceanic handline and stimulating use of illegal gear – long 
line. 
 
Some fishers and development workers suggested that the pilot project and the “Mi Esperanza” 
exercise was allowed to take place with only one purpose: to allow the fishers to experiment 
with the open sea techniques and to prove that this alternative would not work. They claim 
GNPS be the winner of this quest. 
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The Galápagos fishers, facing market forces on one side and restrictions on production methods 
on the other side, were left with few other options than to continue working with practices 
beyond regulation and in favor of the market. 
 
Processing centers 
According to conservationists and fisheries experts, the main challenge of the alternative was 
getting a good price and good quality handling of fish. A good price would result from 
professional handling skills and selling arrangements on the main international market. 
According to a WWF Galápagos fisheries expert, careful and time efficient manipulation of fish 
was a key to its quality and price, and therefore commercialization through processing centers 
posed a challenge of additional transportation time and manipulation. The “mother-ship” 
channel, however, was logistically much more efficient and once it proved to be economically 
sustainable, fishers would abandon processing centers completely (Villón, C., interview 2006).  
 
Low utilization of the processing center of San Cristobal and intention of fishers to pursue 
commercialization through a “mother-ship” have shaken the fishers’ discourse of processing 
centers, and made conservationists conclude that an unnecessarily high development investment 
into facilities remain useless for the most part (personal communication with development 
workers). 
 
In the summer of 2006, according to Alberto García Banda, technical staff of GNPS, five 
fishers from San Cristobal were ready to use their big boats as “mother-ships” for 
commercialization (García Banda, A., interview 2006). But if they wanted to operate open sea 
fishing by using their own vessels as “mother-ships” and take the catch directly to the 
continental market, processing centers would be used only by the coastal fishers and would 
remain highly underutilized. 
 
However, if the processing centers were built with consideration for future growth of open sea 
fishing, then utilization of those centers at full capacity would indicate a high level of resource 
extraction and thereby would contradict with the conservationist discourse of the feared growth 
of fishing activity. 
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The turning point 
Solutions for market access compliment each other in the discourse of the fishing sector. 
However, conservationists and fisheries experts see them as contradicting each other. 
Considering significant difference in views on marketing, investing in processing centers seems 
to have been a premature decision on the part of the conservationists. The economic feasibility 
of fish processing centers was not properly assessed and marketing strategies for Galápagos fish 
were not developed. 
 
According to many interviewees, especially in the conservationist sector, the key to sustainable 
Galápagos fisheries is a combination of a high market price and a low extraction rate, which is 
only achievable with the creation of a niche market for Galápagos fish and with local control on 
production (Watkins, G., interview 2006).  
 
7.4 Conclusions  
The open sea fishing alternative was an promising economic opportunity for fishermen that 
would allow them to remain in fishing.  However, in the process of the introduction to the 
initiative the following challenges and opportunities were identified.  
 
The co-management decision to prohibit longline was political, and so was the oceanic handline 
and FAD initiative. The latter was to mitigate the prohibition of longline and yet to prove that 
open sea fishing would not work in the Galápagos – with longline or with oceanic handline – in 
the vision of the fishermen. 
 
Internal differentiation and poor coordination of common project activities among actors in the 
conservationist sector leads to inconsistent, uncoordinated policies and practices. Inconsistency 
of practices is usually associated, in the fishers’ perception, with the lack of their participation 
in project planning with special emphasis on administration of conservation funds. Fishers’ 
strategy to defend their rights for funding is to treat development projects as a market place, 
where they can sell their cooperation.  
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The conflict between the conservationist narrative of FAD as sustainable and the more 
pragmatic scientific evaluation of its environmental impact indicates that conception of 
sustainability in the conservationist discourse is about manipulating facts to adjust them to a 
specific purpose. Thus, ‘sustainability’ is discursively embedded; it is above science and it is 
used as an instrument to order behavior of other actors in the conflictive field, in order words, 
to gain power. 
 
Like in the case of EF, the red thread of the fishers’ capacity unites all the fields: the fishers’ 
capacity for change is conditioned by access to investment funds, new fishing technologies and 
to the market with a developed marketing strategy. Although in the absence of marketing 
strategies, the initiative of open sea fishing would be threatened by the competition from 
longlining and likely to fail as development assistance focuses mainly on technology and 
equipment.  
 
 
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter we discuss some main issues brought forward in the previous chapters, regarding 
problems and merits of the theories chosen, while relating them to the practices and methods of 
resource management in the Galápagos. Furthermore, we analyze the subject of study at 
different levels, as well as the rationale and dilemmas of the research. 
 
8.1 The dilemmas of managing the commons 
One of the classic principles for managing common pool resources according to the CPR 
school, as we described before, is that the resource has to be within a clear and defined 
boundary or community and a well-defined and well-established single use resource or unit 
(e.g. fisheries). This assumption poses a methodological problem as described by Stein (1999) 
and assessed along this thesis. A resource system generally produces a multitude of products 
and multiple uses, and often it is subject to conflicting purposes and uses for which different 
management regimes are in place. 
 
In the case of the Galápagos we encountered not just a differentiated and heterogeneous 
community, as we described in chapter four, but also an un-defined and mobile boundary 
Stacey and Fuks                                                                 Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 109
within the multiple resource use in the existing context with conflicting uses. The oldest 
generation of fishers who were farmers in the “olden days” depended on the land resources. 
Some of them were also doing balacao fishing during Easter. Later, with the boom of lobster 
and sea cucumber these farmers became fishers and with the expansion of tourism they started 
some tourism activities as well.  Today, many fishers are also involved in farming (many have 
farms in the highlands).  
 
Although the majority of fishers are newcomers they are considered to be “extractors” of the 
marine resources and are mainly “seen” in the media and by society as the aggressors or 
predators committing permanent illegalities or acts against the rules and the Special Law. On 
the other hand, tourists are considered as actors that do not extract resources. They are seen as 
almost “passive observers” within the planned-zones of non-extraction. However, there is 
documentation proving that tourism is a major force of degradation and has a higher number of 
illegalities than fisheries. Nevertheless, these illegalities are not “seen”, neither by the Park 
authorities nor by the media and society.  
 
We cannot exclude the activities many researchers and conservationists do in their area of 
fieldwork at the marine and terrestrial sites of the protected areas. Some interviewees told us 
that these scientific visits have an impact on the object of study, while for example monitoring 
and evaluating the different species and ecosystems (Interview of tour operator from Santa 
Cruz). Although farmers, people from the tertiary sector, civil servants from governmental and 
private institutions or other groups, families and sectors from the islands (inhabitants in 
general) are not considered users and actors within the protected areas, they do impact the 
ecosystems in their own way. They use the beaches, paths, transport, move around the islands 
and consume sea and farming products50.  
 
In this way, there is a complex system with multiple users and uses of a single resource e.g. 
fisheries, which are also related and inter-dependent with the tourism, conservation and even 
farming and livestock sector. Therefore all have a stake, an impact and a “say” on the resource. 
In this case, all actors and users should be taken into account in the management system. As an 
interviewee told us “here everybody is giving priority to the fishing sector, they are 
                                                 
50 Although many of the local galapagueños are migrants from the mainland highlands that do not have a tradition 
of eating sea products, we cannot deny the assumption that local fishers sell fish to the local population.  
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participating in the management bodies and now they are the ones who get the first priority for 
the economic alternatives and other programs and projects. What about the other sectors and 
inhabitants of the islands?” (Civil servant, National Park Service, interview 2006). 
 
A nested institutional arrangement 
In relation to the management regime, we found different management and property regimes 
interconnected but also sometimes conflicting with each other. There is a complex and multiple-
use resource system with a nested system of institutions that are under different regimes. On 
the one hand, there is the regional level (Provincia de Galápagos) of the archipelago that is 
under a decentralized regime (Régimen Seccional Autónomo) with institutions such as the 
INGALA and the Municipalities51. They have their own Management Plan, programs and 
sectoral strategies too.   
On the other hand, there is the protected areas regime with the Marine Reserve and the National 
Park. They also have a decision-making arrangement, management system and management 
plans. 
 
These nested institutions and management regimes encounter positions of conflict between 
them with regard to some of the resource uses such as fisheries and locally based tourism. 
There seems to be a lack of coordination between them, mainly each having their own interests, 
agenda, objectives, budgets and own criteria and practice for addressing problems and 
solutions. For example the Municipality of Isabela has developed a strategy and guidelines 
(Ordenanza) to support local tourism development, to counteract the conventional water-born 
tourism. Santa Cruz is also developing its own tourism plans and strategies. INGALA is 
developing a tourism strategy too, with new land-tourism attractions so that tourists would have 
incentives to stay on the islands rather than on the ships. At the private level there is also a 
nested institutionalism of the conservationist and development NGOs, having their own agenda 
and with asymmetric access to funds, power and resources in relation with the less resourceful 
public institutions. 
 
                                                 
51 These institutions have the objectives of conservation, development and integrated management of the Province 
of Galápagos, under national and regional policies and the Galápagos Special Law. The Municipalities manage 
land resources, from both urban and rural areas. INGALA advises and coordinate the Galápagos institutions, 
guides the planning of conservation and development of the inhabited zones. 
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In the Common Pool Resource school (CPR), institutions or decision-making arrangements are 
considered to provide the mechanisms whereby individuals can transcend social dilemmas; 
characteristics of social outcomes are not only explained by individual preferences and the 
optimization of behavior, but also on the basis of institutional preferences (Stein 1999:13). As 
we could see in the case of the Galápagos management system, it is designed for the 
participation of the main direct users and stakeholders to make decisions on practices and 
policies of the reserve. These institutions have the assumptions that they have various assets on 
management: they receive information about ecosystems and marine resources to decide fishing 
bans, quotas and calendar dates. Furthermore, these institutions and actors decide the set of 
working rules “determining who is eligible to make decisions, what actions are allowed or 
constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what 
information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be assigned to individuals 
dependent on their actions” (Ostrom 1990:51). Moreover, decisions are made in a complex 
situation that we previously analyzed: under asymmetric relations, differentiated access to 
information and “scientific” knowledge and tools, unequal access to funds and advisers, 
external pressures and so forth. Under these circumstances we can ask whether institutions can 
transcend social dilemmas in the Galápagos, or, how can the participatory management system 
transcend social dilemmas and which “dilemmas” have to be considered. 
 
The CPR theoretical approach considers -in contrast to neo-classical economists- the decision-
maker not as a perfectly rational individual with perfect knowledge engaged in the exchange of 
homogenous goods, but with bounded rationality, imperfect knowledge and highly variable 
goods. This situation increases uncertainty. Given these assumptions, opportunism and free-
rider problems often appear (Acheson 1994 in Stein 1999:13). It is also assumed that the 
“presence of significant transaction costs can be reduced by institutions, since they make the 
activities of others more predictable”(Stein 1999:14). 
 
In the illustration of the two cases of economic alternatives to fisheries, we could assess that 
institutions are able to reduce some transaction costs52. Conservationist’s organizations help 
reduce transaction costs by facilitating studies of the economic alternatives to fisheries (reports 
of costs and benefits, market situation etc.), building infrastructure, financing advisers and 
                                                 
52 Transaction costs are “the time, effort and expense necessary to obtain the information to make an exchange, 
negotiate and enforce the exchange” (Stein 1999:14). 
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transport for negotiation meetings etc. But such processes and costs are influenced by 
opportunism (in the language of the CPR school) of some actors who have their own interests 
(in the language of the Actor Oriented approach) and aims, such as the Navy/DIGMER that 
wanted to stop the experiential artisanal fishing initiative because of their interest in sport 
fishing in the Galápagos.  
Generally, the costs of any initiative or process in the Galápagos are influenced, as shown in 
previous chapters, by specific people involved (advisers, local leaders, politicians), the location 
(depending on which island, which institution), the resource (specific fishery such as lobster, 
sea cucumber, finfish or shark-finning) and the activity  (e.g. experiential artisanal fishing, 
tourism, open sea fishing etc.). 
 
Methodological problems and merits of the CPR school within the Galápagos context 
A methodological problem of the CPR school is that external and contextual factors are absent. 
It is mainly a “framework still focusing on the internal dynamic of collective resource 
management only” (Stein 1999, Edwards & Steins 1998). Although the external world has been 
recognized as one of the resources of uncertainty, it is regarded as a given fact. Local resource 
users will base their decision to cooperate or defect not only on the expected social and 
economic costs and benefits generated by the CPR, but will also consider the expected costs 
and benefits from opting for alternatives (Ibid.). In the case of the Galápagos we have seen that 
many external factors have influenced not only fisheries, but also other aspects of the local 
context, such as national policies regarding migration, decentralization and land reform, 
economic changes (e.g. oil boom), market prices and demands, national and regional political 
and social movements among others. Furthermore, actors from the Marine Reserve have also 
considered costs and benefits of the Participative Management System and the new economic 
alternatives as we analyzed in previous chapters. 
 
A merit of CPR theorists is the common vocabulary of the CPR. The concept of the CPR are 
resources, i) for which joint use involves subtractability, that is, use by one user will subtract 
benefits from another user’s enjoyment of the resource system, and ii) for which exclusion of 
individuals or groups involves high transaction costs (Stein 1999:15). 
Both criteria are valid to the Galápagos case: in one contextual moment, local and artisanal 
fishers and conservationists united to fight against industrial fishing and therefore industrial 
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fishing and fishers were excluded from the Galápagos waters and the new participative 
management system of the marine reserve. Today artisanal fishers, conservationists and tourism 
sectors are considered to be related directly to marine resources, as they are able to participate 
in the managerial system of the marine reserve. The rest of the islands’ social actors, such as 
farmers, traders and others are excluded. The process of exclusion has meant the re-
organization of new alliances or in other cases the strengthening of old alliances between 
sectors, as well as the establishment of (changing) political positions, development of 
environmental educational concepts and tools to support the new management scenario and 
funding to maintain the management system. Therefore, exclusion means in one way the loss of 
possibilities and defeat of some sectors and people, an in another way the strengthening of 
some other sectors. But it also means a potential situation of growing demand, competition and 
conflict amongst actors and stakeholders over access to, allocation of and control over the 
resources and spaces.  
 
The GMR institutional arrangement is built with a premise of efficiency, where decisions have 
to be taken within a limited time and with a number of limited and direct users of the resources. 
This will carry fundamental problems related with democracy, good governance and 
participation and therefore may hinder any resource management in the archipelago. It will be 
difficult to tackle permanent exclusion of actors and sectors, as interest groups and generally 
the inhabitants of the islands are not just users of the multiple resources nor just residents, but 
rather members of the community, holders of rights, and therefore citizens of the Galápagos.  
 
Another merit of the CPR theory and school is the “emphasis that a set of well-established 
decision-making arrangements alone does not necessarily guarantee collective action” (Stein 
1999:15). The framework helps with tools to explore patterns of interaction amongst: i) the 
physical and technical characteristics of the CPR, ii) the institutional framework for the CPR 
governance, and iii) the social characteristics of the user community (Edwards & Steins 1998, 
Steins 1999). Moreover, there is a series of factors and issues that we have considered that are 
not only under the institutionalization and transaction cost rationale. Power relations, access to 
differentiated knowledge systems, narratives, differences in understanding and perceiving 
management, fisheries and decision-making are fundamental aspects to take into account in a 
conflictive setting such as the Galápagos. 
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8.2 The rational individual, the social actor and the citizen 
A group of rational choice theorists following a new trend, the new institutionalism, believe 
that institutions or decision making-arrangements provide the mechanisms whereby individuals 
can transcend social dilemmas (Acheson 1994, Bates 1994, Ostrom 1990). Since individuals 
pursue the maximization of their own utility, cooperation towards collective objectives 
becomes increasingly problematic. CPR theory embraces not the classical assumption of 
calculated rationality but a bounded rationality as the driving force behind individual behavior. 
This implies that individual behavior is studied in the context of complex and uncertain 
situations that affect the actor’s decisions and the value he attributes to certain courses of action 
(Stein 1999:51). 
 
We believe that the people of the Galápagos are not just “users” or “appropriators” of 
resources, but active social actors who have the agency to act upon their rights, demands and 
needs. We cannot see a rational individual making always the right choices, but an actor in a 
field of power relations and encountered interests and therefore constrained in his choices as 
we addressed in the previous chapters. 
Many conservationists in the Galápagos believe that fishers are “extractors”, users with an 
incentive to maximize their own utility at the expense of the resource. It suggests a “non-
dynamic relationship between the resource user and the resource system, in which the user 
withdraws products from the resource and does not give anything back (for example, 
undertaking conservation work to the CPR)” (Steins 1999:51).  
Here we see the challenges of the collective resource governance and management, challenging 
the principles of homo economicus. The concept of the social actor does not refer to individual 
human beings only, but also embodies different types of organizations. Organizations also 
make decisions and have organizing capacity to enroll others that make a difference to pre-
existing states of affairs, which is when actor-oriented approaches recognize effective agency 
(Long 1992 in Steins 1999:53). This also involves a learning process to use the material and 
cultural entities available to them in a manner suited to the constraints and opportunities of the 
situation (Crozier & Friedberg 1980 in Steins 1999:52). The concept of agency is tied to the one 
of power and in the Foucault sense is “exercised rather than possessed” (1979) and is 
constituted in social relationships, such as networks, alliances and conflicts.  
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The introduction of the notion of social actor does not mean the concept of rationality is 
discarded, for “every theory of society encounters the problem of employing a concept of 
rationality” (Habermas 1987 in Steins 1999). In rational-choice theories, new institutionalism 
and implicitly in the actor-oriented approach, the model of strategic action serves as the (given) 
prime mover for individual behavior. In the social actor perspective, rationality takes shape of 
the rationalization of action, or the actor’s capacity to supply reasons for his behavior (Steins 
1999). 
In the case of the Galápagos, fishers and conservationists agree (at different levels) that they 
need to find a common solution to the perceived notion of the fisheries crisis. Although, the 
economic alternatives have been delayed due to conflicts and drawbacks, they are the result of a 
process of rationalization of their situation and a devise for “bridging, accommodating to, or 
struggling against each other’s different social and cognitive worlds” (Long 1989:14).   
 
Furthermore, we want to address that the people we were talking and listening to, meeting, 
observing and interviewing in the Galápagos were not just rational individuals searching to 
maximize the resource utilities or just a social actor strategizing his actions and encountering 
others’ interests and power, but also citizens of a heterogeneous community. 
The word citizen is described in the Oxford dictionary (2000) as “a person who has the legal 
right to belong to a particular country; A person who has the rights given by a country or state 
to its people, for example the right to vote and to live there permanently”. But, we want to point 
out the need for a broader status and position of the Galápagos’ residents and a more societal 
view of the local context, addressing people not just as homo economicus or homo politicus, but 
rather as citizens in a “society of man-kind”, as Arendt states, where “the social begins to 
acquire the general meaning of a fundamental human condition” (Arendt, H. 1969:24). We 
cannot relate to “a society of faithfuls, as in the Middle Ages, or a society of property-owners, 
as in Locke, or a society relentlessly engaged in a process of acquisition, as in Hobbes, or a 
society of producers, as in Marx, or a society of jobholders, as in our society, or a society of 
laborers as in socialist and communist countries” (Arendt 1969:31). Rather we want to include 
a concept of society which engages the public and the private “realms”, where man is a political 
and economical actor as well as a social being with particular characteristics and concerns. In 
this way we should include different “realms” such as the household, the family, the individual 
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and ‘private’ matters. Moreover, where are the symbolic, the spiritual and the cultural issues of 
the human agency? How do they become a “collective concern”? How are they perceived and 
constructed in a particular society and time? F. Barth (1973) and P. Bordieu (1991, 1997, 1995) 
tried to explain these characteristics through the analysis of social structures, habitus, relations 
and historical practices.  
 
Although social structures, formal and informal rules, processes such as globalization and 
market forces tend to unify life-styles, interests, demands, political and scientific trends etc. 
people, actors and citizens have also struggled and gained the (however determined) possibility 
to choose, influence and develop different governance options and decision-making 
arrangements. “Democratic”, “participative”, “sustainable management” buzzwords, narratives 
and discourses are part of the new institutional agenda and around the globe.  
In this way, the Galápagos has to be considered under these trends and appealing management 
approaches and concepts. The people of Galápagos, the galapagueño, need to be seen not just 
as a rational individual, a user or an actor, but as a citizen of the Galápagos who can help to 
give new insights to the debate.  
What kind of rights do all Galápagos inhabitants have towards the access to, the allocation of 
and the control over the resources? What kind of institutional arrangements for the archipelago 
and the citizens of Galápagos need to be (re)-established to develop a more sustainable, 
participative and democratic management of not only the protected areas and resources but of 
the society as such? Which factors and citizens need to be included in the institutional 
arrangements? Which societal issues need to be taken into consideration in the institutional and 
managerial bodies of the Galápagos? 
The list of questions can continue including answers. But the people of the islands, researchers, 
actors and stakeholders should continue asking questions and looking for answers in the 
constantly changing social, environmental, economical and political context of the Galápagos. 
 
8.3 Narratives, discourses and perceptions: struggling for the tortoise with the golden egg 
We have paid attention to and heard during our field research many stories, ideas, critiques, 
analysis and theories, which we believe are important representations and reflections of people 
about “who they are, what they care about, and how they hope to realize their aspirations. In 
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fact, people everywhere are in a critical, reflexive dialogue with the world in which they live, 
with themselves and with the researcher” (Rosaldo 1989, Pigg 1996 in Nuijten 2005). 
We are considering power in multiple force fields as a main core of our theoretical framework 
and therefore discourses are also a product of this process of differentiated domination and 
practice, but also “true and incomplete at the same time”(Nuijten 2005:11).  
As researchers this methodological tool has helped us to identify different aspects of the same 
issue: different ways of “looking” at practices, approaches and principles used in the Galápagos 
management system. We have critically analyzed the discourse around sustainable management 
of the marine resources on the Galápagos with narratives such as participation.  
 
Overexploitation by fishers can also be called a narrative that embraces power relations 
between the actors in the Galápagos: it is mainly the fishers who are considered the ones who 
threaten the environment. We do not deny a critical exploitation and almost total exhaustion of 
sea cucumber and lobster done in earlier years, but it is critical and highly conflictive to 
consider the fishers as the only “extractors” and “predators” and threat. It is also a statement 
and narrative based on studies (and an approach) of species-by-species and also not considering 
fisheries within an eco-system approach. Fishers and other galapagueños believe that there is a 
need for “the bad guys” to keep an image of the islands as a threatened space. This image 
would help conservationists and NGOs working in the islands access to funds.     
As we explained earlier there are also other users and extractors of the resources that are not 
“seen” by the authorities and media such as the tourism sector, that bring illegal activities and 
threats to the environment. Furthermore, issues concerning tourism management are not 
discussed or included in the agenda of the Participative Management Board of the GMR. Also, 
issues on development and conservationists programs, aims, budgets etc. related to the marine 
and terrestrial resources of the Galápagos are almost absent. They plan, decide and allocate 
resources such as funds, people and activities outside the discussions of the management 
system. In this way, the issue is not only who participates in the management system, but also 
what and how is discussed. The agenda is dominated by a central discourse: a participative and 
sustainable management system, which we have deconstructed and critically analyzed. 
 
There is no doubt about the uniqueness of the flora and fauna of the Galápagos. Although, 
fishers perceive the islands as a place to extract resources and base their livelihood, the tourism 
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industry builds a pristine and un-touchable environmental image for marketing purposes and 
the threatened image marketed by the media and conservationists have helped the creation of 
different commodities and interests.  
There is a struggle for access and control over the turtle with the golden egg: each actor has its 
own interest on the resource, with their own strategies, knowledge and tools to maneuver in a 
force field.  
 
8.4 Sustainability: a balance between the global and the local 
Linking economic, ecological and social sustainability, we assess that market forces have a 
great impact on all the three aspects of the Galápagos society. Even though market forces have 
always been present in the Galápagos through industrial fishing for many decades, it is not until 
three decades ago with the tourism industry that the market began to monopolize the entire 
sector, transforming the nature and its resources into a commodity without paying the 
environmental and social costs.     
Later, with the high demand for sea cucumber and lobster, Asian markets stimulated a rapid 
change of livelihood, mostly for the local population with changed composition and numbers of 
population, and most importantly, a dependency for the local people on the commodity and 
availability on demand for these resources.  
 
Development intervention by the international environmental organizations is another form of 
global market intervention, which has made local conservation and development initiatives, and 
thereby also the local economy dependent on the global rating of the “Galápagos” commodity. 
Thus, instead of liberating the Galápagos’ inhabitants from poverty and limitations of local 
economies, the process of market globalization enslaves them through the “free” market. 
Although the “boom” of sea cucumber and lobster brought along an economic boost, the market 
forces have ensured the over-exploitation and collapse of the resource base and thereby have 
proven this dependency to bring economic and social instability. 
 
Although the economic alternatives are a move to minimize this dependency by capitalizing on 
the local knowledge and resources, dependency from the global markets continues even with 
the diversification policy. Besides the dependency on external sources of investment funding,  
sustainability of the alternatives depends on their ultimate consumers – the “Northern” markets. 
Stacey and Fuks                                                                 Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 119
In the case of EF they are the tourists from the USA and the European Union, and in the case of 
the open sea fishing they are international fish markets.  
 
Thus, building community based initiatives in the Galápagos cannot avoid the globalized 
economy with all the advantages and risks it brings along. Even though these initiatives aim at 
local economic, social and ecological sustainability, their dependency on the external markets 
will always maintain a certain level of uncertainty and instability. In this way, it is the right 
balance of the local and the global that might be the key to sustainability of the fishing sector as 
well as the Galápagos society. 
 
 
CHAPTER 9: FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter aims to bring a conclusion to the characteristics and challenges of resource 
management in the Galápagos, specifically on the institutional arrangements and the recent 
diversification policy in fisheries management. We discuss key developments of the fisheries 
management and place them into the context of governance and sustainable development of the 
Galápagos as a society.   
 
In terms of answering the main problem formulation and taking into account conclusions of the 
thesis’ chapters, we discuss what characterizes conservation politics of the Galápagos Marine 
Reserve and what the implications of these politics are, in terms of social and institutional 
constraints and opportunities for the sustainable management of fisheries in the Galápagos. 
 
The “fifth man” and the red thread 
The red thread begins with the identification of the “fifth man” as a scientific construction that 
guides and informs our research. Through the application of the construction to the stories of 
the other “men” – actors in the field of study – the research results in a new discursive 
formation: the story of the “fifth man” himself about the same “elephant”: the management 
system of the GMR (figure 4). 
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Figure 4: The red thread (b). 
This flow chart is visual illustration of the logic of the thesis It is build by two kinds of steps: analysis and 
output. Elliptic fields in gray color indicate analytical steps, and rectangular fileds in various colors indicate 
output of analysis. It begins from building the fifth man's – the researchers’ - identity as social scientists. 
The researchers view the other “blind men” through a prism of a combination of the theoretical tools of the 
new institutional economics, actor-oriented approach and critical discourse analysis, which help them to 
understand the stories of the other “men”. The other “blind men” are local actors grouped in the 
conservationist, the tourism and the fishing sectors - the main users participating in the Galápagos Marine 
Reserve management system. Their stories are about themselves and the relations among themselves. The 
researchers identify conflictive issues and force fields, where discourses of actors become obvious, and 
deconstruct the discourses to understand the values given by the actors to their resources and the strategies 
they employ to achieve better access to resources. The force fields are: i) access and control over resources 
ii) institutional arrangements, iii) capacity for change, and iv) sustainability. Deconstruction of discourses 
within the conflictive fields leads the researchers to identifying meanings of the conservation politics of the 
Galápagos, which emerge as a result of power relations between GMR users. The researchers’ final step is 
to give their own value to those meanings as constraints and opportunities for sustainable governance of the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve and thereby identify their own discourse as to what determines conservation 
politics of the Galápagos. 
 
 
Meanings of conservation politics of the Galápagos  
Before the Special Law, the conservation policy in the Galápagos was embedded in the 
mainstream eco-centric approach to conservation. The central idea of this approach is to 
protect its unique ecosystem from human induced changes and, if possible, to restore the 
state of already affected ecosystems.  
 
Appealing to the issue of the exhaustion of sea cucumber and lobster populations, to the 
presence of illegal fishing activities and to the permanent pressure from fishers to re-open 
and re-negotiate bans and quotas, conservationists have developed a discourse of fishing 
as a threat to the Galápagos marine ecosystems. Furthermore, strict regulation of fishing 
activity on one hand, and economic needs of the fishing sector on the other hand, have 
resulted in an economic, social and ecological crisis of the fisheries.  
 
The participatory management system established for the Marine Reserve has helped to 
change the way rules and decisions were taken, and introduced the approach of local 
users and actors’ participation. It has also helped to change it from an open access regime 
(despite the state claims and related rules) to a co-management and common property 
regime, under certain principles of collaborative, participative, responsible, adaptive, 
precautionary, sustainable and integral management. By recognizing these principles and 
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the actors’ participation in governance of the protected ecosystems, the Participatory 
Management System came a step further towards ecologically, economically and socially 
sustainable governance of the Galápagos Marine Reserve.  
 
Nevertheless, the new participatory management approach did not mean inclusion of all 
users and therefore has proven to be discriminating rather than democratic. Furthermore, 
being the first step towards democratic governance of marine resources in the Galápagos, 
PMS has provided participation opportunity for the included users, but it did not ensure 
equal participation among them. PMS is subject to external political influence and 
embeds power relations of the local actors that underpin asymmetric participation in 
decision-making. Good governance of the marine reserve and the Galápagos as a region 
would be difficult to put into practice because of this conflictive scenario of exclusive 
and asymmetric participation.  
 
PMS has become an example of the co-management of marine resources for many other 
protected areas in the world. We conclude, however, that despite the obvious advantages 
of this governance system, the huge efforts and resources involved (both human and 
economic) to build a good governance and innovative management system will not make 
a finished and functioning system good enough to resolve key conflicts and constraints. 
We are not arguing for a conflict-free system, but for a system with the appropriate 
conflict resolution tools, where a more equal access to decision-making and resources 
and a broad participation from all the layers and realms of the Galápagos society, would 
help to make a better governance.  
 
Nevertheless, since the establishment of PMS, the social conflict in 2004 reached its 
peak. It is true, as expressed by the management staff of GNPS, that the system is young 
and that making it work is a time and labor consuming process. To date, however, PMS 
has re-produced the “old” pattern of asymmetric power relations and the conflicts 
between users; it has maintained the crisis of fisheries and with it the threatened image of 
the Galápagos.  
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The image feeds into the “traditional” conservation narrative of overexploitation and the 
mainstream eco-centric approach separating man from the ecosystem and portraying him 
as a threat to it, thereby jeopardizing its own definition as “participatory”.  The 
international community is presented with the image of the Galápagos suffering from 
human activities, such as fishing. By means of the same image the Galápagos is 
advertised as a pristine paradise to be protected for visitors to enjoy that then promotes an 
even higher flow of mass tourism. Interestingly, tourists are not viewed as users being a 
threat, but rather as a blessing that brings income to support conservation. Although this 
contradicts the narrative of over-exploitation of the Galápagos by humans, exclusion of 
tourism from this narrative, despite of its threatening and controversial role, has been 
possible due to the entire focus directed towards fishing. This is a result of an asymmetric 
power constellation within the governance system and the traditional alliance between the 
tour operators and the conservationists. 
 
As the social crisis stimulates unruly behavior and free-riding (fisher’s strikes and illegal 
activities) and puts at risk the “ecological integrity” and the extremely valuable image of 
a “pristine” Galápagos – both for environmentalist groups and the tourism industry – the 
international community is called for help to combat the fisheries crisis. The new policy 
of diversification has been put forward and NGOs together with the GNPS are now 
working on projects to develop economic alternatives for fishers.  
 
The implementation of economic alternatives to fishing was not only a matter of 
technical solutions and limitations, but rather a matter of power relations in competition 
for access and control over the resources. The “project of alternatives”, or the 
diversification policy, has been conceived in the context of the longline gear prohibition, 
which appears to be a purely political decision. Transformation of this technical issue into 
a political one has determined the politicized nature of the diversification policy and its 
outcomes. 
 
Development and conservation intervention is funded by private and public sponsors 
from all over the world. It creates promotional opportunities and prestige for the 
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environmental organizations, jobs for the individuals employed in those organizations, 
development assistance to fishers and additional advertising for the tourism industry as 
well as continued immunity from regulation compliance.    
 
Development intervention in the Galápagos in general has a paternalistic and asymmetric 
nature. Limited beneficiary participation in the project cycle and poor communication 
between project donors and beneficiaries at all stages of the project planning and 
implementation process leads to conflicting perceptions of project activities and 
outcomes. This then jeopardizes the sustainability of intervention initiatives. 
Consequently, distance between the fishers and the conservationists increase, and both 
sectors employ their own conflicting strategies to compete for project resources.  
 
There are also conflicting values of what development and sustainability are, and 
therefore interventions are interpreted in different ways. The Galápagos institutions 
perceived the limited results of development intervention as a lack of coordination, rather 
than a problem of different interests, power and access to resources.  
 
Competition for access to development and conservation funds is claimed to be the 
reason for internal ‘territorialism’ in the conservationist sector. There is a consequent 
lack of coordination of common project activities that leads to inconsistent policy and 
practice. Conservation funds are at the heart of the fishers’ discourse of the Galápagos 
being the “golden egg” in captivity for the conservationists. The Galápagos is not only a 
unique treasure in itself, but an instrument of enhancing the potential of funding for 
conservation goals through institutional and media narratives, thereby producing ever 
more wealth. Lack of inter-institutional coordination, thus, appears to be a result of 
competition for the benefits of the added value of the “golden egg” and protection of the 
institution’s prestige in the eyes of the international environmental networks as well as 
the general public. 
 
The “golden egg” of the Galápagos is not only its treasures, but also the social conflict 
over the access to those treasures. The conflict escalates the value of those treasures as 
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they become threatened and ever more valuable and thereby are transformed into a 
commodity of nature. If solving conflicts takes away the threats and decreases the value 
of the “golden egg”, then maintaining conflicts keeps its value high as well as the need 
for development and conservation intervention.   
 
Thus, beginning with the eco-centric approach the meanings of the conservation politics 
of the Galápagos can be broken down to the inflow of conservation and development 
funding as an output of these politics, which then gives benefits to all the main users. The 
conflict seems to work for everyone, and maintaining it is the way of maintaining the 
inflow of financial resources. We like to compare the fishers and the conservationists to a 
dancing couple: they need each other to keep on dancing and they need to move 
according to the same rules. Relations between the two sectors could be seen as a dance 
of conflict, where illegalities by fishers are broadly advertised but allowed to continue 
under moderate control, where illegalities and social unrest is stimulated by strict 
regulation and lack of alternatives, and where introduction of alternatives has become a 
lengthy process with questionable motivation for change from all parties. 
  
Implementation of alternatives has revealed that the ultimate conflict between users is not 
primarily about the fisheries but about the added symbolic value of the “golden egg”: the 
financial resources that are attracted by the Galápagos’ image as a threatened protected 
area. The conflict is about distribution of the benefits brought in by conservation and 
development intervention. Access to these benefits is determined by access to power and 
the asymmetric relations between the users. Thus, the crisis of fisheries provides the users 
with access to the added value of the “golden egg”. Even though the access is asymmetric 
and the fishers, who supposedly get the lowest share of the “golden egg”, do not agree 
with this pattern, all actors seem to agree by their actions that they need this “golden egg” 
and that they need to maintain the conflict over the fisheries. 
 
We agree with Vincent Gravez (interview 2006), the facilitator of the fishing sector, that 
the crisis of fisheries should be dealt with in a comprehensive way, embracing all 
solutions in a diversification management approach: “there is no perfect response to the 
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crisis of the fisheries, and nobody has one common solution.  This reflects the complexity 
of the process of searching for solutions: every actor has his selection of solutions, each 
of which can only solve a part of the puzzle. The solutions should be considered all 
together, and they should complement each other” (Gravez, V., interview 2006).  
 
Furthermore, we contend that in order for the solutions to contribute to a more 
sustainable and benign governance system all actors and citizens should be included with 
their differentiated positions, backgrounds and resources. Therefore, we conclude that the 
Galápagos management system cannot transcend the social and political dilemmas 
analyzed here unless it addresses the issue of power relations and a common 
understanding of the principles addressed by the PMS. The Galapagueño, the inhabitants 
of the Galápagos, must neither be seen only as users, nor just as actors encountered in a 
power field and constrained in their choices. They also have to be seen as members of a 
heterogeneous community, holders of citizen’s rights, where different types of assets 
(economic, social, cultural, political and symbolic) intertwine and interfere in the lives 
and decisions of people and institutions.  
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APPENDIX 1. Maps 
 
Figure 1: Map of South America and Ecuador. 
 
Source: http://www.adventure-life.com/img/maps/c-s_america.gif , retrieved 20-02-2007, 15.00 GMT 
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Figure 2: Distance between the mainland Ecuador and the Galápagos archipelago – approximately 
1000 km; regions of Ecuador – the coastal in yellow, the mountainous in brown and the east in green. 
 
 
Source: PNG 2003 
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Figure 3: The Galápagos archipelago. The outer yellow line delimits the 40 nautical miles of the 
Marine Reserve, while the inner dark line delimits the base line. 
 
 
Source: PNG 2005 
 
 
Stacey and Fuks                                                    Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 
 144
APPENDIX 2. Description of fisheries  
 
A) Finfish fisheries: A variety of finfish species is captured in the Galápagos waters 
using hand-lines, seines and gillnets. The fishing of species such a cabrilla or bacalao 
(Mycteropuerca olfax), and the minor catch of lisa (Mugil spp) has been the main 
fisheries for the local inhabitants since their settlement in the islands. As well as the 
bacalao, the lisa was sent to the mainland dried and salted (seco-salado 
The capture volumes have been decreasing as a consequence of the permanent fishing 
of these species since the 1840s and to date, lots of seco salado arrive from Peru 
during Easter and –moreover- cheaper, making this product more difficult for the 
galapagueños to sell to the mainland (Ramirez 2004:81-82). 
 
Other authors such as Bin Yami (2001), and confirmed by fishermen address the 
decrease of this finfish due to the reduce of the fishing effort as the fishermen are 
more interested on other commercial species such as lobster and sea cucumber and 
not as a result of a decrease in the stock. He also refers that the fishermen lack enough 
labor force and the ability and appropriate methods to deal with this fishery. On the 
other hand, our interview data indicates that the main reason for the decline is 
exhaustion of this resource.  
 
B) Lobsters: The second fishery refers to the red lobster (Panaluris pennicillatus) 
and blue lobster (Panaluris gracilis) associated with a local and artisanal fishery, 
which is considered having an industrial and commercial character. Both species are 
almost entirely exported as frozen tails and middlemen pay the same price for both 
species. There was also the catch of the crustaceo langostino or slipper lobster 
(Scyllarides astori) which is consumed locally (Bustamante et al. 2000, Ben-Yami 
2001). 
  
Lobsters have been collected since the period of whale and tortoises-hunting, traffic 
of seal-furs and pirates. Catching lobsters “has been an important part of the economy 
of the fishing sector since the establishment of an export-oriented spiny lobster 
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fishery at the beginning of the 1960s. From then until the early 1980s, spiny lobsters 
were harvested for export by divers operating from large vessels based in mainland 
Ecuador and carrying a variable number of dinghies. The primary diving gear used 
for commercial harvest of spiny lobster in the Galápagos is hookah gear, that consists 
of a small air compressor in a dinghy (called panga in the Galápagos) supplying air to 
up to two divers via long low-pressure hoses to depths of up to 15m.” (Reck 1983 in 
Bustamante et al. 2000:210). 
 
Initially, divers operated mainly during daylight  hours, catching lobster either by 
hand in their dens or by handheld harpoons. In the late 1980s, night diving became 
more important, as lobsters are more easily taken at night as they forage outside their 
shelters and the use of slings also increased (Ibid.) 
 
The lobster fisheries were the main economic income for the Galápagos fishermen 
until the sea cucumber boom started. Until the beginning of 1980s lobster meant 65% 
of the fishers’ total income (cf. Beck 1983 in Ramirez 2004:82) and in later years 
lobster represented 42% of the fishers’ total income (cf. Andrade in Ramirez 2004). 
 
The importance and volume of captures in the early periods of lobster fisheries was 
clearly accounted by a fisherman to Ramirez: “In the 1970s ships from Guayaquil 
began to arrive, where they could catch around 30.000 pounds of lobster. There was 
no control, big ships with around 30 divers and small boats around the main ship 
sailed around the islands all the year if they wanted to. There were so many lobsters 
and they where very easy to catch in the shores, there was no need for tanks and air 
compressors, just snorkeling equipment and jump to the water, then take and throw to 
the boat!”(in Ramirez 2004:83).  
 
Fuelled by an increase in tourism and immigration during the 1980s and the 
retirement of the last remaining large vessel in 1984, the lobster fishery grew rapidly 
at the local level (Reck1983 in Bustamante et al. 2000). Today, the lobster catch is 
Stacey and Fuks                                                    Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 
 146
regulated by a minimum size of 26cm. of length, together with a number of other 
restrictions such as quotas and quarantines. 
 
C) Pelagic fish: The Galápagos waters have always been considered as a “feeding 
zone” for many species. They are rich in big pelagic fish, such as tuna, picudo, 
dorados and sierra, and therefore an optimal place for tuna vessels from all over the 
world (Bin Yami 2001). This fishery targets mainly the yellow-fin tuna (Thunmus 
albacares), bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus), barrilete (Euthyn us pelamis), bonito 
negro (Euthunus lineatus), bonito blanco (Sarda spp).  
 
Between the 1930s and 1950s foreign tuna fisheries made fortunes in the Galápagos 
(Ramirez 2004:84). This fishing left nothing to the local economy. According to our 
interview data, today, despite the Special Law that prohibits industrial fishing in the 
Galápagos Marine Reserve, foreign and the Ecuadorian industrial tuna vessels still 
enter the waters of the Reserve to fish.  
 
The presence of industrial fisheries has been permanent in the Galápagos and has 
done severe damage to the marine resources due to the high levels of extraction and 
type of methods used. 
 
D) Sea-cucumber: A new type of fishery has evolved since the 1990s as an export 
oriented activity and considered a “boom” in the local economy is the sea cucumber 
collection. Sea cucumber (Stichopus fuscus) was abundant in the beginning of the 
1990s, easy to collect, highly demanded and priced in the Asian markets. This coastal 
species can be found primarily at the depth of 4-12 m below surface.  
 
Since 1992,coinciding with the establishment of the Galápagos Marine Reserve, the 
“sea cucumber boom” has attracted immigrants into artisanal fisheries and, among 
them, people who never fished before. Further, it quickly enriched local traders. 
Between 1992 and 1994, tens of millions of sea cucumbers were extracted within the 
few months of the fishing season (Reck and Bustamante 2002:18).  
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The legal sea cucumber season lasts normally two months, starting in May or April. 
Fishermen cook and dry the sea cucumber for it commercialization. The minimum 
commercial size (dried) is approximately of 10cm. (Ben Yami 2001). In the 
beginning of the 2000s the Charles Darwin Station concluded that the sea cucumber 
population in Fernandina island decreased until 80% in comparison to 1993. In other 
areas were almost extinct (Ibid). 
 
The profitability of sea cucumber was so high that fishermen were able to get up to 
USD$ 4.000 per day and some fishermen told us that a good night-catch could bring 
up to USD$10.000 (interviews 2006).  
 
E) Illegal shark finning: There are thirty registered species of sharks in the 
Galápagos, from which seven are more common in the area (and attractive for 
tourists). Sharks are caught for their fins; since it is difficult to handle a shark’s body 
in a discrete way, they get thrown back to the sea alive after their fins are cut off. 
There is no detailed information of volumes and extension of this practice.  
 
Income from fisheries has been permanently estimated since 1997 by the fishing- 
monitoring program of the CDRS. Sea cucumber has given around 3´million USD$ 
per year since 1999 (except 2001); lobster fishery has been reported at least 1´million 
per year since 1999, while finfish fishery has given around 0.1 million USD$ per 
year. This data has been reported by the fishers. Thus, additional income from 
commerce and exports has to be added to these amounts (Ospina 2004:33). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stacey and Fuks                                                    Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 
 148
APPENDIX 3. Participatory Management System of the Galápagos 
Marine Reserve 
Inter-Institutional Management Authority, IMA:   
Minister of Environment     
Minister of Defense      
Minister of External Trade, Integration and Fishing   
Minister of Tourism      
Galápagos sector of Science and  Conservation   
Galápagos Tourism Chamber     
Galápagos Artisanal Fishing Sector    
Technical Secretary of GNP Service    
Special Advisors      
Charles Darwin Foundation     
Fisheries Development Council     
       
 
        
       
       
    Galápagos National Park, GNP:  
    
the administrator of the Marine 
Reserve 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Participatory Management Board, PMB:    
Artisanal Fishing Sector     
Tourism Sector      
Charles Darwin Scientific Station    
Naturalists Guides      
Galápagos National park     
Source: adapted from Galápagos National Park & CDF, 2003 
IMA  
PMB  
GNP  
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APPENDIX 4. Statistical data in diagrams 
 
 
Figure 1: Days of fishers’ strikes per year   
 
Source: adapted from Ospina 2005 
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of the number of fishers in the Galápagos between 1974 and 2004 
 
Source: adapted from Diaz et al 2005 
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Figure 3: 
 
 
Source: Castro 2005 
 
 
Figure 4: 
 
Source: Castro 2005 
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Figure 5: The total artisanal fishing fleet of the Galápagos between 1999 and 2005  
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Various sources , adapted from Diaz et al 2005  
 
 
Figure 6: The numbers of visitors to the Galápagos between 1979 and 2004 according to the origin; 
the yellow signifies national visitors and red signifies foreign visitors. 
 
 
Source: Ospina 2004 and  GNP for the data for 2004, adapted from Diaz et al 2005. 
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Figure 7: Income generated by the expenditure of tourists in the Galápagos and income generated by 
the sea cucumber and lobster fisheries.  
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Source: Informe Galápagos 2001, Fundación Natura; Murillo, S. 2002, Linea base de la bíodiversidad de la 
RMG; adapted from PNG 2003 
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Figure 8: Division of the Galápagos population by economic activities in 2001. 
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Electricity, gas and w ater 0,5%
New  w orkers 0,6%
Social and health services 2,0%
Real estate agencies 3,1%
Domestic service 3,3%
Community social activities 4,6%
Hotels and restaurants 5,3%
Education 5,4%
Manufacturing industries 5,7%
Fishing 6,7%
Construction 7,1%
Not decleared 7,9%
Agriculture, livestock and hunting 10,3%
Public administration and defense 10,3%
Merchants 11,2%
Transport and communicaion 15,3%
 
 
Source: INEC and sensor 1962, 1990 and 2001, adapted fom PNG 2003. 
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Figure 9: Average education levels in Ecuador as a whole and in the Galápagos. 
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Source: INEC, sensor 1990 and 2000, adapted from PNG 2003 
 
 
Figure 10. The scale of Illiteracy in population from 10 years of age and above  
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Source: INEC, sensor 1990 and 2000, adapted from PNG 2003 
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APPENDIX 5. Open sea fishing technology   
 
Figure 1: Horizontal longlining. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Preston et al, 1998 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Drawings of a FAD installation.  
 
Source: SEA Trust, adapted from WWF Galápagos 2006.       Source: Preston et al, 1998. 
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Figure 3: Oceanic handline (empate oceanico o palangre vertical). 
 
Source: Preston et al 1998. 
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Oceanic handline consists of a vertical mother line attached to a floating buoy, FAD or a 
vessel, and it is grounded by a weight (2.2 kg). Minimum three hooks are attached to the 
vertical mother line with the highest hook being no higher than 30 meters below the 
surface. There is no limit to the number of hooks (the pilot project used maximum of 
three hooks per line). The buoy is supplied with a light for the night time fishing or with a 
flag for the day time fishing. A vessel follows the floating buoys. When the fish bites, the 
moving light or a flag indicates that53.  
 
The low environmental impact of the oceanic handline in terms of by catch is explained 
by the fact that it sets its hooks at the depths where tuna actually moves – 100 m during 
night time and at 300-400 m during day time and thereby minimises the chances of 
catching other species that move closer to the surface, such as turtles, dolphins, and 
sharks. Furthermore, use of “ecological” circular hooks allow for liberation of incidental 
catch by extracting the hook from the animals throat without major injuries for the 
animal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53 Hand line has traditionally been used in Galápagos in bacalao fisheries (Mycteroperca olfax), and the 
product was commercialized as dry-and-salted (seco-salado). Until 1970s it was very abundant and it 
constituted almost 100% of fishing (Instituto Nacional de Pesca 1987). 
 
Stacey and Fuks                                                    Struggling for the Golden Egg: Conservation Politics in the Galápagos 
 
 
 158
APPENDIX 6. Budgets of international projects in the Galápagos.  
 
 
Source: Ospina 2005 
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APPENDIX 7. Interviewees.  
 
A. Fishing community  of Isabela Island: 
1.   Carlos Moncayo 
2. Carlota Cartagena 
3. Edison Intriago 
4. Emma Flor, president of Pescado Azul 
5. Flavio Gomez 
6. Gloria Gil, Pescado Azul 
7. Gustavo Gil Morales 
8. Henry Segovia, owner of the discothèque Millenium in Puerto Villamil  
9. Jomelio 
10. Juan Mendoza 
11. Leonardo Rosero 
12. Maron Mieles 
13. Omar Bajano 
14. Oscar Flor, owner of the discothèque La Barca in Puerto Villamil 
15. Oscar Intriago 
16. "Papita" 
17. Peter Flor 
18. Ricardo  
19. Roberto Nieto 
20. Rosendo Rivadeneira 
21. Salvador Valladares 
22. Simón Morales, president of the fishers’ cooperative COPAHISA 
23. Teresa Toalombo, Pescado Azul 
24. Victor Romero (has changed to tourism three years ago) 
25. Walter (Chéla) 
 
 
B. Fishing community of Santa Cruz Island: 
1. Aminual Arturo 
2. Donate Rendon, president of the fishers’ cooperative COPROPAG of Santa Cruz 
3. Eugenio Santana 
4. Kléver López, administrator of the fishers’ cooperative COPROPAG of  Santa 
Cruz 
5. Manuel Patiño 
6. Peter, Pelican Bay 
7. Tito Franco, Pelican Bay 
 
C. Fishing community of San Cristobal Island: 
1. Alex Olaya, representative of COPESAN fishers´ cooperative in PMB 
2. Max Freire, representative of COPESPROMAR fishers´ cooperative in PMB 
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D. Tourism operators: 
1. Administrator of ‘Cormoran’ hotel, Isabela  
2. Antonio Gil, tour operator and owner of  San Vicente hotel 
3. Jaime Cedeño, owner of La Choza restaurant in Puerto Villamil, Isabela 
4. Jimmy Iglesias, naturalist guide 
5. Liandro Castillo, diving instructor of  Nauti Diving and former sea cucumber   
collector and merchant, Santa Cruz 
6. Vicente Berdonces, general manager of Nauti Diving  
7. Roberto Haro, tour operator 
8. Victor Vaca Penadera, tour operator 
 
E. Governmental Organizations: 
1. Alberto García Banda, project staff, BID/GNPS 
2. Carlos Carrion, INGALA, Santa Cruz 
3. Cecilia Troya, Secretary of the Department of Tourism, Municipality of Isabela 
4. Eduardo Espinoza, Marine Resources Unit of JICA and GNPS, Santa Cruz 
5. Edwin Naula, Director of the Tourism Department, GNPS 
6. Franklin, Guard of GNPS, Isabela 
7. Freddie Herrera, Ministry of Tourism, Galápagos, Santa Cruz 
8. Harry Reyes Mackliff, Monitoring of Fisheries, Department of Marine 
Resources, GNPS Santa Cruz  
9. Iván López Villalba, Subsecretary of the Ministry of Tourism, Ecuador 
10. Jaime Ortiz, INGALA 
11. Javier Villón, adviser on tourism, GNPS/Charles Darwin Research Station 
12. Jose Rosero, Municipality of Santa Cruz 
13. Leonardo García, former director of the Marine Resourses Unit of the Technical 
Office of Isabela, GNPS 
14. Mario Piu, Director of the Department of Marine Resources, GNPS, Santa Cruz 
15. Monica Rivadeneira, Ministry of Environment, Ecuador 
16. Nicola Connerly, a volunteer for a tourism sector development project of the 
Municipality of Isabela 
17. Nuria Estrella, Tourism Department, Isabela 
18. Oscar Carvajal, Director of the Technical Office of Isabela, GNPS 
19. Oscar Cortez, Juridical Department, GNPS 
20. Pablo Gordillo, Mayor of Isabela  
21. Patricio Proaño, department of tourism, Municipality of Santa Cruz 
22. Segundo Coello,  former Vice-Minister of Environment, Ecuador 
23. Sergio Larrea, Facilitator of PMS 
24. Washington Tapia, Executive Director of the Galápagos National Park Service 
 
 
F. Non-governmental organizations: 
1. Alex Hearn, Charles Darwin Research Station, Santa Cruz  
2. Carlos Zapata, Director of the Fundación FUNDAR 
3. Carlos Villón, Fisheries Officer, World Wildlife Fund, Galápagos Ecoregion, 
Santa Cruz 
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4. Carlos Valle, Co-director of the Galápagos Academic Institute for the Arts & 
Science, San Cristobal 
5. Cesar Viteri, Program Officer, Fundación Natura (proyecto Galápagos) 
6. Diego Quiroga, Co-director of the Galápagos Academic Institute for the Arts & 
Science, San Cristobal 
7. Eliecer Cruz, Director of World Wildlife Fund, Galápagos Ecoregion, Santa 
Cruz 
8. Fernando Ortiz, Director of Conservation International Galápagos. Santa Cruz 
9. Godfrey Merlen, Director of the Fundación WildAid, Santa Cruz 
10. Graham Watkins, Executive Director of the Charles Darwin Research Station, 
Santa Cruz 
11. Guther Reck, director of the Institute of Applied Ecology, Universidad San 
Francisco de Quito 
12. Jason Sharrett, volunteer coordinator for the Conservation Program of the Peace 
Corps, Quito 
13. Jerson Moreno, Charles Darwin Station, Isabela 
14. Manfred Altamirano, Charles Darwin Research Station, Biomar unit 
15. Manuel Bravo, Fundación Natura/Wild Aid 
16. Pablo Valladares, Charles Darwin Foundation, Isabela 
17. Pablo Gomez, Conservation International Ecuador, Quito 
18. Pablo Ospina, Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador 
19. Salvador Cazar, Coordinator of Tourism, Conservation International, Ecuador 
20. Vincent Graves, Facilitator of the Artisanal Fishing Sector of the Galápagos, 
UCOOPEGAL 
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APPENDIX 8.  Photographs: Stacey and Fuks in the field.  
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APPENDIX 9. Interview guides 
 
GIUDE I 
Puerto Villamil, 20-03-06 
Interview guide for fishermen 
 
Theme A: Livelihood strategy and fishing practices 
 
1. For how many years have you been fishing? 
 
2. What methods do you use? 
 
3. How often do you go fishing? Where? 
 
4. Where do you sell the fish and for what price? 
 
5. Do you have other sources of income? 
 
6. What is the most important source of income? can you give us figures? 
 
7. What are the costs of one fishing trip per person?  
 
8. How much do you earn per trip/per day? 
 
9. With whom do you go fishing? 
 
10. How has it been in the past? 
 
11. What fish is sold more? Which is sold more expensive than others? 
 
12.  How is the harvest changing from year to year? 
 
13.  If you have incidental catch, what are the species and how often it occurs? 
 
 
Theme B: Alternatives to fishing 
 
 
14.  Do you want to change to another activity? What equipment do you have for 
realizing this activity?  
 
 
15.  What are the realistic alternatives to existing fishing? 
 
16. What conflicts, potentials and challenges do you see in this shift? 
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17. What do fishermen, tour operators and the Islands gain in this shift? 
 
Theme C: Fishers’ organizations 
 
18. How do you evaluate work of the cooperative and its leaders? 
 
19. What are the benefits of being a member of a cooperative? 
 
Theme D: Relationship between sectors 
 
20. What is the actual relationship between the tourism sector and the fishing 
sector? is there potential for conflict?  
 
 
Theme E: Management of the Marine Reserve 
 
21. How do you consider the state of the fisheries? 
 
22.  What is your opinion about the claims of illegal fishing? what is its scale and 
impacts? 
 
23. What about industrial fishing? is it almost abandoned in the region/Reserve? 
 
24. What will be the situation with permits for pesca vivencial/experiential fishing? 
 
25. What is your perception of the decision making process in JMP and AIM?  
what is the weight of each actor in this platform? 
 
26. What are the weaknesses and strengths of JMP? 
 
 
GUIDE II 
Quito, 08-02-06 / 10-02-06 
Interview quide 
 
Interviewee: Gunther Reck(G),  director of the Institute of Applied Ecology, University 
of San Francisco de Quito.  
Interviewee: Pablo Ospina, Universidad Andida Simon Bolivar 
 
Theme:  governance of the GNP and the Marine Reserve; relationship of the tourism 
sector with other actors; relationship between tourism and fishermen; tourism as an 
alternative livelihood for fishermen. 
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State policies 
 
1. What do you think about the Special law? How does it help to manage the GNP? 
 
2. Do you think community based tourism can  be applied to Galapagos?   
 
3. What is the role of the scientific community (USFQ) in the management of the 
GNP? 
 
Management of the Marine Reserve.  Illegal fishing and illegal tourism 
 
4. What is your opinion about the claims of illegal fishing? How does it take place? 
and by who? How is the copntrol of this activity in the Marine Reserve? 
 
5. What can you say about violations of regulation by the tourism sector?  
 
6. What is your perception of the decision making process in JMP and AIM?  
 
Tourism as an alternative livelihood 
 
7. Is it realistic to convert fishermen to tourism? and what kind of tourism? 
 
8. What is the relationship of tourism sector with the other actors in the 
conservationist and the fishing sectors? 
 
Environmental and social impacts of tourism and fishing 
 
9. How do you evaluate the environmental impact of tourism in the Galapagos? 
 
10. Do you think, the Galapagos can afford more tourists to stay on the islands, if 
some fishermen will change to local tourism?   
 
11. How do you evaluate environmental impact of fishing?  
 
 
GUIDE III 
Quito, 06-02-06 
Interview quide 
 
Interviewee: Monica Rivadeneira (M), Environmental Lawyer, Regional Department of 
Galapagos, Ministry of Environment of Ecuador, Quito 
 
Management of the Marine Reserve 
 
1. What are, on your opinion, the strong and weak points of the Galapagos Special Law? 
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2. What does the government do in order to enforce the Special Law? 
 
3. The Ministry of Environment authorizes and monitors new tourist uses in protected 
areas. Which is your/Min. of Env. position towards new areas for fishermen in the 
Galapagos (if they should start in the tourism sector)? 
 
4. The Reglamento de Turismo de Galapagos states that it is the Ministry that monitors 
and supervises the tourist activity in the islands. How is this situation? What problems 
do you have with this? 
 
5. What is the place of tourism in the environmental management of the Galapagos? 
 
6. What is the strategy for environmental monitoring? 
 
7. How is this strategy implemented? 
 
8. How does the Ministry of Environment coordinate its policies with the Ministry of 
Tourism and the Ministry of Commerce? 
 
9. What is the environmental impact of artisanal fishing?  
 
10. How it can be isolated from the impact of the industrial fishing? 
 
11. What is your opinion about the claims of illegal fishing? How does it take place? and 
by who? 
 
12. How do you estimate the scale of illegal fishing? and thereby its impact of the marine 
ecosystems? 
 
13. What is the role/input of the Ministry in AIM? What is your perception of the 
decision-making process of this platform/participative management system (including 
the JMP).  
 
14. What can be improved in its structure and procedures?  Or should there be another 
kind of institution? 
 
Tourism as an alternative livelihood 
 
15. What do you think about the common interest of development 
agencies/conservsationists in tourism as an alternative livelihood for fishermen? 
16. Is it realistic to convert fishermen to tourism? 
 
17. What institutions and structures are there already to help fishermen to involve in 
tourism? 
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18. What capacity is still needed in order to do that? 
 
19. Do you know of environmental projects to assist fishermen to learn about tourism 
operation? Can you evaluate their success? 
 
Environmental and social impacts of tourism 
 
20. How do you evaluate the environmental impact of tourism in Galapagos? 
 
21. How do you evaluate the capacity of the Ministry of Environment to deal with the 
environmental damage? 
 
22. What is the relationship between the environmental sector/ministry of environment 
and fishermen? 
 
GIUDE IV 
Quito, 06-02-06 
Interviewee: Ivan Lopez (I), Subsecretary, Ministry of Tourism of Ecuador, Quito 
 
Puerto Ayora, 30-03-06 
Interviewee: Eddie Herrera, Gerente de Region Galapagos, Ministry of Tourism of 
Ecuador, Puerta Ayora 
 
Tourism state policies 
 
1. What have been the main difficulties and success in the tourism development and 
implementation of policies? 
 
2. What do you think about the Special law? How does it help to manage the GNP? 
 
3. Do such modalities exist as local tourism, nature tourism, ecotourism, 
community-based tourism? Can they be applied to Galapagos?   
 
4. What is the position of the Ministry of Tourism towards opening new tourist sites 
for local tourism? (by fishermen) 
 
5. Does the Ministry of Tourism cooperate with the Ministry of Environment and the 
ministry of Commerce in developing common policies for natural resource 
management? 
 
6. What is the relationship between the tourism sector and the other sectors in the 
Galapagos? 
 
Management of the Marine Reserve 
 
7. What can you say about violations of regulation by the tourism sector?  
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(According to the records of GNP violation of regulation by tourism operator is 
even higher that by the fishermen). 
 
8. What is the input of the Ministry in AIM?  
 
9. What is your perception of the decision making process?  
 
10. What is the role of tourism operators in JMP? How strong is your position 
compared to other actors, such as fishermen? 
 
11. Is it realistic to convert fishermen to tourism? And what kind of tourism? 
 
 
Environmental and social impacts of tourism 
 
12. How do you evaluate the environmental impact of tourism in Galapagos? 
 
13. Do you think, Galapagos can afford more tourists to stay on the islands, if some 
fishermen will change to local tourism?   
 
 
GUIDE V 
Puerto Ayora, Santa Cruz, Galapagos 28-02-06 
Interview guide 
 
Interviewee: Harry Reyes, GNPS, Department of Marine Resources 
 
Themes:  governance of the GNP and the Marine Reserve; relationship between tourism 
and fishermen; tourism as an alternative livelihood for fishermen (Pesca Vivencial). 
 
1. What is the responsibility of the department of the Marine Resources? 
 
2. What are the challenges in the work? 
 
3. How do you evaluate the state of the marine resources? 
 
4. What is your opinion about the claims of illegal fishing? What is its scale and 
impacts? 
 
5. How do you monitor/control fishing? 
 
6. What can you say about violations of regulation by the tourism sector due to its 
higher number of felonies than in fishing?  
 
7. How do you evaluate environmental impact of tourism in relation with marine 
resources? 
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8. What is the role of CDRS in monitoring? How do you use their data? 
 
9. What do you think about fishermens´ use of the marine resources? 
 
10. What are the realistic alternatives to existing fishing? 
 
 
GUIDE VI 
 
Puerto Ayora, Santa Cruz, Galapagos 30-03-06 
Interview quide 
 
Interviewee: Mario Piu (M), GNP, Department of Marine Resources, 
 
Theme:  governance of the GNP and the Marine Reserve; relationship between tourism 
and fishermen; tourism as an alternative livelihood for fishermen. 
  
 
1. How do you evaluate environmental impact of tourism in relation with marine 
resources? 
 
2. What is the role of CDRS in monitoring? How do you use their data? 
 
3. What is the role of GNP (CDRS) in defining the fishing calendar? 
 
4. If the sea cucumber fishery will not open this year, what consequences do you 
expect? 
 
5. What are the legal constraints for Experiential Fishing (pesca vivencial)?   
(contradicting requirements from GNP and the Navy: on one hand there is security 
requirements, on the other hand  - requirement to keep equipment small.) 
 
6. What will be the situation with legalisation and permits for pesca vivencial? 
 
7. What is the debate about the diving permits? Why do people say that diving is not 
legal, while almost every local tourist activity in the Reserve is not legal either 
(tour de bahia, tour diario, etc. – totally 7 modalities)? 
 
8. How many cupos for local tourism and fishing already exist? 
 
9. What are the advantages and problems associated with  
a) pesca de altura con empate oceanico 
b) FAD’s 
c) Mi Esperanza  
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10. What is the participation of the sector in JMP? GNP is represented and has a 
vote? 
 
 
GUIDE VIII 
 
Puerto Ayora, Santa Cruz, Galapagos 30-03-06 
Interview quide 
 
Interviewee: Washington Tapia, Galapagos National Park, GNPS, Director in charge 
 
Themes:  governance of the GNP and the Marine Reserve; relationship between tourism 
and fishermen; tourism as an alternative livelihood for fishermen (Pesca Vivencial). 
 
 
11. How does GNPS deal with illegal fishing?  What is its scale and impacts? 
 
12. When did you take up your post? What is the reason that in a few years (4-5) so 
many directors have come and left (10)? 
 
13. What is the role of the Park (or CDRS) in defining the fishing calendar?  
 
14. What can you say about violations of regulation by the tourism sector due to its 
higher number of felonies than in fishing? 
 
15. What are the realistic alternatives to existing fishing? 
 
16. Do you think the sea cucumber fishery will be open this year? If not, how will GNP 
handle possible strikes? 
 
17. What are the reasons for a 8 year delay of permits for the new activities ? 
 
18.  What is the debate about the diving permits? 
 
19.  What is the criteria for determining the number of cupos/permits for each activity 
(and for each island)? 
              
20. How many qualified applicants do you expect?  Can GNPS give a permit to every 
qualified applicant? 
 
21. If GNP can not issue permits for every qualified applicant, what do you expect the 
rest of the applicants to do? 
 
22. How strong is the advantage of fishermen in getting a tourist permit?  
 
23. What are the legal constraints for Experiential Fishing, EF?   
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24.  What is the position of the Navy and of the Park for developing EF? 
   
 
GUIDE X 
Puerto Ayora, Santa Cruz, Galapagos,  27-02-06 
Interview quide 
 
Interviewee: Godfree Merlin, WildAid Galapagos and a relative similar interview guide 
to other NGOS and organisations working in the Galapagos. 
 
1. What are the projects of Wild Aid in Galapagos? 
 
2. For how many years WA has been working in Galapagos? 
 
3. What has been your work in conservation ? 
 
4. What do you think about the conservation strategies and their implementation 
here in Galapagos?  
   
5. What results has WA achieved? 
 
Management of the Marine Reserve 
 
1. How do you evaluate the state of the marine resources in Gapapagos? 
 
2. What is your opinion about the claims of illegal fishing?  
 
3. How is fishing monitored in GMR? 
 
4. How are tourism activities monitored? 
 
5. How do you evaluate environmental impact of fishing?  
 
6. What can you say about validity of the data produced by CDRS to JMP and GNP 
and other actors? 
 
Alternatives to artesanal fishing 
 
7. Is it realistic to convert fishermen to tourism? and what kind of tourism? 
 
6. What is necessary to realize the change ? 
 
7. What is the potential of PV? 
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Environmental and social impacts of tourism and fishing? 
 
8. How do you evaluate the environmental impact of tourism in Galapagos? 
 
9. Do you think, Galapagos can afford more tourists to stay on the islands, if some 
fishermen will change to local tourism?   
 
10. What type of conflicts can be caused by the fishermen’s involvement in tourism? 
 
State policies 
 
11. What do you think about the Special law? How does it help to manage the GNP? 
 
12. What is the role of the scientific community and conservationist NGOs in the 
management of the GNP? 
 
 
GUIDE XI 
Puerto Ayora, Santa Cruz, Galapagos,  02-03-06 
Interview quide 
 
Interviewee: Pablo Gordillo, Mayor of Isabela 
 
Theme:  governance of the GNP and the Marine Reserve; relationship of the between 
sectors; relationship between tourism and fishermen; tourism as an alternative livelihood 
for fishermen, green tax. 
 
1. How do GNPS and Local government coexist and cooperate? 
 
2. What do you think about the conservation strategies and their implementation 
here in Galapagos?    
 
Environmental and social impacts of tourism and fishing 
 
3. How do you evaluate the environmental impact of tourism in Galapagos? 
 
4. Do you think Galapagos can afford more tourists to stay on the islands?    
 
5. What type of conflicts can be caused by growth of tourism as it is now?  
 
6. Does Municipality carry a responsibility for improving the level of tourism 
service and control over the park resources? 
 
7. How do you evaluate the state of the marine resources in the Galapagos? 
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8. How does the Municipal government see fishermen`s role in management of the 
GMR? 
 
9. What is the Municipal policy regarding artisanal fishermen?  
 
Alternatives to artisanal fishing 
 
10. What are the most realistic and favourable alternatives to exhaustive fishing in the 
coastal waters? 
 
11. Is it realistic to convert fishermen to tourism? and what kind of tourism? 
 
12. What is the potential of Pesca Vivencial? 
 
State policies 
 
13. What do you think about the Special law? How does it help to manage the GNP? 
 
14. What is the position of the Municipality towards subsidizing fishermen for not 
fishing as they do in some other parts of the world? 
 
15. Development of new activities requires investment and allocation of funds. Can 
Green tax be a sources of such funds ? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
